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Detection of Trafﬁc Initiated by Mobile Malware Targeting Android Devices
in 3GPP Networks
Abstract
Android devices have become the most popular of mobile devices; omnipresent in both business
and private use. They are virtually always on and offer functionalities exceeding those of desktop
computers. These properties, as well as sensitive information stored on Android devices, render
them an attractive target for mobile malware authors. As the volume of mobile malware increases,
analysis is becoming challenging and, sometimes, infeasible. Additionally, current network-based
intrusion detection systems are very efﬁcient at detecting malicious IP-based trafﬁc, but often lack
functionalities for detecting circuit-switched trafﬁc often (mis)used by mobile malware.
Recognizing the increasing difﬁculty of analyzing mobile malware, we sought to understand
trends and relationships between mobile malware samples. We conducted various analyses of
large volumes of Android malware samples. Among other outcomes, we provide a chronological
quantitative analysis of Android malware samples depicting the usage of obfuscation techniques
and map relationships among samples known to initiate short messages. The latter analysis
helped us to understand the typical trafﬁc pattern in short messages and even the number of
authors responsible for mobile malware initiating short messages.
This thesis introduces three innovations in the detection of mobile malware. A new architec-
ture, called 3GPPMobile malware Protection (3GPPMOP), is designed to reside in the core network
of any currently operated 3GPP network such as 2G, 3G and 4G network and to detect mobile
malware targeting any mobile device in near real-time. The second innovation, the highly space
efﬁcient blacklist (HSEB), optimizes the space needed to store entries in the blacklist, rather than
optimizing processing time, which is of critical value for managing the volume of ﬁltered trafﬁc
processed in mobile networks. Finally, we employ supervised machine learning to successfully
detect yet unknown short messages initiated by Android malware.
Keywords:
Android malware, mobile malware, short messages, dynamic analysis, static analysis, social
analysis, blacklisting, 3GPP networks, supervised machine learning, classiﬁcation.

Erkennung von durch mobile Schadsoftware erzeugtem Datenverkehr von
Android Geräten in 3GPP Netzwerken
Abstrakt
Android-Geräte gehören zu den beliebtesten mobilen Geräten sowohl im geschäftlichen als auch
im privaten Leben. Die meisten davon sind durchgehend eingeschaltet und bieten Funktiona-
litäten über die eines klassischen Rechners hinaus. Diese Eigenschaften, sowie die vielen auf dem
Handy gespeicherten sensiblen Informationen, machen das Handy zu einem attraktiven Ziel für
Autoren von mobiler Schadsoftware. Darüber hinaus sind die derzeitigen netzwerkbasierten
Angriffserkennungssysteme zwar sehr effektiv bei der Erkennung vom schädlichem IP-basierten
Datenverkehr, können aber noch nicht Schadsoftware über Mobilfunk-speziﬁsche Daten erkennen,
obwohl diese häuﬁg von mobiler Schadsoftware missbraucht werden.
Trotz der zunehmenden Schwierigkeit der Analyse von mobiler Schadsoftware war es unser
Ziel, die Beziehungen zwischen mobilen Schadsoftware-Samples und Trends in diesem Bereich
besser zu verstehen. Für diesen Zweck haben wir verschiedene Analysen von großen Mengen
von Android Schadsoftware-Samples durchgeführt. Neben anderen Ergebnissen zeigen wir eine
chronologische quantitative Analyse von Android Schadsoftware-Samples, die verschiedene
Verschleierungsmethoden anwenden, und wir untersuchen Beziehungen zwischen Samples, die
typischerweise SMS-Nachrichten versenden. Diese Untersuchung hilft uns zu verstehen, wie die
klassischen, durch mobile Schadsoftware erzeugten SMS-Nachrichten aussehen, und sogar die
Anzahl von Autoren der obengenannten mobilen Schadsoftware abzuschätzen.
Diese Arbeit stellt drei Innovationen im Bereich der Erkennung von mobiler Schadsoftware
vor. Eine neue Architektur namens 3GPP Mobile Malware Protection (3GPPMOP) beﬁndet
sich im Kernnetz eines derzeit betriebenen 3GPP-Netzwerks, wie z. B. 2G, 3G oder 4G, und
erkennt mobile Schadsoftware für beliebige mobile Geräte in Echtzeit. Die zweite Innovation, eine
sehr platzsparende Blacklist (HSEB), optimiert anstatt der Bearbeitungszeit den Speicherplatz
der für die Speicherung von Einträgen in der Blacklist benötigt wird. Die HSEB zeigt sich
für die Verwaltung des in mobilen Netzwerken verarbeiteten Volumens an Datenverkehr von
entscheidender Bedeutung. Schließlich zeigen wir, wie die durch mobile Schadsoftware erzeugten
noch unbekannten SMS-Nachrichten mit überwachtem maschinellen Lernen erfolgreich entdeckt
werden können.
Schlüsselwörter:
Android Schadsoftware, mobile Schadsoftware, SMS Nachrichten, dynamische Analyse, statische
Analyse, soziale Netzwerkanalyse, blacklisting, 3GPP Netzwerke, überwachtes maschinelles
Lernen, Klassiﬁzierung.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The early days of mobile devices were prolific in terms of companies developing operating
systems for mobile devices. Since then the situation has dramatically changed. As of
March 2016, Google’s Android is the most prevalent mobile operating system with a
market share of more than 84% of all new smartphones sold in the first quarter of 2016
followed by iOS with a market share of 14, 8% [76]. These numbers correspond to roughly
293 million Android smartphones and 51 million iOS smartphones sold in the first quarter
of 2016 worldwide [76]. The strong market position of Google’s Android stimulates app
developers to develop apps for mobile devices running Android in the first place. Indeed,
Google’s official Android app store, Google Play, is the biggest app store in the world
with over two million apps available for download [164] and more than one thousand
new submissions every day [20].
Android Malware
The popularity of mobile devices also draws the attention of mobile malware writers.
In 2014, it was estimated that 97% percent of all mobile malware was developed for the
Android platform [39]. Speaking in absolute numbers, while in 2012 security companies
registered about 150.000 mobile malware samples intended for Android devices, by the
end of 2013 the number of samples more than quadrupled [166]. At the end of 2014,
security companies identified nearly one million unique mobile malware samples. As
of March 2016, the McAffe security company reports more than twelve million mobile
malware samples [106].
The reasons for developing Android malware are manifold. First, mobile devices are
omnipresent in both private and business use. They are used to store and communicate
sensitive information including account details, passwords, contacts, or emails. According
to a study of the Federal Reserve Board performed in March 2016 [129], more than half
1
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of all surveyed smartphone owners had used mobile banking in the last twelve months
prior to the survey.
Secondly, mobile devices possess hardware components tantamount to desktop com-
puters. Moreover, many mobile devices are nowadays equipped with a huge range of
additional sensors boosting the capabilities of mobile devices and improving the user
experience. The other side of the coin is that sensors of mobile devices can be misused
by mobile malware, even if the user is not actively interacting with the mobile device.
For instance, the accelerometer can be used to identify passwords from keystrokes typed
on a nearby keyboard [116] or the gyroscope can identify the voice of a speaker from
gyroscope signals [120].
Thirdly, mobile devices are virtually always on. Compared to desktop computers
where the operator of malware has to wait for the victim to come online in order to
perform malicious activities, mobile devices are connected to a mobile network 24 hours a
day and can be contacted over various channels. For instance, the short message service is
attractive for mobile malware as the short message service is a store and forward service.
It means that in case the mobile device is not in the range of a mobile network, the short
message will be stored and delivered right after the mobile device connects back to the
mobile network.
Fourthly, installing software on mobile devices is straightforward, but users have only
a limited possibility to verify the true functionality of the installed app. Although the user
sees the name of the app developer, the name of the app with required permissions, and
the description of the app, there is no way to verify whether the description of the app
really corresponds to the functionality of the app. This limited possibility is often misused
by rather trivial mobile malware sending short messages to premium numbers each time
the app is started. Here, it is noteworthy to say that besides the official Google Play, users
owning Android devices can install apps from more than eighty publicly available 3rd
party markets. These typically do not offer the multi-layer protection offered by Google
Play. The lack of protection against mobile malware makes it even easier for mobile
malware authors to sneak malicious apps into the markets.
Last but not least, compared to applications on desktop computers Android apps can
be more easily decompiled. Mobile malware authors often combine this property with
the limited possibility to verify the true functionality of the installed app. A decompiled
popular app is complemented by some malicious activity and resubmitted to an app
market. The name of the app and its description is identical to the name and description
of the popular app. In fact, this seems to be the most common method for spreading
Android malware [188].
2
Detection of Android Malware in Mobile Networks
Antivirus solutions detect mobile malware predominantly on mobile devices. However,
once the mobile malware roots the device and gains full control of the infected device, it
can simply turn off the antivirus solution. We therefore believe that this approach should
be complemented if not replaced by approaches detecting the presence of mobile malware
directly in the (mobile) network.
Detecting mobile malware in mobile networks is not a new concept [25], [27] but
little attention has been paid to this idea. This is somehow surprising as detection of
mobile malware initiated traffic by the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) is particularly
interesting for both subscribers (users) and MNOs and brings several advantages. The
main advantage for users is that a detection sensor deployed in the mobile core network
would protect them all the time. As a consequence, users will not have to rely on third-
party antivirus solutions, nor depend on following critical updates. They would be
protected from the moment their mobile devices connect to the mobile network and
for the whole time they are connected. All they would have to do is to trust the MNO.
Some of this trust in the MNO is already there. In fact, a survey of 5.187 employees from
different countries revealed that users trust their MNO more than their employer [32] and
they expect from the MNO to address their end-users security concerns. Some users even
falsely believe that the MNO can restore their data in case of emergency [72]. From the
MNO perspective, such an approach would not only boost trust and reliance in mobile
services, but also save both MNO and user resources. For instance, the MNO would not
need to process and store all short messages in the network when the recipient is offline.
It would also reduce the power consumption required for transmission of millions of
short messages initiated by mobile malware between base stations and mobile devices.
Mitigation of traffic initiated by mobile malware would reduce the traffic received and
processed on mobile devices which in turn will prolong the battery life of users’ devices.
Existing network-based architectures detecting malware are usually bound to a spe-
cific mobile network [25] or deploy approaches limited to IP-based traffic [125], [28]. Many
of these detection approaches can be quite easily adapted for detecting IP-based traffic
initiated by mobile malware. However, besides the IP-based traffic, mobile malware also
misuses the SMS service (running on top of a different protocol stack) for communication.
The main scope of this thesis is to detect infected devices across multiple mobile
networks solely from the traffic initiated by mobile malware. In order to support many
mobile networks, we design a generic architecture deployable in many currently operated
mobile networks including GSM, UMTS, and LTE networks. The detection in the network
consists of several approaches developed exclusively for this purpose, e.g. of a blacklisting
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solution optimized for a huge amount of entries stored in blacklists or of classifiers
detecting yet unknown traffic initiated by mobile malware. Since machine learning
approaches that detect yet unknown IP-based traffic initiated by malware already exist
[28], we focus on classifying the SMS-based traffic. We demonstrate that the MNO can
indeed to a great extent differentiate between short messages initiated by users and
mobile malware. Contributions of this thesis are summarized at the end of this chapter.
Android Malware Analysis
For correct detection of mobile malware it is necessary to analyze existing mobile malware
samples. Two approaches, static and dynamic analysis, are widely adopted. In the static
analysis, an Android malware sample is decompiled and analyzed in a static manner,
i.e., without running the sample. Manual static analysis of all mobile malware samples
is infeasible due to the tremendous number of mobile malware samples. A commonly
used approach, therefore, is to first analyze suspicious samples using existing automated
tools and then manually analyze only a fraction of all apps in order to confirm their
maliciousness. Existing tools, e.g. [57], [146], support the static analysis by decompiling
the Android samples and providing elementary information on the suspicious samples
such as the name of the app, permissions used, or estimating the level of similarity of the
bytecode to some other apps. Based on the similarity score, the mobile malware analyst
can decide which sample from a group of similarly looking samples will be analyzed first.
The decision influences the time required for the manual analysis. The unwritten rule is
that the less obfuscation is used, the less time is needed for the analysis. If more obfus-
cation types are used, then the correct order of resolving obfuscation may significantly
reduce the time needed for the static analysis. In the worst case, an inappropriately chosen
sample can be analyzed only to some extent making the whole analysis inapplicable.
In dynamic analysis, the suspicious sample is run in a sandboxed environment. During
the run, all occurring events are closely monitored and evaluated. The main advantage
of dynamic analysis over static analysis is that, in general, dynamic analysis detects
malicious behavior faster than static analysis. Already published dynamic analyses detect
API calls responsible for the malicious activity [67], [141], native calls [111] or initiated
traffic [160], [174]. The majority of dynamic analyses of Android samples including
those of [141], [111], [160], and [174] is performed in the Android Emulator provided
by Google [59]. It has been shown in [173] that the official Android Emulator is not the
best choice for dynamic analysis because the emulated Android API returns different
values than those on actual devices. This limitation is known to Android malware
developers who either check for common parameters of the default emulator before
activating the malicious part or wait to trigger the malicious activity until some user
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or network interaction is recognized [66]. Our dynamic analysis targets this limitation.
Although our dynamic analysis is in many aspects similar to [160] and [174] and is based
on the official Android Emulator provided by Google, it is highly customized so that it
returns values as are set on an HTC One X+ smartphone. Compared to [160] and [174],
the dynamic analysis is reduced to obtain only traffic initiated by mobile malware.
Results from the analysis of Android malware samples are usually processed, aggre-
gated and stored in list-based representations such as long lists or databases. Due to
the tremendous number of samples out there, representing these results is challenging.
Therefore, we identified a need to develop a new format that would enable malware
analysts to better see patterns and relationships in the aggregated data. We show how
aggregated data can be visualized so that relationships between samples initiating similar
short messages, as well as samples initiating short messages to identical destination phone
numbers, become more apparent. The visualization provides not only the big picture of
the analysis in a single figure, but also shows transitive relationships between samples
that are hardly recognized in list-based representations.
1.1 Outline and Contributions
In the following, we outline the chapters of this thesis and list the contributions of the
six peer-reviewed publications, i.e. [100], [101], [102], [103], [104], and [105], the chapters
are based on. Contributions of this thesis are presented in three core subsequent chapters
following after Chapter 2 summarizing the necessary technical background.
Android Malware Analysis
In Chapter 3, we describe our analysis of Android malware as a prerequisite for successful
detection of traffic initiated by Android malware. This chapter starts with related work
in the area of Android malware analysis in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we present our
methodology, including data collection – gathering Android malware identified between
October 2009 and July 2014 - and the static and dynamic analysis of that data. Section 3.3
presents our static analysis, of 29.574 Android malware samples, where we search for the
presence of identifier renaming, reflection and encryption. Of particular significance to
the literature is our chronological, quantitative analysis, described in Subsection 3.3.4.
The analysis characterizes Android malware’s use of identifier renaming, reflection and
encryption. It also elucidates general facts about the evolution of Android malware, for
instance, that identifier renaming is still popular as an obfuscation method, reflection hit
its peak in 2012, and only about 10% of analyzed Android malware employ third party
libraries for encryption purposes. These results were published in a paper titled Fast
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Identification of Obfuscation and Mobile Advertising in Mobile Malware [105] at the 14th IEEE
International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications.
In Section Section 3.4 we describe the customizations we made in an Android emulator
in order to conduct a dynamic analysis of 4.468 Android malware samples known to send
Mobile-Originating (MO) Short Messages Initiated by Mobile Malware (SIMM) messages.
We first describe the customization of the emulator and all steps of the dynamic analysis
in the paper Applying Highly Space Efficient Blacklisting on Mobile Malware [103] of the
Logic Journal of the IGPL. Insights to the collected traffic are given in Subsection 3.4.2. In
Section 3.5, we illustrate relationships between samples, SIMM messages, and phone
numbers using social graphs. The resulting visualization enables us to estimate the
number of malware authors developing Android malware initiating SIMM messages. This
research contribution was presented at the 2nd Workshop on Security in Highly Connected
IT Systems held in conjunction with the 20th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security in a talk with the title Social Network Analysis of Mobile Malware Initiating SMS
Messages [100].
The 3GPPMOP Sensor
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a new component detecting traffic initiated by mobile malware
directly in the mobile network. The new component is called the 3GPP Mobile Malware
Protection (3GPPMOP) sensor. After we review related work in Section 4.1, Section 4.2
describes the 3GPPMOP sensor, design goals, and other components the 3GPPMOP
sensor is communicating with. The first version of the 3GPPMOP sensor was developed
within the ASMONIA project and is documented in the non-peer reviewed deliverable
Recommender System for Security Risk Reduction - Situational Awareness for Critical Information
Infrastructures [87]. The 3GPPMOP architecture from [87] was peer-reviewed and pub-
lished as the paper 4GMOP: Mopping the Malware Initiated Traffic in Mobile Networks [102] at
the 16th Information Security Conference. Contributions from [102] that reoccur in this thesis
are the 4GMOP’s architecture, the description of the components, and its deployment
in 4G networks. In addition, in Section 4.3 we discuss possible bindings between the
3GPPMOP sensor and existing components in 3GPP networks, and show the best location
for deployment in three currently used 3GPP networks.
The 3GPPMOP architecture consists of two lines of detection. Section 4.4 introduces
the first line of detection as the inherent part of the 3GPPMOP sensor. It consists of the
Highly Space Efficient Blacklist (HSEB) and pattern matching. The generation of the
HSEB as well as adding new and deleting obsolete entries in the HSEB is described in
Subsection 4.4.1. Evaluation on numerous datasets prove that the HSEB can save up to
74,43% memory space. Speaking in terms of traffic initiated by Android malware, the
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HSEB can save up to 14,46% if applied on IP traffic but only marginally outperforms a
simple blacklisting technique when applied to destination phone numbers. The reason
for the poor compression rate in the latter scenario is the very sparse distribution of
phone numbers compared to other scenarios. The HSEB as a research contribution was
first introduced in the paper Highly Space Efficient Blacklisting [101] at the 7th International
Conference on Computational Intelligence in Security for Information Systems. The application
of HSEB on traffic initiated by Android malware collected in our dynamic analysis was
evaluated in the paper Applying Highly Space Efficient Blacklisting on Mobile Malware [103].
In Subsection Subsection 4.4.2 we discuss groups of patterns identifying Android
malware initiated traffic that are suitable for analysis through pattern matching. Since
many strings are dynamically changing with each user and device, Section 4.5 proposes a
Detection Approach in Mobile Networks (DAIMON) app. The DAIMON app informs
the user about each occurred event and let the user whitelist each event by solving an
Short Message Service (SMS)-based Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA). The feasibility of the 3GPPMOP sensor
to detect traffic initiated by Android malware samples directly in 3GPP networks is
empirically verified in Section 4.3. For this we reroute radio traffic between the modem
and higher layers of an Android device. A demonstration of the deployed 3GPPMOP
sensor on emulated and rerouted traffic with the possibility to whitelist short messages
via the SMS-based CAPTCHA was shown at the non-peer reviewed ASMONIA Result
Presentation Workshop under the name 4G Network Sensor for Mobile Malware [99].
Detection of MO SIMM Messages by Supervised Machine Learning
Candidates for the second line of detection are evaluated in Chapter 5. In general, the
second line of detection expects more resource intensive approaches than the first line
of detection and is able to detect traffic initiated by mobile malware that was never seen
before. In Chapter 5, we compare five classifiers – SVM, KNN, DTs, RFs, and MNB on the
dataset of short messages collected during the dynamic analysis described in Chapter 3.
Since the classification of short messages initiated by mobile malware differs from the
classification task in general, we first review related work in Section 5.1 and then describe
feature extraction in Section 5.2 and feature selection in Section 5.3. Trained classifiers
are evaluated not only using standard validation methods; rather we formulate two
new validation methods better fitting to the new classification task in Section 5.4. All
classifiers perform well with the best mean accuracy of over 99, 36% achieved by RFs.
Section 5.5 evaluates the performance of the training and classification phase. Issues
experienced during training and evaluating classifiers are discussed in Section 5.6. Here,
we differentiate between general limitations of using supervised machine learning and
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new limitations emerging from using supervised machine learning for classification of
SIMM messages. Except for the discussion of limitations, the majority of Chapter 5 is
taken from the paper Classification of Short Messages Initiated by Mobile Malware [104]
presented at the 1st International Workshop on Malware Analysis held in conjunction with
the 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. The contributions
of the paper are not only the comparison of classifiers but also the whole process of
finding suitable feature vectors for classification, performance evaluation and the two
new validation methods more suitable for comparing classifiers for classification of SIMM
messages.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by summarizing the main results of the prior
chapters and by providing an outlook to future directions in this area of research.
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Background
This chapter provides the background for this thesis. We start with Android in Section 2.1.
We describe its layered software stack and the structure of an Android app. The layering
approach prevents Android apps from directly accessing resources of lower layers.
The three currently deployed mobile networks GSM, UMTS, and LTE are introduced
in Section 2.2. We describe their architectures and components. The location and role of
each component is of great importance in the context of Section 4.3 where we identify the
locations for the placement of the detection sensor we propose in Section 4.2. Opposed to
existing detection approaches, this sensor can filter traffic characteristic to mobile services.
In Section 2.3 we describe the structure of short messages and explain in detail how short
message service works in mobile networks and on Android devices.
In Section 2.4, we study mobile malware. We focus on infection strategies and intents
of mobile malware. The infection strategy and intent determine to a great extent the type
of traffic generated by mobile malware. Patterns in SMS and Internet traffic pointing to
mobile malware will be revealed in Section 3.4 and discussed in Subsection 4.4.2. In the
same Section 2.4, we recall obfuscation types commonly occurring in mobile malware in
order to speed up static analysis in Section 3.3. In the end of this section, we present two
different life cycles of mobile malware that help in comprehending stages of the dynamic
analysis presented in Section 3.4.
In Section 2.5, we recall Boolean minimization and elucidate how to solve the two-
level minimization problem. The Quine-McCluskey algorithm introduced in Section 2.5
serves as a basis for the highly space efficient blacklist presented in Subsection 4.4.1.
Definitions used in machine learning and five commonly used classifiers are provided
in Section 2.6. In Chapter 5 we show that it is possible to detect yet unknown short
messages initiated by mobile malware based on already detected ones with the help of
any of the five classifiers introduced here.
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One service and various tools used in this thesis are reviewed in the last Section 2.7.
Specifically, we describe VirusTotal, APKtool, Androguard, Android SDK, Gephi, and
Scikit-learn. The VirusTotal service is used for downloading mobile malware samples. The
APKtool extracts the downloaded samples and translates bytecode into a more human
readable form. Similarities between samples are revealed by Androguard’s module
Elsim. Our dynamic analysis runs an Android emulator that is part of the Android
SDK. Gathered traffic is visualized with the help of Gephi and classified by algorithms
implemented in Scikit-learn.
2.1 Android
Android is the most wide-spread mobile operating system installed on more than 80%
of all smartphones [161]. Besides the operating system, the name Android also includes
the software stack and key mobile applications (apps). Android is developed by Google
and maintained by the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) [139]. Most of the Android
source is released under the Apache Software License, version 2.0 [64]. The license allows
for custom creations of Android variants. In particular the openness makes Android
highly customizable and very attractive for chip manufacturers and vendors developing
proprietary software that interacts with Android.
2.1.1 Software Stack
The Android software stack consists of components that fall into five-layers, including
Android apps, the Android framework, the virtual machine, user-space native code and
the Linux kernel [64], see Figure 2.1. Each layer is tightly integrated and provides an
abstraction layer to the layer above.
The heart of the Android software stack is the monolithic Linux kernel residing in
the lowest layer. The kernel is responsible for process, memory, and power management.
Compared to a Linux kernel running on a desktop computer, the Android kernel has
more restrictive power management and supports a multitude of sensors.
The next layer contains the Android’s user-space native code components including
libraries, system and networking services. Most of the native libraries, such as OpenGL
and Webkit, are written in Bionic, a lightweighted C/C++ library developed by Google for
Android. These libraries provide common APIs for the operating system and upper layers.
The Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) defines a standard interface for hardware vendors
to implement. It allows Android to be agnostic about lower-level driver implementations
[138].
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Figure 2.1: Android software stack.
The next layer hosts the Dalvik virtual machine and its successor the Android Runtime
(ART). Both of these virtual machines are improved and optimized variants of the Java
virtual machine and are responsible for the execution of Android apps. The ART was
first introduced in Android version 4.4. From Android version 5.0 on the Dalvik virtual
machine is completely replaced by the ART [58].
Android app developers access Android services over managers located in the app-
lication framework layer. Various mangers allow apps to access services and ensures
compatibility with other libraries presented in Android. The existence of managers make
it possible to enforce the fine-grained permission model.
Installed apps reside in the application layer at the top of the software stack and are
executed in an environment built upon the Linux’s user-based permissions model. Each
app instance is executed with an unique user ID. The user ID isolates the app within
Android.
2.1.2 App Structure
Android apps are distributed as Android Application Packages (APKs). An APK is a
compressed bundle of files typically containing a source code, a manifest file, resources,
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assets, signatures, and a certificate.
The source code of Android apps is mainly written in Java using Android’s APIs
provided by the application framework layer. In the APK, human readable Java source
code is already compiled to custom machine bytecode known as the Dalvik Executable
(DEX) bytecode. The DEX bytecode is hardly human readable. Java source code is first
compiled into Java bytecode and then recompiled to DEX bytecode. In the Dalvik virtual
machine, the DEX bytecode is optimized for a specific processor and executed at runtime.
The technique of optimizing and executing the DEX bytecode at runtime is called just in
time compilation. While the Dalvik virtual machine performs just in time compilation, the
main advantage of ART is the ahead-of-time compilation optimizing the DEX bytecode
right after the installation of Android apps. In the APK, the DEX bytecode is stored in the
classes.dex file. The classes.dex file is often abbreviated to the .dex file.
The manifest file is a binary XML file defining multiple aspects of the app. It lists
the package name, permissions, activities, intents, services, content providers, and broadcast
receivers notifying the app about certain events. The package name identifies the app in the
system. Requested permissions are permission that the app must have in order to access
resources provided by the application framework layer. The Android permissions model
differentiates between API, file system, and IPC permissions [64]. API permissions are
required for accessing high-level functionality within the Android API/framework. They
are also required for third-party frameworks for tasks such as querying device information
or allowing the device to connect the Internet. File system permissions are required if an
app tries to access resources with a different user ID outside the main app space such as the
SD card or other external storage. IPC permissions relate to the communication between
app components. Since not all permissions are backward compatible, the manifest file
defines the preferred API supporting all required permissions. An activity in the context
of Android is each separate screen that interacts with the user. The starting activity is
called the main activity and it is the very first activity the user sees after launching the app.
Each activity can start another activity. The desired action of an activity is called an intent.
The intent is defined as an object carrying information that the Android system uses to
determine which component to start [61]. There exist explicit, implicit, and broadcast
intents. An explicit intent is used to launch a particular activity or service in the app.
Services are processes running in the background. An implicit intent declares a general
action to perform, which allows a component from another app to handle it. Broadcast
intents are listed in broadcast receivers and broadcast by the system. They invoke actions
for specific system events even when the app is not running. Common system events
include, e.g, boot completed, incoming short message, or network state changed. The
standard way to let the system know about broadcast receivers is to declare them in the
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manifest file. However, app developers can dynamically register each receiver in the
source code. Finally, content providers provide mechanisms to access, maintain, and
share data between apps more easily. Content providers are primarily intended to be
used by other apps called provider clients. Together, providers and provider clients offer
in Android a consistent, standard interface to handle inter-process communication and
secure data access [60].
Resources are maintained by the resource manager. Compared to assets, resources
have a specific role in the app, e.g., the app icon. Each resource has its unique identifier.
At runtime, the appropriate resource is loaded based on the Android version and the
mobile device. Assets are raw unspecified data that contain files usually processed by the
app during its execution.
To guarantee integrity of the APK, all files including the .dex file, manifest, resources,
and assets are signed with a private key. The public, private key pair can be freely
generated by the app developer himself and the public key contained in a certificate is
bundled in the APK. The public key is used to verify the integrity of the APK. In fact,
there are several signatures over different parts of the APK signed with the same private
key. This makes the comparison of files bundled within two APKs easier.
2.2 Mobile Networks
The First Generation (1G) of mobile networks deployed in the early 1980s was analog.
These networks were replaced by the digital Second Generation (2G) of mobile networks
developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in the 1990s.
European countries and the majority of countries worldwide adopted the Global System
for Mobile Communications (GSM) standard by and by. To support even better reliability
and higher data rates, seven leading telecommunications organizations developing mobile
network standards worldwide (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TSDSI, TTA, TTC) founded the
Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The first task of the 3GPP was to develop
new standards for the Third Generation (3G) mobile networks on top of the GSM standard.
Their result was the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) standard
extending the capabilities of GSM networks. The successful specification of UMTS led to
enlarging the scope of the 3GPP to develop new generations of mobile networks and to
maintain the GSM standard. The Fourth Generation (4G) of mobile networks is referred
to as Long-Term Evolution (LTE). Currently, the architecture of the Fifth Generation (5G)
mobile networks is being standardized by the 3GPP. The first commercial deployment of
5G mobile networks is expected in the year 2020 or later [132].
Throughout this thesis, we refer to a 3GPP network as either a GSM, UMTS or LTE
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the GSM network architecture.
network. The standards for 3GPP networks are scattered in numerous 3GPP specifica-
tions series, e.g. [5], [13], [11]. In the following, we briefly describe main components
of the GSM, UMTS, and LTE network architectures as they are standardized in 3GPP
specification series. A more detailed overview of components and interfaces in 3GPP
networks is given in [5]. The version of the 3GPP specifications series used in this thesis
is, whenever possible, Release 13.0.0 [1].
2.2.1 Global System for Mobile Communications
The GSM network is a circuit-switched network. The main components of the Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) architecture are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The
two dashed lines separate the home GSM network in the middle from subscribers (users)
on the left and partner networks on the right.
Each GSM network can be divided into an access and core network. In the GSM
network, the Base Station Subsystem (BSS) is the access network. The BSS consists of
many Base Transceiver Stations (BTSs) and several Base Station Controllers (BSCs). The
BSC routes traffic from BTSs to the Mobile Switching Centre (MSC) located in the core
network.
The MSC is the central switching component of the GSM core network. The MSC
manages mobile services such as registration, authentication, and mobility management,
forwards short messages, and routes user data of visiting subscribers to the Gateway
MSC (GMSC), which communicates with some other Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN). The GMSC is the element participating in mobility management, communication
management, and connections to the other networks [96]. All connections between two
subscribers are always routed over the MSC, even if these subscribers have established a
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connection communicating over the same BTS.
Each MSC has an associated Visitor Location Register (VLR). The VLR holds the
record for each subscriber that is currently served by the MSC. These records are only
a copy of the original records stored in the main database called the Home Location
Register (HLR). This copy stored in the VLR is used to reduce the traffic load between
the MSC and the HLR. The HLR is responsible for holding information such as user
identification, numbering, addressing, and location information. International Mobile
Subscriber Identitys (IMSIs) and secret keys of user’s SIM cards required for network
authentication are stored in the Authentication Center (AuC). The HLR and AuC are
shown in the reference architecture up to and including Release 4 as separate components.
As of Release 13, both components are considered a subset of the Home Subscriber
Server (HSS) [5]. The list of Mobile Station Equipment Identities (IMEIs) identifying
mobile devices is stored in the Equipment Identity Register (EIR).
The SMS Service Center (SMSC) is used to store and forward short messages. We
describe this procedure in more detail in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) network follows in the foot-
steps of the GSM network. It combines properties of the circuit-switched voice network
with the properties of the packet-switched data network. Moreover, it improves upon
the GSM with a significantly enhanced radio network system [148]. An overview of the
UMTS network supporting circuit-switched and packet-switched services is illustrated in
Figure 2.3. This figure is a simplified version of Figure 1 taken from [5] and complemented
by the SMSC as specified in [5]. In Figure 2.3, we further replace the MSC server and the
Circuit-Switched Media Gateway Function (CS-MGW) by the MSC as an MSC server and
the CS-MGW make up the full functionality of the MSC [5].
As the GSM network, so the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
network can be divided into an access and core network. The Radio Network Sytem (RNS)
and BSS together form the access network. The RNS consists of one Radio Network
Controller (RNC) controlling one or more Node Bs (NodeBs).
New components in the core network are a Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN)
and a Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). The SGSN is the main gateway for traffic
exchanged between the RNS and the packet-switched part of the UMTS network. Note
that the VLR is the location register only for circuit-switched services. For packet-switched
services, the location register is an inherent part of the SGSN. The GGSN is another
gateway that allows the UMTS network to transmit data packets to external networks
such as the Internet. The GGSN has a location register too. This location register stores
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Figure 2.3: Overview of the packet switched domain in the UMTS network architecture.
subscriber and routing information for each open packet-based connection to an external
network. The procedures for information transfer between the SGSN, the GGSN, the VLR
and the HLR can be found in [11] and [4].
2.2.3 Long-Term Evolution
Strictly speaking, Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is the evolved access network called
Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN) and the core 4G mobile network is denoted as the Evolved
Packet System (EPS). However, the term LTE has been widely adopted as the synonym
for 4G mobile networks as specified by the 3GPP [5]. An overview of the LTE network
architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The access network consists of many Evolved Node Bs (eNBs). Compared to GSM
and UMTS networks, eNBs communicate directly with the Serv-GW supported by the
Mobility Management Entity (MME).
All relevant planes in the LTE core network architecture interconnect in one central
component called the System Architecture Evolution Gateway (SAE-GW). The SAE-GW
consists of two logical subparts: a Serving Gateway (Serv-GW) and a Packet Data Network
Gateway (PDN-GW). The Serv-GW routes and forwards user data within the network.
The PDN-GW acts as an anchor for mobility between 3GPP and non-3GPP mobile systems.
The PDN-GW is the entry and exit point for the core network as are the MSC in the GSM
network or the GGSN in the UMTS network.
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Figure 2.4: Overview of the LTE network architecture.
Another new component is an MME. The MME handles signaling traffic for mobility
management in the LTE network and so assists the Serv-GW. User traffic is routed solely
through the SAE-GW. Also, the MME acts as the location register in the LTE network. The
MME stores subscription and location information for packet-switched services for each
subscriber registered in the MME. Only packet-based connections to external networks
are not stored in the MME. These are stored in the PDN-GW.
The HSS, the EIR and the SMSC are nearly identical to their UMTS relatives. In fact,
in the LTE network the HSS communicates with the Serv-GW via UMTS’s SGSN that acts
as an intermediate router [5]. The procedures for information transfer between the SGSN,
the MME and the HSS are defined in [3] and [4].
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Figure 2.5: Implementation of SMS service in GSM networks.
2.3 Short Message Service
The Short Message Service (SMS) has been introduced in GSM networks and provides
functionalities required for transmission of short messages between mobile devices. It is
a store and forward service. Instead of transmitting messages directly to the destination
mobile device, the short message is first sent to the SMSC and then forwarded to the
recipient. If the recipient is offline, then the short message is stored in the SMSC and
sent to the recipient as soon as the recipient connects back to the network. The sender
is informed when the message delivery is complete or the validity period of the short
message is expired. Protocols supporting SMS communication in UMTS or LTE networks
are identical to protocols introduced in GSM. Several specifications standardize the
service. Technical realization of the SMS is described in [13]. Support of SMS over generic
3GPP networks providing IP connectivity is specified in [12]. Interface protocols between
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Figure 2.6: Structure of a mobile-originating short message.
mobile networks and backward compatibility of SMSC are described in [2].
The use of radio resources for the transfer of short messages between the modem of a
mobile device and the MSC, SGSN, or MME is specified in [10]. The following simplified
SMS procedure is taken from [85] but adapted to Release 13. Whenever a mobile phone
sends a short message to some destination number, (1) the content of a short message
is first sent to the MSC (or SGSN in UMTS). The short message is stored in the SMSC,
see Figure 2.5 for the GSM network. (2) The SMSC queries the HSS of the destination
mobile phone. (3) If the destination mobile phone is available, then the SMSC sends the
short message to the destination MSC. The destination MSC asks the VLR about the exact
location of the destination device and sends the short message to its final destination.
If the destination mobile phone cannot be located, then the short message is queued in
the SMSC and the MSC informs the destination MSC about an incoming short message.
When the recipient’s mobile device connects back to the network, the destination MSC
notifies the SMSC that the mobile device is available again. The short message is sent to
the MSC which forwards the message to the recipient’s mobile device. Note that each
short message has a validity period. After the validity period has expired, the SMSC
informs the sender and irreversibly deletes the short message.
2.3.1 Structure of Mobile-Originating Short Messages
The 3GPP differentiates between Mobile-Originating (MO) and Mobile Terminating (MT)
short messages [13]. For the scope of this thesis, only MO short messages are relevant.
The reasons are described in the introduction of Chapter 5. The structure of a MO short
message in hexadecimal notation is illustrated in Figure 2.6. It consists of a header and
payload part known as a Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The first octet in the header is the
length of the SMSC address. If the length is zero, then the SMSC address is not provided
and the default SMSC address listed in the MSC should be used instead. The SMSC
address itself is encoded in the E.164 format [38]. The PDU type specifies the type of the
MO short message. If the PDU type is zero, then no Validity Period (VP) is provided. The
Message Reference (MR) field identifies the order in which short messages have been sent
to the SMSC. It is eligible that two short messages have the same originating address and
MR. Then the receiving SMSC has to check other parameters contained in the message or
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Telephony manager RILd Modem
PDU
+CMGS: MR
>
AT+CMGS=L AT+CMGS=L
>
PDU
+CMGS: MR
Figure 2.7: Mobile-originating short message submission over AT commands.
in signaling traffic and decide which message was first. The length of the phone number
is 15 digits at most and the phone number itself must be in the E.164 format. Protocol
Identifier (PID) and Data Coding Scheme (DCS) are payload-specific parameters. One of
them is the encoding alphabet as the payload can be encoded using a variety of alphabets.
The default alphabet is the GSM 7-bit alphabet [7]. The last field in the header part is
the length of user data. More precisely, the length gives the number of characters in the
content of the short message. Since the content of a short message is limited to 140 octets,
the content has no more than 160 characters in the default 7-bit alphabet or 70 characters
in a 16-bit alphabet.
2.3.2 AT Commands
Communication between the modem on a mobile device and Android is utilized with the
help of Attention (AT) commands [8]. AT commands were developed in order to simplify
the instruction set used for accessing GSM and UMTS network services for calls and the
SMS.
Modem drivers in modems are proprietary software developed by chip manufacturers.
They communicate with Android over an RIL Daemon (RILd). The RILd is implemented
as two pipes. These pipes forward all radio traffic entering the device to upper layers
of the Android software stack and all initiated radio traffic to the modem. The RILd
can be seen as an interface between the modem and the telephony manager residing in
the application framework layer. The telephony manager is responsible for generating,
processing and translating AT commands. An example communication of submitting
a new MO short message is illustrated in Figure 2.7. The telephony manager starts
by sending an AT+CMGS=L command. The command is forwarded by the RILd to the
modem. The command informs the modem that the device wants to send a new MO
short message. The parameter L indicates the length of the message. The length is given
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in octets and computed as the number of octets in the PDU minus one. The modem
responds with an acknowledgement > telling the telephony manager that it is ready to
accept the incoming PDU. After the telephony manager successfully submits the PDU
representing the short message, the modem returns an acknowledge +CMGS: MR with
the MR as the returning parameter. All information is exchanged over the RILd. We
exploit this protocol in Subsection 4.5.2 where we emulate radio traffic by injecting AT
commands directly into the RILd.
2.4 Mobile Malware
As of June 2016, about two million apps were available to download for various iOS
and Android devices [163] [162]. However not all apps do what they claim or users
think they do. Some apps conceal their true nature and proclaim functionalities the user
wants to have, but in reality they execute a wide range of malicious activities. Malicious
activities range from initiating short messages on behalf of the user to creating complex
networks of infected devices performing arbitrary activities via remote control. We first
detail common intents of malicious apps, their infection strategies, present obfuscation
techniques hindering the analysis of malicious apps, and show sophistication levels of
two typical mobile malware types.
Throughout this thesis, the terms malicious apps and mobile malware are used
interchangeably. All parties involved in the execution process of mobile malware are
referred as a single entity called the Mobile Malware Operator (MoMO).
2.4.1 Common Malicious Intents
The very first proof-of-concept mobile malware, called Cabir, showed the user a harmful
message with the name of the virus writers group who created Cabir [151]. Nowadays,
mobile malware is mostly written for profit [66]. The profit can be generated directly or
indirectly. The direct profit scenario includes mobile malware where the user is directly
affected, e.g., by sending short messages and running extensive processes on infected
devices.
The most trivial mobile malware sends short messages [73]. These short messages are
typically hardcoded in the source code of the app and sent to the recipient as soon as the
main activity is started. If the message is sent to a premium rate number, the content of
the message is rather irrelevant; the fact that the message is sent already generates profit
for the MoMO.
Infected mobile devices are being used as remote CPUs for mining digital curren-
cies too. Although this incentive is very questionable, several antivirus companies
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independently reported that they have in fact spotted such malware samples in the
wild [114] [171].
Whereas in the direct profit scenario, the user is the one who directly suffers losses, the
indirect profit scenario generates profit by gathering sensitive information or misusing ser-
vices provided by third parties, in particular advertising providers. Sensitive information
may include information about the user or the infected mobile device. The information is
communicated either over SMS or over the IP. The content of short messages is particularly
relevant for mobile malware trying to intercept and forward short messages [165]. Targets
are clients of banks using the SMS for two-factor authentication. For general information,
SMS is preferred over IP for shorter strings since the message will be delivered even if the
recipient is temporarily offline. A larger amount of data is sent over the IP. In Chapter 3
we provide a list of values collected through our analysis of mobile malware.
Third parties, such as advertising providers, provide ad libraries for app developers.
The ad library is embedded in the app and the developer of the app decides when,
where, and which type of an advertisement is shown to the user. The ad library itself
can only minimally influence the developer’s decision on where to place the app and
trigger the advertisements. The MoMO is well aware of this limitation. Documented
mobile malware places the advertisement outside the visible screen [112], performs click
fraud [54] or simply exchanges the advertising ID of the original developer by the ID of
the MoMO [187]. Click fraud is used not only to generate revenue from advertising but
also to increase market rating and search engine optimization [73]. The malware opens
and immediately closes only specific links in order to optimize the final rank of that page.
Market rating optimization is similar to search engine optimization in many ways. Here
the malware silently installs and removes apps just to increase the number of downloads.
Mobile malware does not always restrict itself to a single dedicated malicious intent.
Sometimes, it maintains a list of possible actions and let the MoMO decide when and
which task should be performed. Since this type of mobile malware usually gains system
privileges over time, it can spawn and suspend any processes on the infected device,
giving it the possibility to perform any malicious activity.
The MoMO can create a network of infected devices that are remotely controlled
through a Command and Control (C2) infrastructure. This type of mobile malware is
called a mobile botnet. The C2 infrastructure can be centralized with only one or a few
C2 servers or decentralized with infected devices acting as C2 servers for other peers
in the botnet. Centralized C2 architectures are easier to detect in mobile networks than
decentralized ones, due to the higher amount of connections to the single C2 server
[83]. Therefore, the most resilient botnets rely on Peer-to-peer (P2P) decentralized C2
architectures or on a mix of centralized and decentralized C2 architectures. The latter
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approach is called a two-level C2 architecture. The first centralized level ensures that
many (distinct) sets of P2P nodes are informed about new commands. The role of the
second decentralized level is to efface all traces to the first level. A permanent take-down
of decentralized C2 architectures is nearly impossible. It requires a quarantine of all
infected devices virtually at the same time. Otherwise, the infected devices reroute the
communication over not-yet-quarantined peers.
Mobile botnets usually utilize different communication channels between the victim
and the MoMO. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and SMS are especially popu-
lar [122]. Although HTTP is very attractive for desktop botnets, its application in the
mobile environment is rather limited. In the UMTS and LTE networks, the IP address
of the infected device is routable only within the mobile network. Bidirectional botnets
communicating exclusively over HTTP would require a public IP at the MoMO side.
The MoMO could be concealed by delivering commands over content distribution-like
networks acting as fast-flux service networks [88] or by choosing an intermediate peer
maintaining a set of peers coexisting in the same network. The first case is preferred by
MoMOs as devices frequently change their connectivity typically several times during a
day. Not only do they switch between MNOs, but also between mobile and WiFi networks
due to higher Internet speed and lower service charges.
The SMS provides a better environment for P2P mobile botnets from the MoMO
perspective [184]. The most significant difference is the fact that the SMS is a store and
forward service. It is virtually always available. Even if the receiving mobile device
is offline, the SMSC buffers all messages. When the device reconnects to the network
again, all short messages stored in the SMSC are pushed to the device in the order they
had arrived at the SMSC. Neither the sender nor the recipient is bound to a specific
location. The SMS is not considered to be a security threat, because of the rather simple
plain text-based protocol used to transmit the short messages. The phone number of the
MoMO can be anonymous in terms that the MNO of the recipient does not know the true
identity of the sender. Short messages support transport of arbitrary binary data and their
160 septets are enough for encrypted communication [16]. All these properties make the
SMS very popular in mobile botnets. The major limitation is the higher communication
cost compared to Internet-based communication. Several mobile botnets mix the SMS
and HTTP. In this case, the SMS is predominantly used for delivering commands and
HTTP is used for updating and delivering requested data to the MoMO.
In addition to the already mentioned scenarios, a mobile botnet could be used to
perform a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack where multiple infected devices
are used to flood the targeted resource. A study on mobile botnets consisting of 11.750
infected devices can be misused to perform a DDoS attack against a mobile network [170].
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Such an attack on a mobile network could reduce the throughput of legitimate traffic by
93%.
A special kind of mobile malware is ransomware. Compared to the direct and indirect
profit scenarios discussed so far, this type of mobile malware does not try to conceal itself
once installed on a device. On the contrary, it informs the user about the infection and
threatens the user that it will publish, encrypt or delete information stored on the device.
In order to revert or stop the action, the user has to pay money to the MoMO. This type of
mobile malware is beyond the scope of this thesis, since regular backups can successfully
mitigate the impact of this type of mobile malware.
2.4.2 Infection Strategies
Popular infection strategies reported in the wild are repackaging [188], malicious updates
[188] [136], URI download [102], drive-by download [31], or modification of the SDK [131].
Apart from these strategies, proof-of-concept malware show how malware can spread
over Bluetooth [151], WiFi [90], or device-to-PC synchronization [65]. In the following,
we concentrate on infection strategies seen in the wild, since our analysis in Section 3.4
focuses primarily on malware samples captured in the wild.
The name repackaging comes from the idea to repackage an existing app with a mali-
cious payload. The MoMO first identifies, downloads and decompiles some popular app.
The source code of the benign app is first either completely removed or complemented by
functions responsible for the malicious activity and then resubmitted to the app market
and advertised as being the original app. The repackaged app typically claims the same
functionality, package name and icon as the original one. Due to this common practice,
users are even more confused and the malicious functionality is not recognized before the
user downloads, installs and executes the app, if recognized at all.
In malicious updates, the initially benign app downloads and installs malicious
payload later at runtime. The initial app contains an update component that initiates the
downloading and installation process. The APK does not contain any hints to a malicious
payload, apart from the update component pointing to some external Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI). URI downloads use classical phishing techniques or cross-references
within URI in order to trick the user into visiting and downloading mobile malware from
websites that copy the layout and design of official markets or other popular sites. Some
variants of mobile malware use contacts stored in the phone book to look more credible.
An advanced infection technique is the drive-by download. It downloads and in-
stalls an app without any user interaction while the user is surfing the Internet. The
MoMO exploits existing vulnerabilities in mobile browsers to download and install new
applications running in the same user space as the browser. After successful installation,
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the malware typically connects to a C2 server and downloads additional root privilege
escalation exploits completing the installation. With the help of the exploit, the malware
is able to gain root privileges and thus ultimately control the device.
The last infection strategy reported in the wild distributes malicious payload as part
of a modified version of the SDK [131]. Each time an app developer compiles an app in
the modified SDK, the malicious payload is automatically added to the app.
2.4.3 Obfuscation Types
Current analyses of mobile malware indicate that MoMOs tend not to implement their
own obfuscation algorithms, but rather reuse one of the existing standard Java obfuscation
tools [21]. Especially popular standard Java obfuscation tools are proGuard [107], Allatori
[154], Zelix KlassMaster [183], Dash-O-Pro [158], Java Obfuscator [56], and dexGuard
[84]. Three obfuscation types are often reoccurring in mobile malware, namely identifier
renaming [21], reflection, and string encryption [142]. We later evaluate the presence of these
obfuscation types in mobile malware in Subsection 3.3.4.
Identifier renaming renames classes, methods, and field identifiers in bytecode to
humanly meaningless sequences of characters. Parameters and local variables are not
renamed because they are stripped off by compilers during the optimization step. Current
obfuscation tools reuse short identifiers as often as possible to create redundancies in
identifiers of identical lengths of similarly looking characters or generate identifiers in
some non-standard way to hinder the analysis of mobile malware to an even greater
extent.
Reflection allows an app to determine its characteristics at runtime. It helps the app
to be more flexible as it can react to user’s input more easily [74]. In addition, single
components of the app can be reused in other apps. In mobile malware, reflection plays
the role of a transformation attack [142]. Here, it is predominantly used to conceal the
execution of the function responsible for the malicious intent. The function is determined
at runtime, usually based on dynamically changing parameters. If these parameters are
dependent on the communication with a C2 server, then the C2 server can decide when
the malicious function should be triggered.
Encryption achieves confidentiality of information. In benign apps, encryption is
used to protect the confidentiality of internal parameters, assets, and exchanged data.
In mobile malware, if encrypted internal parameters are decrypted at runtime, then
we speak about string encryption. Note that string encryption is undetectable in static
analysis since the internal parameters are not decrypted before they are used. If the
key is present, then dynamic analysis can successfully decrypt the string. The second
case is traffic encryption. The use of traffic encryption in mobile malware does not try
25
Chapter 2 Background
to primarily hinder the reverse-engineering process of the malware sample, rather it is
used to bypass detection approaches deployed outside the infected device. The inability
to decrypt the encrypted traffic outside the running environment is seen as the major
limitation of detection approaches not running within the infected device. One one hand,
the once initiated encrypted traffic cannot be decrypted and inspected in as great detail
by MNOs as it could be on the infected device. On the other hand, the encrypted traffic is
sent together with unencrypted meta and header information. This information is usually
not encrypted and is being used in network detection approaches [83].
String encryption is often combined with reflection. In Android malware, calling
a method of a class in Java using reflection does not require any direct instantiation
of the corresponding class nor a cast to the class. The called class and method are
determined based on parameters at runtime. If these parameters are encrypted and the
decryption key is sent by the MoMO to the infected device during the execution of the
malware sample, then the called class (or method) is non-detectable by static analysis [142].
Nevertheless, the virtual machine processing the optimized bytecode requires the classes
to be unencrypted. Hence, the encryption (decryption) method together with the key
must be present somewhere in the app or be fetched from a C2 server at runtime. If the
key cannot be fetched at all, then, assuming the encryption algorithm is cryptographically
strong, the security researcher has no possibility to reveal the called class or method.
Note that security researchers always analyze the reconstructed source code of a
mobile malware sample and do not possess the original source code. The extracted
source code obtained from bytecode is already optimized. Due to the optimizations in
the compilation process, it is impossible to reconstruct the original (unobfuscated) source
code.
In Android apps, the slightly modified Java source code leads to an APK with a
different signature. Since signatures on resources and assets do not change, a modified
signature of the .dex file gives a false feeling that the APK is only an updated version of
the app whereas it might be a repackaged app in reality. For the MoMO, it is possible to
generate plenty of new samples by subtly modifying the source code of the malicious
app and hoping to infect their victims before the new samples are noticed by security
experts. For some security experts, each new signature counts as a new mobile malware
sample. Other experts count only a sample with a new functionality as a new sample.
This difference in defining a new sample makes it infeasible to estimate the real number
of new mobile malware samples.
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2.4.4 Sophistication Levels of Mobile Malware
Mobile malware can have up to three stages: infection, activation, and execution. In the
infection phase, the malware uses one of the infection strategies to download, install
and start itself on the device. The activation phase is optional and serves for informing
the MoMO about the installation status, downloading and installing updates, updating
parameters, and informing the MoMO that the malware is fully operational and awaiting
commands. Various malicious intents are executed in the execution stage. The lifetime of
trivial mobile malware samples has only two stages (infection and execution) whereas
more sophisticated samples employ all three stages.
Sophisticated mobile malware uses any infection strategy to access the device and
typically does not embed the malicious intent into the main activity. Once installed, it does
not show any signs of maliciousness. Only when some logic or timing requirements are
met, the activation and execution stages are triggered. In particular, the logic requirement
is often used by mobile botnets to start the execution stage. The malicious activities may
not be triggered for a long period of time, and it can take years to detect the mobile
malware sample [44]. Until then, the malware sample performs the malicious activity
numerous times. Since it requires greater efforts to pair the app with the malicious action,
this life cycle is being used with both direct and indirect profit scenarios.
In summary, MoMOs achieve their goal by spreading many subtly modified versions
of the same malware samples for direct profit or by generating more sophisticated mal-
ware that conceal their malicious intents. Whereas in the first case the malicious intent is
started as soon as possible and the profit is generated from the quantity rather than from
the quality, the second case prefers quality over quantity. Here, the aim is to coexist in the
running systems and execute activities over a longer period of time.
2.5 The Quine-McCluskey Algorithm
Traffic initiated by mobile malware can be detected by blacklisting. Our very space
efficient blacklisting technique described in Section 4.4 adapts the Quine-McCluskey
algorithm first proposed by Quine [140] and improved by McCluskey [118]. The Quine-
McCluskey algorithm is primarily known in the electrical engineering field where it
plays an important role in the Boolean circuit minimization process [33]. It simplifies
the logic required to describe a particular Boolean function by solving the two-level
minimization problem. First, a list of products for a given Boolean function is generated
and afterward reduced to the minimum set of products describing the same Boolean
function but with minimal number of terms. The introduction provided in the following
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is already published in [101].
Let f be a Boolean function in the disjunctive form representation defined in terms of
i independent binary variables in alphabetical order a, b, c, . . . , i. Let a be a literal, a¯ its
complement and a product be a set of distinct literals. Then the two-level minimization
problem computes a minimal solution f
′
for a given f with respect to the number of
products in the first place and the number of literals in the second. The order in which
products or literals appear in f (or in f ‘) is irrelevant.
An implicant is a product that implies f whereas a prime implicant pi implies f
′
. Each
implicant can be described by an n-minterm with n representing its degree and by mi
with i representing its decimal value of the implicant. The degree is equivalent to the
number of missing literals in the product. If pi cannot be covered (i.e. created by applying
multiplication and distributive laws) by any other prime implicants from the set of all
prime implicants denoted as prime(f ′), then pi is an essential prime implicant epi. The
set of all epi is denoted by essen(f
′). We denote the set of all prime implicants of the
degree n with primen(f
′). Assume m < n, then primem(f
′) is a set of all prime implicants
of degree m that cannot be covered by any subset of primen(f
′). The same holds for
essen(f ′). For completeness, the set of all yet unsorted implicants of degree m (i.e. we
still did not decide whether they are prime or essential prime), is called a set of pseudo
implicants pseudom(f). Note that all unsorted sum-of-0-minterms listing all literals in
each product is pseudo0(f
′).
The Quine-McCluskey algorithm follows two successive steps in order to compute
the minimal f
′
. In the generation step, it selects all prime(f ′) and in the reduction step it
determines essen(f ′). The bottom-up version used in this thesis starts with pseudo0(f
′).
The number of implicants in the generation step is reduced by generating minterms
with higher degrees. There is a probability that a single generated minterm will cover
many implicants and so reduce the overall number of implicants in prime(f ′). A minterm
of a higher degree exists only if two pseudo implicants differ in a single bit. Then a new
pseudo implicant is created with a degree increased by one and reduced by the literal
representing the flipped bit. In such manner, all pseudo implicants are compared to each
other. Once all pseudo implicants for pseudo1(f
′) are determined, the method continues
in an iterative manner. Pseudo-prime implicants of higher degrees are computed based
on pseudo implicants of a lower degree until no more merging is possible.
The second step continues by determining essen(f ′). To obtain all essen(f ′) from
prime(f ′), a covering matrix of all prime implicants and implicants of f is built. Rows
represent products of f and columns final prime implicants. Prime implicants for which
there is a row with a single X are strictly essential prime implicants as no other prime
implicants covering that same underlying implicant exist.
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a b c d
m0 0 0 0 0
m5 0 1 0 1
m7 0 1 1 1
m9 1 0 0 1
m10 1 0 1 0
m11 1 0 1 1
m14 1 1 1 0
m15 1 1 1 1
(a) pseudo0(f
′)
a b c d
m5,7 0 1 - 0
m10,11 1 0 1 -
m11,15 1 - 1 1
m14,15 1 1 1 -
m9,11 1 0 - 1
m7,15 - 1 1 1
m10,14 1 - 1 0
(b) pseudo1(f
′)
a b c d
m10,11,14,15 1 - 1 -
(c) pseudo2(f
′)
a b c d m0 m5,7 m9,11 m7,15 m10,11,14,15
0 0 0 0 X
0 1 0 1 X
0 1 1 1 X X
1 0 0 1 X
1 0 1 0 X
1 0 1 1 X X
1 1 1 0 X
1 1 1 1 X X
(d) Covering matrix
Table 2.1: The Quine-McCluskey algorithm applied on f(a, b, c, d) = a¯b¯c¯d¯ + a¯bc¯d + a¯bcd +
ab¯c¯d + ab¯cd¯ + ab¯cd + abcd¯ + abcd.
The Boolean function f in Table 2.1 (a) has four literals a− d. Its pseudo0(f ′) equals to
eight pseudo implicants described by mi. All pseudo1(f
′) for f are given in Table 2.1 (b).
Note that the terms in bold from Table 2.1 (a)-(c) represent implicants which cannot be
further merged together. Hence, the set of all bold terms is prime(f ′). The covering matrix
is shown in Table 2.1 (d). Essential prime implicants are essen(f ′) = {a¯b¯c¯d¯, a¯bd, ab¯d, ac}.
Note that, e.g., m7,15 is not essential since it can be covered by m5,7 and m10,11,14,15.
For larger f the covering table can be split into many independent two-level mini-
mization problems and can be further reduced. Rows of the covering matrix are often
permuted in order to yield a matrix with a solution in diagonal blocks such that rows that
cover a common column are in the same block. If more than one solution exists, then each
minimal solution is the union of minimal solutions of the blocks on the diagonal and each
row that intercepts only a single block is strictly an essential implicant [53]. Sometimes
the process stops before all essen(f ′) are determined because there are no more clear
diagonals or single blocks. Then it should be decided which subset of prime(f ′)\essen(f ′)
denoted as a cyclic core together with which essen(f ′) leads to the minimal solution. The
remaining covering problem is called a cyclic covering problem [128].
To solve the cyclic covering problem, the Quine-McCluskey uses a branch-and-bound
algorithm [53]. The algorithm heuristically selects an arbitrary prime implicant from the
cyclic group to be a so-called relative essential prime implicant. The relative essential
prime implicant generates two subproblems, one resulting from choosing the prime
implicant as an essential prime implicant and the other resulting from discarding the
prime implicant from essen(f ′). These two subproblems are consequently simplified
and then recursively solved. The final solution is the minimum of solutions of the two
subproblems. Note that the algorithm has to be repeated for all possible combinations
in order to compute the minimal Boolean function. For cyclic cores with many prime
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implicants, the Quine–McCluskey algorithm becomes quickly impractical.
A technique commonly called dominated columns is more efficient than the branch-and-
bound algorithm but does not necessarily lead to the minimal Boolean function. In fact,
the dominated columns technique solves only one of the two subproblems generated by
the branch-and-bound algorithm. It heuristically selects one prime implicant from the
cyclic core to be a relative essential prime implicant and computes the reduced covering
matrix. All single entries in the rows of the reduced cover matrix are handled as essential
prime implicants. The process is iteratively repeated for smaller cyclic cores. Since the
dominated columns technique heuristically picks some of the prime implicants to be
essential prime implicants, the final solution is only a very good approximation to the
minimal cover with no exact information on how far the solution is from the minimal
solution.
2.6 Machine Learning
Machine learning and pattern recognition can be viewed as two facets of the same
field [30]. Machine learning can be supervised, semi-supervised or unsupervised. If input
data and their corresponding classes are known beforehand, then machine learning is
called supervised. Semi-supervised machine learning operates with some data labeled
beforehand and some unlabeled data. Completely unlabeled data are characteristic of
unsupervised learning. Description of classification and supervised machine learning
algorithms are taken from [30] if not stated otherwise.
2.6.1 Classification
Classification is the process of predicting categories based on input properties. In super-
vised machine learning, the aim of classification is to assign an input vector of properties
to one of a finite number of discrete categories called classes [30]. Input properties used
for classification are called features. A feature can be characterized as an individual
measurable property of a phenomenon being observed [181]. In this thesis the content
of short messages will be the phenomenon being observed. The act of transforming the
measurable property of a phenomenon into an informative, non-redundant and easier
to solve classification problem is called feature extraction and a combination of extracted
features is called a feature vector. Since different feature vectors may lead to different
classification results, a pre-processing step called feature selection evaluates feature vectors
with the goal to expose feature vectors approximating the desired classification result.
The feature selection method used in this thesis is an adapted Sequential Feature Selection
Algorithm (SFSA) [43]. We choose the SFSA due to the iterative nature of the algorithm.
30
2.6 Machine Learning
All features are evaluated at least once in the SFSA. Generally, SFSA starts with an empty
set and adds one feature per step. Then a new subset of features is evaluated and features
leading to the highest classification accuracies are permanently included into the feature
set. The limitation of the SFSA is the nesting property. Once a feature is included, it
cannot be excluded anymore. Note that having more features in a feature vector does not
always lead to better results. On the contrary, artificially increasing the dimensionality of
the feature vector may yield suboptimal results. This phenomenon is generally known
under the term overfitting.
2.6.2 Supervised Machine Learning Algorithms
Most supervised machine learning algorithms (or short classifiers) rely on two phases,
a training and a testing phase. In the training phase, the algorithm trains a model based
on a subset of elements from a training dataset. Usually, the training dataset is divided
into three possibly disjoint sets before training a model. The first set is the training set,
the second set is the validation set, and the last set is the testing set. The training dataset is
the set of all elements where the feature vector with corresponding class-label for each
element is known. The training set is a subset of the training dataset used for training
a model within a classifier. The testing phase involves model validation and model
testing to estimate the accuracy of a classifier. Traditionally, the validation set is used for
model selection within a classifier. However, our intention is to show implications of
logic hidden behind different types of classifiers and not to validate hundreds of existing
models. In this thesis, the models are already carefully chosen based on their properties.
Therefore, we divide the training dataset of known data only into training and testing
sets. Moreover, an evaluation set is a set of elements where we can extract features but do
not necessarily know the corresponding classes. The difference between the testing and
evaluation set is that while the testing set is used to test the trained model and so obtain
the accuracy of the classifier, the evaluation set classifies elements with the help of the
already trained classifier. The role of classification is always to predict the class of the
new element based on the trained model. The class of the new element to be classified is
usually unknown.
A single classifier can support several models. A classifier represents more the idea
of classification whereas a model is the concrete, formal function description of the idea.
The model is assumed to be trained if it predicts the correct class for a previously selected
threshold of testing elements.
Nowadays, there exist numerous supervised machine learning classifiers. However,
only some of them have been proven to provide exceptional results and, at the same time,
are fast enough to process traffic in 3GPP networks in nearly real-time. Exceptional traffic
31
Chapter 2 Background
classifiers include Support Vector Machines [124], K-nearest neighbor [135], Decision
Trees [45], Random Forests [152], and Naive Bayes [185]. In the following, we describe the
main ideas of these classifiers and provide the most pertinent parameters. If we introduce
more than one model per classifier, then the model name will be appended to the name of
the classifier and the classifier-model pair will be considered as a stand-alone classifier.
Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) represent a supervised learning technique suitable for
solving classification problems where the number of available training data for one class
is rather small. Given the training set, the training phase of SVMs derive an optimal
hyperplane separating all classes. Therefore, SVMs are particularly well suited for classi-
fication problems separating data between two classes. The hyperplane is computed so
that the function describing the hyperplane retains the largest possible distance to the
nearest training elements of all classes. These elements are called support vectors. The
model in the SVM classifier is the optimal hyperplane separating all classes.
On one hand, adding new elements to the system requires to rerun the whole training
and generate a completely new model. On the other hand, once the model finds the
optimal function, the classification itself is very fast. We describe two functions for SVMs.
In the Linear SMV (SVM-LIN) case, the model is a linear hyperplane regardless of the
feature vectors in the training set. If there does not exist an optimal linear hyperplane
separating elements of the training set, the so-called kernel trick is applied. The kernel
trick assumes that there may exist a linear separation in some higher dimensional space
than the current one. With the help of the kernel trick, the SVM-LIN maps feature vectors
of elements into another higher feature space through some non-linear mapping function.
Since the new higher feature space has a higher dimension than the original space, the
probability that there exists a linear hyperplane separating all classes is higher. The
disadvantages of using the kernel trick are that this trick does not scale well to large
numbers of training elements. In addition, if the dimensionality is not bound to a fixed
number of dimensions, then the kernel trick creates dimensions up to the number of
extracted features. To compute a model that approximates the perfect solution in a feasible
amount of time, two options can be considered, a cost parameter and non-linear kernel
functions.
The cost C parameter tells the SVM classifier how many misclassifications are accept-
able. Lower C values compute the hyperplane faster but with relatively many elements
misclassified, while a high C aims at classifying nearly all training examples correctly.
The reason for longer computation times is that the higher C, the more elements are
selected as support vectors. Another option is to exchange the linear hyperplane with a
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Figure 2.8: Model visualization for (a) SVMLIN (b) SVMRBF.
non-linear kernel function. Common functions are polynomials, trigonometric or radial
basis functions. The latter one will be evaluated in Chapter 5 and is therefore described
in more detail. Here, the Radial Basis Function (RBF) for SVMs is used to label feature
vectors within a distance from some center feature vector as one class. The norm distance
is usually the squared Euclidean distance but other distances are possible as well. The
shape of the RBF is computed based on C and on a gamma parameter. The role of C in the
SMV with Radial Basis Function (SVM-RBF) is equivalent to C in the SVM-LIN classifier.
The gamma parameter influences the size of the radius. If the gamma parameter is too
large, the radius of the area of influence of the support vectors includes only the support
vector itself and not even regularization with C can prevent over-fitting. On the other
hand, very small values for the gamma parameter train models that are too constrained
and not able to capture the complexity of the feature vector space. In general, tuning C
and gamma parameters correctly is a vital step to considerably improve the classification
results.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the difference between (a) SVM-LIN and (b) SVM-RBF models
graphically. Both SVMs are trained on identical training sets. The linear hyperplane in
Figure 2.8 (a) already separates the majority of feature vectors and provides high accuracy
with some points misclassified due to the linearity property. The non-linear function in
SVM-RBF is able to "bent" itself to evade points that were misclassified in the SVM-LIN
case and thus classifies them correctly.
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K-Nearest Neighbors
As the name suggests, the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classifier determines class repre-
sentation based on classes of the k input feature vectors from the training set that are
the closest ones to the tested element. The distance between points is computed in an
arbitrary metric space. General KNN is called uniform KNN and uses the Euclidean
distances to determine the closest feature vectors. If the k nearest feature vectors do not
belong to the same class, then the resulting class is the mode of the classes. The class in
uniform KNN is weighted equally for each neighbor whereas distance KNN gives higher
weights to neighbors closer to the tested element than neighbors further away.
Classification in KNN is dependent on the distribution of the k nearest neighbors
and not on all elements in the training set. The relatively small number of training
elements taken into consideration for classification makes KNN more prone to False
Positives (FPs). On the other hand, reducing the training set to only k points in space
may reveal boundaries between otherwise not separable classes. Another advantage of
KNN compared to SVM is that KNN does not need any model for classification. The
training phase is reduced to storing training feature vector and class pairs in some metric
space. The property of not generating models before classification is referred to as lazy
learning [186].
Trees
A Decision Tree (DT) is a rooted directed graph utilizing the branching method to rep-
resent decisions based on elements in the training set. Each branch represents a single
decision and each decision is made upon a feature or a set of features. Binary DTs
always have two branches per split. The depth of DTs depends solely on branching. For
non-binary DTs, the number of branches varies with features of elements in the training
set. The maximum depth of binary and non-binary DTs is equivalent to the number
of training elements minus one. The problem of creating an optimal balanced DT is
NP-complete but feasible for smaller numbers of features or training elements. To reduce
the complexity of the NP-complete problem, the maximum depth of DTs is set to some
small constant compared to the absolute maximum depth. Ideally, DTs have only a few
balanced branches. Leafs of the graph correspond to classes.
Figure 2.9 shows a toy example for a binary DT predicting the origin of a MO short
message sent in the EU; whether it was generated by an EU user (the class is User) or by
some mobile malware (the class is Malware). Classification of short messages is done on
three binary decisions. Only if the message is written with Latin characters, is not sent to
Russia and does not include any URI location, then the message is classified as being sent
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Figure 2.9: The binary DT classifying the sender of short messages.
by an EU user. Otherwise, the DT classifies the short message as being sent by mobile
malware.
Distinct DTs have low bias but high variance easily leading to overfitting. However,
putting multiple DTs together and averaging their values has proved to be beneficial.
The idea of Random Forests (RFs) introduced by Breiman [34] utilizes a multitude of low-
depth DTs created from a randomly selected subset of training elements and a subset of
randomly selected features for each tree. Then the mode class of all classifiers is returned
as the prediction. This somehow counterintuitive strategy of not learning on all training
elements and features turns out to generate models that are robust against overfitting.
Due to the randomness in the RF, the bias of the forest increases with respect to the bias
of DTs but its variance decreases at the same time. Variance decreases often more rapidly
than the bias in RFs, leaving RFs to be more accurate on larger training sets.
Naive Bayes
Last but not least, we describe a supervised machine learning classifier dominating in the
field of spam and text classification called Naive Bayes (NB) [185]. We explain the NB
classifier in more detail because we slightly modify the original feature vector extraction
procedure. Classification itself remains in its original form.
The NB classifier is a probabilistic classifier assuming the Naive Bayes conditional
independence assumption, i.e., all features (words) are independent for each class. Al-
though this assumption is rarely true in most real-world tasks, NB performs surprisingly
well even on complex data that does not meet this assumption. In many real-world
scenarios, NB outperforms the above classifiers despite the fact that the conditional
independence assumption is clearly false.
The general idea of NB is the comparison of words in training data with words in
a text t to be classified. NB assumes that there exists a conditional independent subset
of words for each class cj . The posterior probability p(cj |t) (that t is generated by cj) is
computed as
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p(cj |t) = p(cj)p(t|cj)
p(t)
where p(cj) is the prior probability for each class cj , p(t) is the likelihood of t and p(t|cj) is
the probability that words in cj generate t. The class with the highest posterior probability
is returned as the resulting class.
The idea of NB has been improved in several extended variants of NB. For text
classification, Multivariate Bernoulli Naive Bayes (MBNB) and Multinomial Naive Bayes
(MNB) are particularly relevant. In MBNB, the feature vector is a binary vector over
a space of the most informative words wt characterizing distinct classes. The most
informative words are selected during the training phase based on training data. If wt
occurs at least once in t, then the bit representing the informative word in the feature
vector is set. The order in which wt occur in t is insignificant. To classify t, MBNB
computes the product of the probability that cj can be generated by wt in t multiplied by
negative evidence, the probability that informative words missing in t will generate cj .
The MNB classifier improves upon MBNB by capturing word frequency information.
It exchanges Boolean values in the feature vector with integer values representing the
number of times the most informative word occurs in t. Compared to MBNB, in which
informative words occurring in the document were providing the same level of evidence
for cj as informative words not occurring in the document, MNB puts more weight
on words occurring in t more often. This makes the negative evidence property less
significant for classification. It has been shown that the probability that a word appears
in the document the second time is much higher than the probability that it appears
at all [98]. Therefore, the words counting ability of MNB is responsible for improved
classification compared to the MBNB. In addition, Schneider [150] argues that for texts
having no duplicate words, the MNB is still superior to MBNB. The reason is that models
based on multinomial distributions handle negative evidence better than multivariate
Bernoulli models.
Note that in MNB each feature is represented by a word occurring or not occurring
in the element to be classified. At first glance this might seem like an issue, since it
assumes a finite number of words often reoccurring in training elements. While this is
true for benign short messages, it is not for SIMM messages, where many SIMM messages
transmit sensitive information about the user or device varying with each user and device.
In order to be able to use MNB in our settings nevertheless, we consider each character in
the message as a single word in MNB. To reduce the feature space for MNB, we merge
some characters (now representing words) into single features.Note that although NB
assumes in general an independent conditional distribution of features, it performs well
on training sets in which this assumption does not hold [185].
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2.6.3 Confusion Matrix
In classification, the term "best result" is very relative. There exist many parameters
that directly or indirectly influence the final result. Therefore, it is more common to
show a confusion matrix reflecting relations between correctly and falsely classified testing
elements or provide values needed for completing the confusion matrix. These values
include the overall accuracy, the false positive rate and the false negative rate. From
these three values, together with feature and dataset description, it is always possible to
conclude the remaining values in the confusion matrix. Relations between general terms
occurring in the confusion matrix are illustrated in Table 2.2.
Predicted class
Positive Negative
Tr
ut
h True TP FN PRE ACC
False FP TN
TPR FNR
FPR TNR
Table 2.2: Confusion matrix.
We assume that the number of training and testing data is always finite and known
beforehand as well as which training sample belongs to which class. A True Positive (TP)
occurs when the classification of an element returns the class that indeed corresponds to
the evaluated element and the predicted class is the one we are trying to observe. If the
classification result is correct, but the class is not the class we are looking for, then we call
it a True Negative (TN). A false prediction of the class we are trying to observe is called a
FP and a false prediction of the not observed class is a False Negative (FN).
To obtain a wider picture, absolute numbers of TPs, TNs, FPs, and FNs are normalized
to percentage values. The True Positive Rate (TPR) is defined as TPR = TP
TP + FN . It
depicts the proportion of TPs that are correctly identified as such. The TPR is usually
accompanied by its counterpart, the True Negative Rate (TNR) giving the correctly
classified TNs. The TNR can be computed as TNR = TNTN+FP . In literature, TPR and
TNR are also known under names sensitivity and specificity. In the area of malware and
spam classification, the False Positive Rate (FPR) has greater importance as it indicates
the percentage of undetected malicious events. The FPR is computed as FPR = FPFP+TN .
The False Negative Rate (FNR) is computed as FNR = FNFN+TP . The FNR indicates the
percentage of blocked events that in reality should not have be blocked.
Besides the TPR, TNR, FPR, and FNR security researchers compare classifiers based
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on Accuracy (ACC) and Precision (PRE). ACC sums up all correctly classified elements,
i.e. ACC = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN . We use the term mean accuracy to indicate the averaged
ACC of many distinct runs for the identical classifier and feature vector. Considering
only the TP part leads to the definition of PRE. PRE quantifies the percentage of correctly
predicted elements within one class, PRE = TPTP+FP .
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve shows the tradeoff between the TPR
and FPR. The optimal point [0,1] represents no FPs and a maximum of TPs. The closer
the ROC curve is to this point, the better the classifier performs. The definite integral of
the ROC curve is called Area Under the Curve (AUC). AUC quantifies the quality of the
ROC curve. It is often preferred for model comparison as it selects the best model across
many points of the ROC curve.
2.6.4 Validation Methods
To validate capabilities of trained models, the training and testing subset have to be
determined. Two approaches are widely adopted. The simple cross-validation method
trains a model from x percent of the training set while holding out (1 − x) percent of
the training set for testing. The k-fold cross-validation method partitions the training
set into k equal groups called folds. In each run, the model is trained upon k − 1 folds
and tested against the last fold. The whole cross-validation process repeats for k runs.
In each run a different fold is kept for testing while the remaining folds are used for
training. Therefore, one round consists of k runs with k different testing folds. The
result of one complete round is the averaged value over k runs. The advantage of k-fold
cross-validation compared to simple cross-validation is that all input data are used for
training k − 1 times and for testing exactly once. It prevents testing of repeatedly selected
elements. In addition, the k-fold validation method provides an educated guess on how
well classifiers behave on sets of different sizes.
2.7 Tools and Services
This section briefly introduces the tools and services we use throughout this thesis.
We introduce VirusTotal [175], APKtool [146], Androguard [57], the official Android
Software Development Kit (SDK) [59], Gephi [26], and a Scikit-learn library for machine
learning [133].
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2.7.1 VirusTotal
VirusTotal [175] is a service that analyzes files and URIs for the presence of malware.
All uploaded files are stored in the VirusTotal database and checked against more than
50 antivirus and scanning engines. Detected new malware samples are distributed to
partners of VirusTotal and partners of VirusTotal share their datasets with VirusTotal,
making the VirusTotal database the largest available database of (mobile) malware. Each
sample is uniquely identified by its hash sum. VirusTotal supports MD5, SHA1, and
SHA256 hash sums. All malware samples stored in the database are already preprocessed
so that a specific subset of samples can be queried.
By simply querying a <string>, Virustotal searches for samples having the string
as part of the malware family name or the string is equal to the hash value of a concrete
mobile malware sample. Note that some families cover thousands of samples. Based on
naming conventions, each sample may belong to several families. Therefore, it is often
recommended to use modifiers refining the search results. The structure of the modifier is
modifier:parameter. The parameter can be an exact number or a number followed by the
plus or minus sign. The plus sign indicates at least and the minus sign at most.
The modifier submissions returns samples according to the number of times they
were submitted to VirusTotal. Although the most common sources for new samples are
antivirus vendors and security researchers, some mobile malware authors upload their
recently developed samples to VirusTotal with the intention to check if the new sample
will be detected by any antivirus engines. These samples are submitted to VirusTotal
only once and, if detected, not released in the identical form into the wild. By restricting
the parameter of the modifier submissions to more than two, we hope to retrieve
samples that were released to the wild and are not just "testing" malware in development.
The modifier submissions is often used in combination with the modifier sources.
The modifier sources returns samples according to the number of distinct sources
that submitted the file to VirusTotal. It is more probable that samples submitted from
different countries were captured in the wild than that several hundreds of samples
were captured from a single collaborating partner. Note that VirusTotal does not return
all distinct samples with the same hash value. Only the last submitted sample with
the given hash is returned. Another very important modifier is the modifier tag. The
parameter apk ensures that all downloaded samples are standard Android APKs. Mobile
malware known to initiate short messages is tagged by the parameter sends_sms. Some
of our queries include modifiers ls and positives. The modifier ls returns samples
according to the last submission, and positives returns samples being marked as
malicious by parameter antivirus vendors. Modifiers can occur in the query more than
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once and having identical modifiers with different parameters within a single query is
permitted. In fact, it is used to specify ranges.
Only registered users can access the Virustotal database. Registered users using the
database for non-profit activities can request either public or private access. Based on
privileges, filtering the database and downloading samples can be done manually or
through automation. The results can be displayed in a web interface or returned as JSON
objects. The access determines the depth of information provided for a single sample. The
private access returns at least hash sums, type of the submitted file, number of sources,
submission details including the date of the first and last submission, detection engines
detecting the sample as malicious with corresponding family names, and if the sample is
known to send short messages.
2.7.2 APKtool
Working with bytecode stored in the .dex file is not always practical. Therefore, many
decompilers can decompile the .dex file to the Java-like source code. The decompilation
is a complex process that may take up to several minutes per app. For static analysis of
several thousands of apps, the decompilation to java-like source code may take days. On
the other hand, the decompilation to java-like source code is not always necessary. It is
sufficient to disassemble the .dex file to a more easily readable assembly based language.
In Android, the assembly language is called smali and the process of decompiling .dex
files to smali files baksmaling.
APKtool [146] is an open source tool for reverse engineering APKs. It extracts the
APK bundle and creates human readable AndroidManifest.xml and a directory with all
resources and meta information. The .dex file is disassembled to smali files. Each smali
file represents a Java class in the .dex file. The newly generated smali files have identical
functionality as the .dex file but are more human readable. The process of baksmaling
with APKtool is very efficient. On average, it takes no more than ten seconds per app. The
performance of APKtool is crucial to our analysis as we analyze thousands of samples.
Each additional second in the extraction process of a single sample converts into days
when applied to the whole dataset.
2.7.3 Androguard
Androguard [57] is another tool used for reverse engineering APKs. Whereas APKtool is
a standalone tool for baksmaling .dex files, Androguard can be seen more as a set of tools
and modules. Androguard is capable of extracting the APK, parsing the manifest file,
decompiling the .dex file into Java files, displaying the control graphs of methods in the
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.dex file, comparing two APKs and more. We make use of its Elsim module. The Elsim
module is a python script determining similarities of two APKs. Originally, the Elsim
module was developed to detect plagiarism in APKs. In the context of mobile malware
analysis, the Elsim module is used to determine the underlying mobile malware family.
The assignment is based on the assumption that samples within a family share source code
characteristics. Given two APKs, the Elsim module computes the similarity score with the
help of the Silvio Cesare’s grammar [40]. The Silvio Cesare’s grammar transforms each
method into a sequence of instructions characterizing that method. Then the Normalized
Compression Distance (NCD) to all methods of the second APK is computed. If a method
has similar instructions, then the NCD returns a similarity score. The maximum similarity
score is obtained by identical methods. Methods with similarity scores more than some
threshold are marked as similar. The output of the Elsim script lists the number of
identical, similar, new and deleted methods. New methods are methods occurring only
in the first APK, and deleted methods are methods occurring only in the second APK.
We use the Elsim module to determine methods that are very often reoccurring within a
mobile malware family.
2.7.4 Android SDK
Similarly to Androguard, the Android SDK [59] is a comprehensive set of tools maintained
by Google. It includes various debugging tools helping to analyze APKs and a sandboxed
environment emulating many functionalities and services of a running mobile device.
To view, create or see assets of an APK, the Android SDK provides the Android Asset
Packaging Tool (AAPT). The AAPT is used to read the required permissions, package
and main names from the Manifest file.
Developed Android apps can be tested in an emulated sandbox environment called
Android emulator. The Android emulator emulates hardware components, 3GPP pro-
tocols including the SMS, and logs all events. The whole Android emulator is highly
customizable. Not only the emulated user can install arbitrary apps or virtually use the
emulator as a mobile phone on a host desktop computer, the whole OS and the underlying
hardware profile can be modified to better suit the desired requirements. The OS version
and the hardware profile is determined via a so-called Android Virtual Device (AVD) tool
that is part of the Android SDK. The AVD tool already lists the most common hardware
profiles and Android versions. The Android emulator supports ARM, MIPS, and x86
architectures. Screen resolution and other hardware properties are bound to one of more
than forty emulated device types. All Android versions and API levels starting with
Android Version 1.5 (API level 3) are supported.
The Android emulator emulates services in 3G network. Radio traffic in the form of
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AT commands is stored in a real-time updating radio log. The emulated radio traffic lists
all events processed by the emulated radio modem starting with the initial handshake be-
tween the device and network. On one hand, since the device and the mobile network are
emulated, most of the radio traffic has only an informative character and AT commands
are listed for completeness. On the other hand, MT calls and short messages are passed
just as they are in actual devices and processed in higher layers in the Android software
stack. Therefore, the installed apps cannot differentiate between the emulated and real
(3GPP) traffic. The forwarding is realized over the RILd.
The Android emulator can capture all IP-based traffic entering and leaving the emu-
lator. The traffic between the Android emulator and host machine is used to ensure
that the emulator is running properly. For dynamic analysis in Section 3.4, the traffic
generated by the apps installed in the emulator is of more importance. Note that in
general it is infeasible to differentiate benign and malicious traffic solely on IP addresses.
Communication with Android can be filtered but the overwhelming majority of IP traffic
is still associated with apps.
Android emulator communicates with the host machine over a command line interface
called an Android Debug Bridge (ADB). The ADB supports commands for installing new
APKs from the host computer, exchanges data between the Android emulator and the
host machine or simply opens a remote shell. By using the remote shell, the ADB can
access any OS’s services running in the emulator or suspend, reboot and check whether
the emulator instance is fully booted. Installed apps can be instructed over the ADB as
well. The ADB can start arbitrary activities or intents listed in the Manifest file of the app.
We use the AAPT, Android emulator and ADB for performing the dynamic analysis
in a customized Android emulator.
2.7.5 Gephi
Gephi [26] is an open source tool for graph analysis. The tool uses a special 3D rendering
engine enabling Gephi to display customizations in large graphs in real time. Overlap-
ping of nodes and edges is avoided when possible. Several layout algorithms such as
Contraction, Force Atlas2, and Expansion can be applied to manipulate the layout of a
social graph [127]. Layout algorithms considerably reduce the complexity of the graph.
The reduced graph makes patterns in the raw data become clearer than analyzing the
data in the complete graph. A very nice feature of Gephi is that only a set of nodes or
edges can be selected for further processing. The set of nodes or edges can be chosen
manually or using a complex filtering system including thresholds, ranges or properties.
One can even define mew functions by combining the presented filtering systems with
logic operators.
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2.7.6 Scikit-learn
Scikit-learn [133] is an open source python library providing implementations of many
machine learning algorithms. It provides many supervised machine learning algorithms
including SVM, KNN, DT, RF, and NB and validation methods including simple cross-
validation and k-fold cross-validation methods. Several feature selection algorithms are
provided as well, but the SFSA is not yet implemented. Therefore, we implemented our
own adapted SFSA that led to subtly better results than empirically tested Scikit-learn’s
feature selection algorithms.
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Android Malware Analysis
The exact number of malicious Android apps cannot be determined because security
researchers do not have resources to analyze every app ever published. From over eighty
existing Android app markets, the largest, Google Play [80], alone publishes over one
thousand new apps every day [20]. To cope with the situation, security researchers seek for
new techniques that would accelerate the analysis of Android malware. We believe that it
is advantageous to derive obfuscation types of suspicious samples even before the analysis
starts. We mentioned in Section 2.4 that specific obfuscation types can hinder static
analysis and the order of using static analysis is important as not every obfuscation type
can be deobfuscated. If the app can be deobfuscated, then the order in which to perform
the analysis is crucial. Moreover, if two samples exhibit identical behavior, security
researchers could choose to analyze the less obfuscated sample and so significantly
reduce the time required for analysis. Identical or similar behavior may indicate that both
samples are related. By visualizing relationships between samples, security researchers
may be able to reveal transitions pointing to MoMOs that are otherwise hard to detect.
Both identification of obfuscation types and visualization of relationships between similar
samples are detailed in this chapter. We reveal relationships depicted in the visualizations
by employing social network analysis.
An overview of the existing extensive research on Android malware analysis is given
in Section 3.1. Datasets of downloaded Android malware samples are described in
Section 3.2. They are analyzed using static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis detailed
in Section 3.3 is used to generate a chronological quantitative analysis. Chronological
quantitative analysis evaluates the presence of identifier renaming, reflection, and en-
cryption in Android malware in Subsection 3.3.4. For dynamic analysis, we customize
the Android emulator. Customizations made in the Android emulator and all steps
performed prior to our dynamic analysis are explained in Section 3.4. The dynamic
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analysis captures all SMS and IP traffic. We present our findings and further investigate
short messages in social graphs. We reveal that there exist relationships between mobile
malware samples known to initiate short messages. These relationships are visualized in
Section 3.5. A final discussion in Section 3.6 summarizes our findings.
Parts of the context of this chapter were published in [105] [155] [103] [100]. More
specifically, the preprocessing of apps for static analysis, heuristics, performance, ground
truth and the summary of the results of our quantitative chronological analysis (Subsec-
tion 3.3.4) were previously published in [105]. The chronological quantitative analysis is
an extended version of the master’s thesis [155]. Compared to [155], in [105], we provide
a more detailed quantitative chronological analysis of many more Android malware
families than was the case in [155]. In addition, the evaluation in [155] differentiates
only between identifier renaming, reflection, and encryption. Our analysis differentiates
between four types of identifier renaming and two types of encryption. The stages of
our customized dynamic analysis were first described in [103] and the visualizations of
relationships between Android malware sending short messages were presented in [100]
except for the analysis of the samples highlighted in Figure 3.11.
3.1 Related Work
Android malware has been reviewed numerous times from different angles. An overview
of Android malware is given in, e.g., [73] [188], and [102] and particular instances of
Android malware are analyzed in more detail in, e.g., [178], [137], and [187]. In the
following, we concentrate on related work in the area of static and dynamic analysis, Java
obfuscation and on identifying mobile malware by social network analysis.
Static Analysis
Security researchers use static and dynamic approaches to reveal key features charac-
teristic to Android malware. Static analysis focuses on analyzing the Manifest file, DEX
bytecode and other resources located in the APK. Permissions of an app are obtained
by simply extracting the APK and parsing the Manifest file. Permissions in Android
malware are analyzed in [73], [134] and [68]. In [73], authors analyze the number of
permissions requested by mobile malware and state that Android malware is more
privileged than non-malicious apps. Peng et al. [134] analyze the top twenty most used
permissions in Android malware and popular benign apps. The analysis is used to classify
permissions in a hierarchical mixture of Naive Bayes models. Kirin [68] derives co-called
security rules from permissions that are used to detect Android malware. Kang et al. [97]
consider analysis of permissions as not sufficient as such static analysis suffers from
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the laxity of Android’s permission model. He argues that Android app developers can
request more permissions than necessary for the actual execution, making the distribution
of permissions incorrect. Inevitable permissions required for the run of an app are
identified by Stowaway [71]. Stowaway analyzes API calls and finds apps requesting
more permissions than they need. PScout [24] analyzes the usage trend of permissions
in Android apps and lists mappings between API calls and permissions. A similar
approach is used by DroidMat [177]. Droidmat first extracts the Manifest file and then
relates artifacts found in the Manifest file to API calls. A frequency analysis of the
most relevant API calls invoked by Android malware is given in [15]. The computed
frequencies are then used to classify suspicious apps. The presence of native libraries for
malicious intents is checked by RiskRanker [81]. RiskRanker searches through the native
code for patterns pointing to known exploits and through bytecode for the presence of
encryption. Encryption is identified by the presence of the standard Java javax.crypto
package. Authors assume that Android writers favor standard Java packages over custom
encryption for convenience. DREBIN [22] performs a broader static analysis on the
Manifest file and bytecode. It gathers permissions, hardware components associated with
permissions, API calls, found network addresses, intents, actions, content providers, and
broadcast receivers. Gascon et al. [77] generate a graph from used API calls. The existence
of identical substructures between samples serves as input for classification. Finally, Kang
et al. [97] analyze meta information of the certificate such as the serial number. They show
that this information may help to reveal the origin of an app. Our static analysis identifies
obfuscation types presented in Android malware. We search for patterns indicating the
presence of identifier renaming, reflection, and encryption. Compared to RiskRanker, our
approach detects custom encryption as well. Results from the static analysis are evaluated
in a chronological quantitative analysis of found obfuscation types in Android malware.
Dynamic Analysis
In dynamic analysis, security researchers execute the app and observe its behavior through
a taint tracking system. TaintDroid [67], one of the most sophisticated system-wide taint
tracking systems, is capable of simultaneously tracking multiple sources. Taintdroid taints
privacy-sensitive data and monitors its flow through third-party applications. Though
TaintDroid was not primarily designed for Android malware analysis, it is often compared
with other tainting approaches developed for malware analysis. Crowdroid [35] is a
framework that detects Android malware by analyzing the number of times each system
was called during the execution. Logged system calls are sent to a central server where
from the number of times the system call was called the central server generates a feature
vector for classification. AppsPlayground [141] reveals information leakage detection and
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provides sensitive API and kernel level monitoring. FlowDroid [23], EdgeMiner [37], and
CopperDroid [143] are similar to AppsPlayground. All three provide information flow
analysis of API calls. In addition to system calls, MADAM [63] monitors also running
processes, free RAM, CPU usage, and user activities.
Dynamic Analysis Combined with Static Analysis
Dynamic analysis often employs static analysis to find and trigger the execution of
the malicious part of the Android app. DroidBox [108], Andrubis [111], and Mobile-
Sandbox [160] extend the functionality of TaintDroid. DroidBox [108] first parses smali
files for API calls and repackages the analyzed app by explicitly logging extracted API calls
during the analysis in TaintDroid. Andrubis [111] uses DroidBox to perform a detailed
network protocol analysis including short messages. Mobile-Sandbox [160] also uses
DroidBox to track native API calls. A5 [174] reads intents and receivers specified in the
Android Manifest and collects logs on Internet traffic in dynamic analysis. Finally, Droid-
Sec [182] classifies required permissions from static analysis and API calls observed in
the dynamic analysis in deep learning combining supervised and unsupervised machine
learning algorithms.
Our dynamic analysis in Section 3.4 also combines dynamic analysis with static
analysis. We first extract permissions and the main activity from the Manifest file and
then run the actual dynamic analysis. The analysis captures all initiated SMS and Internet
traffic. Andrubis and MobileSandbox seem to be very similar to our dynamic analysis. In
fact, these approaches were developed in parallel to our dynamic analysis. Compared to
their approaches, our dynamic analysis is performed in a highly customized environment
with simulated user interaction of a faked identity.
Table 3.1 summarizes the discussed related work on Android analysis. The first
column gives the analysis type. If the approach is named, we list it in the second column.
This is followed by the focus of the approach. The last column shows the reference.
Obfuscation in Apps
Identifier renaming in Java programs has been studied in [48], focusing on overcoming
the obfuscation by renaming the obfuscated identifiers to more context relevant ones.
Leskov [109] states that most obfuscation approaches in Java are still very limited. In
his view, the only effective form of obfuscation in mobile malware is an embedded
custom virtual machine that translates the most sensitive methods to its instruction sets.
These expensive transformations have not yet been encountered in the wild. However,
obfuscation techniques based on short, meaningless identifiers or nested types once
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proposed as a proof-of-concept [41] have been recently adopted by mobile malware. The
use of string obfuscation in Android apps is reviewed in [21]. The author proposes a
light-weight detection method for string obfuscation by properly chosen Unix find or
grep commands. The author states that it works only on samples using an older version
of obfuscation tools. Our heuristics in Section 3.3 detect the most recent ones as well.
Livshits et al. [113] tried to determine targets of reflective calls in reflection. Their
assumption is that parameters in reflective calls are always unencrypted. This assump-
tion does not hold in Android malware. We detect reflection even if parameters are
encrypted. Note that we are not interested in targets of reflective calls, only if reflection
took place. Though, once reflection is identified, the reflective call can be removed by
partial evaluation [153].
Detecting encryption in Android malware is mentioned in [188], [160] and in [21].
Zhou et al. [188] state that encryption can be used to evade static analysis. Mobile-
Sandbox [160] detects calls of common encryption libraries but no names of concrete
libraries are listed. The third paper [21] describes encryption methods found in recent
Android malware. Encryption methods range from trivial XOR operations to more
sophisticated custom encryption. Their statistical analysis of encryption in Android
malware consisting of 460.493 samples states that 27% of malware samples use encryption.
Our evaluation is more specific than that of [21]. We determine that less than 15% of
Android malware samples utilize common encryption and 45% custom encryption in
Subsection 3.3.4.
Social Network Analysis
The main application domain of social network analysis is to identify relationships
between individuals. They become visible in the social analysis that helps to reveal,
e.g., if individuals share the same circles of friends [117]. Zhu et al. [190] assume that
mobile malware propagates between friends first. They propose to generate a social
relationship graph of friends based on network traffic. The social relationship graph helps
to identify the optimal set of devices that should be patched in order to limit infections
and propagation paths of mobile malware. Dandelion [176] correlates domain registration,
SMS, and IP traffic. It generates a relationship graph from the data records. Edges in the
graph represent the presence of relationships between nodes. The relationship suggests
that two data records can be related to the same user or owner. From the relationship
graph, a group of interests is determined revealing anomalies in mobile network traffic.
Our social network analysis graph is generated similarly to the Dandelion’s relationship
graph, but edges represent relationships between Android malware samples. The aim of
our analysis is to show that many Android malware samples are related.
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An authorship classification of short messages used in frauds is investigated in [91].
The likelihood ratio-based approach presented in [91] assumes an already existing training
set with given short message-author pairs. We address a scenario where no training set is
available but we still can determine the number of malware authors. We determine the
number of malware authors exclusively from short messages and corresponding phone
numbers.
3.2 Data Collections
This thesis evaluates two large data collections. Each data collection consists of several
datasets that specify the type of data. The first data collection incorporates Android
malware samples, IP addresses of servers known to send spam, and results obtained from
our dynamic analysis, see Section 3.4 later in this chapter. The second data collection
consists of benign traffic. Here we group short messages generated by users, valid
land-line numbers of our university, and whitelisted ports led by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) [168].
3.2.1 Android Malware and Spammers
Several institutions provide datasets consisting of Android malware samples. The largest
database is provided by VirusTotal [175]. Although many samples in the VirusTotal
database can also be found in other databases containing mobile malware samples, we
chose for VirusTotal because the stored samples are already preprocessed and specific
groups of samples can be queried. Possible search modifiers in queries are explained in
Section 2.7.
Data collections of Android malware samples are represented by a leading A letter.
We downloaded two datasets of Android malware samples. The two datasets of Android
samples are denoted as A.1 and A.2 datasets. The A.1 dataset is a general overview
of Android malware families and contains 32.217 Android malware samples split into
145 Android malware families. This dataset is chronologically analyzed for presence of
various obfuscation types described in Subsection 3.3.4. The A.2 dataset consists of 4.468
Android samples known to send short messages and results of dynamic analysis applied
on these samples. The last dataset with a leading A letter is the A.3 dataset. This dataset
lists IP addresses of spam senders.
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A.1 – General Overview of Android Malware Families
We downloaded 32.217 Android malware samples from the VirusTotal database as the
result of the query tag:apk <familyname> sources:2+ positives:10+ ls:
2014-07-0100:00:01 during the first four days of July 2014. The names of the 145
families were taken from [159] and are listed in Appendix A. We decided for these
families because they were all present in the VirusTotal database. Since for some of
these families there exist several hundreds of thousands of samples in the VirusTotal
database, we downloaded only up to one thousand samples per family ordered by the last
submission date as listed in the VirusTotal database. If a sample belonged to more than
one family, then we took F-secure’s naming convention in the first place and Kaspersky’s
naming convention in the second. For downloading samples, we extended the Java
implementation of Dilshan’s “VirusTotal Public API 2.0” [62] to additionally support
private API calls such as the first submission date of the sample and the family name of
the sample. The distribution of samples in families is given in Appendix A. From 32.217
download samples, we could decompile only 29.574 samples.
A.2 – Android Malware Samples Initiating SIMM Messages
The A.2 dataset focuses on Android malware samples sending SIMM messages, SIMM
messages and phone numbers of the recipients. The query had the form tag:sends_sms
tag:apk. Although we did not use the modifiers positives and, all samples were
detected by at least one antivirus engine.
Note that this time we did not need the modifier positives since due to the modifier
tag:sends_sms, all downloaded samples are known to send SIMM messages and,
therefore, they are strictly malicious. The modifier submissions:15+ returned only
samples submitted to Virustotal more than fifteen times. We added this restriction in order
to speed up the dynamic analysis. Not all downloaded samples tagged with the apk tag
were valid APK samples. Running an invalid sample would prolong the dynamic analysis
since our dynamic analysis forces the installation of the sample and then wait for a fixed
period of time before continuing with the next sample. The modifier submissions was
used to limit samples to the most spread Android malware. Therefore, we believe that
the A.2 dataset contains only the most common occurring Android malware in the wild
initiating SIMM messages. Altogether, we downloaded 4.468 Android malware samples
known to send SIMM messages from the VirusTotal databases in April 2014.
Besides SIMM messages, the A.2 dataset contains the phone numbers of the recipients
of the SIMM messages revealed in the dynamic analysis. In total, the A.2 dataset contains
4.468 Android malware samples known to send SIMM messages, 3.228 hash values of
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samples that could be triggered in our dynamic analysis (see Section 3.4), 8.845 SIMM
messages initiated by the 3.228 Android samples, 2.441 unique SIMM messages, 3.201
m-unique SIMM messages, 782 valid unique phone numbers, 1.100 unique destination IP
addresses and relations between SIMM messages, phone numbers, and samples. Stored
relations interconnect samples that send SIMM to the same phone number or use the same
keyword. Based on these data, the A.2 dataset is further divided into smaller datasets:
A.2.SIMM - This dataset contains all MO SIMM messages collected during the dy-
namic analysis applied on the samples in the A.2 dataset. The 8.845 SIMM messages
are preprocessed for the needs of evaluation. From 8.845 initiated SIMM messages,
only 2.441 SIMM messages were unique. The last group of SIMM messages in
this dataset are 3.201 m-unique SIMM messages. M-unique SIMM messages are
unique SIMM messages within one month. The one month period is derived from
the date that the sample that initiated the SIMM message was first submitted to
VirusTotal. These are required for the evaluation of classifiers in Chapter 5 as for
some evaluation scenarios the training of classifiers is performed month-wise. For
more information on how we obtained the SIMM messages, we refer to Section 3.4.
In the following text, we always stress which type of SIMM messages is used.
A.2.PN - This dataset contains all valid unique phone numbers of SIMM messages.
A.2.R - This dataset contains relationships between keywords of SIMM messages,
phone numbers, and samples represented by hash values. A keyword is a sequence
of characters up to the first occurrence of the whitespace character. The whitespace
character is not part of the keyword. If no whitespace character is in the message,
then the whole message is the keyword.
A.2.IP - This dataset contains all unique destination IP addresses contacted by
Android Malware. All IP addresses were captured in the same dynamic analysis as
were SIMM messages from the A.2 dataset. During the dynamic analysis we were
capturing three types of Internet traffic: traffic between the Android emulator and
our host machine, traffic initiated by us or the emulator itself, and traffic initiated by
Android malware. The A.2.IP dataset contains all unique destination IP addresses
initiated by Android malware.
The content of the SIMM messages included in the A.2.SIMM dataset is used for
the evaluation of the highly space efficient blacklisting in Subsection 4.4.1 and in the
comparisons of detection rates of five classifiers detecting SIMM messages in real-world
scenarios in Section 5.4. The highly space efficient blacklisting in Subsection 4.4.1 evaluates
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the A.2.PN and A.2.IP datasets as well. The last A.2.R dataset is visualized in Section 3.5
and reveals relationships between samples, phone numbers, and SIMM messages. These
are later used to estimate the number of authors responsible for Android malware samples
initiating SIMM messages.
We first used data from A.2.SIMM, A.2.PN and A.2.R to generate the visualization
in [100] and later (except for A.2.R) we reused them together with IP addresses from
A.2.IP in [103].
A.3 – DNS Blacklist
To be able to evaluate more than 1.100 IP addresses from A.2.IP in Subsection 4.4.1, we
downloaded IP addresses of DNS servers from the NiX spam project [126]. The NiX Spam
project is a publicly available DNS blacklist of IP addresses of spam senders. It updates
itself every 15 minutes and stores IP addresses from the last 12 hours. We created a
script that fetched all entries from the DNS blacklist during October 2013. Altogether, we
collected more than 8,6 GB of DNS blacklisted IP addresses and some meta information,
from which we extracted 1.448.523 unique IP addresses. IP addresses are represented in
the B.4 dataset as a list of 32-bit integers. There exists no link between these IP addresses
and IP addresses from the A.2.IP dataset. This dataset was first evaluated in [101].
3.2.2 Benign Traffic
The collections of benign traffic are represented by a leading B letter. It consists of three
datasets of 4.539 benign SMS messages, 7.079 land-line numbers of our university and
6.053 assigned ports by IANA. The first dataset B.1 is used, together with the A.2 dataset,
for classification of SIMM messages. Datasets B.2 and B.3 are used as whitelisting
scenarios for the evaluation of the highly space efficient blacklists in Subsection 4.4.1. The
B.1 dataset was first introduced in [102], the B.2 and B.3 datasets in [101].
B.1 – Benign Short Messages
There exist several publicly available datasets dedicated to short messages, e.g., [89], [47],
[46] or [17]. For this thesis, the most notable SMS datasets are the NUS SMS Corpus [46]
and the SMS Spam Collection v.1 [17]. The NUS SMS Corpus is the largest SMS database
that is not restricted to any specific topic or language. In order to use the NUS SMS
Corpus properly, a preprocessing step is necessary. The SMS Spam Collection v.1 is a
subset of the NUS SMS Corpus and contains 747 spam and 4.827 benign short messages
written by English users.
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Our benign SMS messages were taken from the SMS Spam Collection v.1 [17]. In
particular, we extracted all single benign SMS messages containing at most 160 characters
in GSM 7-bit default alphabet encoding [7] written in the Latin alphabet. Some of the
benign SMS messages from [17] were not correctly decoded. All occurrences of “&lt;”,
“&gt;”, “&lt;#&gt;” in wrongly decoded benign SMS messages were replaced by an
empty string. We further replaced decoded 8-bit characters 0x92, 0x94 and 0x96 by
apostrophes, curved quotes and dashes, respectively. We believe that these characters
were wrongly decoded because of the CP1252 8-bit character encoding of the Latin
alphabet used in Microsoft Windows. In the CP1252 8-bit character encoding, apostrophes,
curved quotes and dashes are represented by 0x92, 0x94 and 0x96 in hexadecimal
notation. However, many operating systems do not support the 8-bit character encoding
and rely on the more widely used UTF-8 or ISO/IEC encodings. Finally, we replaced
&amp by an ampersand. 173 SMS messages occurred more than once. In that case,
we kept three of the identical messages and deleted any additional occurrences. This
procedure removed 47 SMS messages and left the B.1 dataset with 4.539 benign SMS
messages. Due to privacy reasons, no phone numbers are included in the SMS Spam
Collection v.1.
B.2 – RWTH Land-line Numbers
The B.2 dataset includes 7.079 land-line numbers of RWTH University. These were
crawled from the internal phonebook in April 2014. Each number at our university has a
fixed prefix and variable suffix of five digits. Virtually all institutes have their dedicated
range of phone numbers and there is always a gap between two ranges in case new phone
numbers have to be added. From all possible phone numbers, only 7.079 were valid.
These were distributed quite equally.
B.3 – IANA Ports
Port numbers are assigned in ranges. Ports from 0 to 1.023 are system ports and reserved
for widely-used network services. The use of any system port should be registered by
IANA [168]. User ports ranging from 1.024 to 49.151 are intended for user applications.
Although these ports can be freely chosen by the user, most of them are already bound
to some service and reserved by IANA. The last group of ports up to 65.535 are still
unassigned. Our B.3 dataset lists all 6.053 whitelisted ports taken from the collection of
officially assigned ports led by IANA. We do not differentiate between ports used by the
TCP and the UDP protocol.
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3.3 Static Analysis
Static analysis of Android malware analyzes the APK containing the Manifest file, DEX
bytecode, and other files. After the APK is extracted, it is a good practice to start with
parsing the Manifest file. Permissions listed in the Manifest file specify capabilities of
the app. Intents and broadcast receivers determine system events, application events,
and when the app is triggered. Then the disassembled DEX bytecode is analyzed for the
presence of suspicious methods responsible for malicious intents. Resources and assets
may help reveal information processed in suspicious methods as well.
The challenging part of the static analysis is to identify methods pointing to main
characteristics of Android malware. Manually analyzing every single method is tedious
and time-consuming. Note that an Android malware sample typically contains several
hundreds of benign classes and only a handful of classes responsible for malicious activi-
ties. To cope with this situation, in [105] we developed a preprocessing step identifying
methods that are most susceptible to contain methods responsible for the malicious
activity. Our idea is based on the assumption that these methods are shared with other
samples of the same family. They are identical or at least similar in many samples that
belong to that family. In addition, we assume that these methods reoccur more frequently
in other samples of the same malware family than the benign methods. We consider a
method to be a core method if the method (together with the path) is one of the most often
reoccurring methods in other samples of the same family. To obtain a full list of core
methods within each sample, we compared the sample with itself using the Androguard’s
Elsim module, see Section 2.7. Identical methods within one family are computed based
on Silvio Cesare’s grammar [40] which is already implemented in the Androguard’s Elsim
module. That way, a list of methods is generated counting the number of times each
method was identically found in other samples, see Figure 3.1 listing ten core methods
of a sample of the Counterclank family. The first line in the figure states that out of 999
analyzed samples within the Counterclank family (see Appendix A for the number of
analyzed samples in each family), 989 contain the nested method Status which can be
found in the decompiled Java file CommandStatus under java/com/apperhand/common/d-
to/CommandStatus in the APK’s file tree. The <clinit> in the Method column indicates
initialization methods that are invoked implicitly by the virtual machine. These methods
are invoked only indirectly as part of the class initialization process [52]. The second line
in Figure 3.1 shows the method a under Lcom/apperhand/device/android/a/a/a that reoccurred
in 366 out of 999 samples belonging to the Counterclank family.
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Hits Class path Method
989 Lcom/apperhand/common/dto/CommandStatus$Status <clinit>
366 Lcom/apperhand/device/android/a/a/a a
365 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/d/f$a <clinit>
357 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/d/a a
355 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/d/a$b <clinit>
355 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/d/a$c <clinit>
353 Lcom/apperhand/device/android/a/b a
337 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/b/h$1 <clinit>
235 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/b/b c
174 Lcom/apperhand/device/a/b/i a
Figure 3.1: Top ten core methods of the sample d048. . . d974, family Counterclank.
3.3.1 Heuristics for Obfuscation Types
During static analysis of Android malware, we experienced that determining the concrete
tool responsible for the obfuscation of a given sample does not necessarily fasten the
analysis. It suffices to identify obfuscation types that hinder the analysis and start the
analysis in the correct order. We recommend starting with encryption, since a missing
key often hinders the entire analysis. Trying to resolve any other obfuscation type first
could result in time spent in a vain analysis attempt. In [105], we proposed heuristics for
detecting identifier renaming, reflection, and encryption. All heuristics operate exclusively
on smali files and methods returned from the preprocessing step. Literal properties of
obfuscated identifiers in identifier renaming are exposed by four heuristics of Type I to
Type IV. The heuristic denoted by Type R detects reflection. In encryption, we differentiate
between common and custom encryption. Heuristics for common and custom encryption
are denoted as Type E1 and Type E2, respectively.
Heuristics of Type I-IV
The first heuristic detects identifier renaming of identifiers that are renamed to short
identifiers. This obfuscation method reuses short meaningless identifiers as often as
possible in order to create redundancy in identifiers. The sample is identified as obfuscated
by identifier renaming of Type I if one-third of all class or method names is below a
minimum length threshold of three characters. In identifier renaming, having up to three
characters in the name of a valid identifier corresponds to several thousand possible
identifiers. We assume that no class declares more than this number of identifiers within
one class and no app has more than this number of classes.
The heuristic for Type II counts identical lengths of identifiers. Identifier renaming
can obfuscate identifiers by giving them the same length. If the length of three-quarters of
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all class or method names is identical, then the sample is evaluated as being obfuscated
by identifier renaming of Type II. Note that Type II obfuscation can be a side effect of an
optimization during bytecode compilation. Java source code allows nested types, i.e.,
identifiers defined within another type. When compiled to bytecode, bytecode represents
nested types as x$y, where x is the enclosing type and y the nested type. Decompiling
such bytecode back to Java source or smali code creates non-nested types with a $ symbol
in the identifier name producing a very complex disassembled code. Since it hinders the
reverse-engineering process from the security researcher’s point of view, renamed nested
types are classified as identifier renaming obfuscation as well [48].
Some obfuscation tools use reduced alphabets of similar looking characters. The
resulting identifier names are harder to distinguish by a human being. The heuristic for
Type III counts the absolute number of all used different characters in all identifiers and
detects identifier renaming operating upon limited alphabets of up to three characters.
Type III is returned, if the limited alphabet is occurring in at least half of the methods or
class names.
Most Android developers follow the CamelCase Java programming style technique,
i.e., identifiers representing class names start with capital letters and only the first letters
of additional words in the name are capitalized. Assuming that app developers follow this
common coding practice, the ratio of capital letters to lower letters should be rather small
but should never reach zero. Therefore, the last heuristic for Type IV compares capital
letters in identifiers to the CamelCase technique. Type IV is returned, if the CamelCase
technique is not present in at least half of the method names.
In the case the sample is obfuscated by more than one type of identifier renaming, the
current implementation returns the lowest type. For better comprehension, two examples
per heuristic type are given in Table 3.2.
Heuristic Family name Examples of method names
Type I VdLoader a, g, e, c
Type I FakeInst ´ , ` , ’, –
Type II Opfake biewchpv, bkuftums, gnjwedsk, lqsxoock
Type II FakeInst access$1, access$2, access$3, access$4
Type III RuFraud CccIOcc, CccOIcc, IcCClc, ICcloIIlC
Type III SmsSend l1lI1, l1Ill, ll1Il, ll1Il
Type IV Opfake jujbjlg, kohrohv, ykpfrejsv, junyqboh
Type IV Opfake eaeyesebw, nkwbpyv, rkybkefvj, whfjasuv
Table 3.2: Examples of identifier renaming of Type I, III, III and IV.
58
3.3 Static Analysis
A family name refers to the family name of the Android malware where we observed
the respective obfuscation type. The examples of method names were found in the
decompiled source code of Android malware manually analyzed as part of [105].
Heuristic of Type R
All methods related to Java’s reflection API are included in the Android API. Reflective
abilities are united in the Android API, under the java.lang. Class class or the
java.lang.reflect package. The API allow Android apps to deduct object types, set
and get a field value, instantiate new objects, and invoke methods at runtime. The imple-
mentation of reflection is usually achieved with the help of three consecutive calls. The
class of the method is requested with a call to the static method Class.forName(String).
The class name is passed as the parameter. The method getMethod(String, Class...)
of the obtained class is called passing the name and parameter types of the desired
method as parameters. Finally, the method is executed by calling invoke(Object,
Object...), where the first parameter is an instance of the class the method belongs to,
and the second parameter holds instantiated parameters that will be passed to the called
method.
It is possible to detect the use of reflection by determining if any of the corresponding
methods, classes or packages have been used. It can be done in Java or smali. We decided
for smali files as baksmaling is significantly faster than decompiling the whole .dex file
back to Java source code. The heuristic of type R parses the method for the presence of
java.lang.Class or java.lang.reflect. In addition, if reflection was used, then
the smali file should have at least one opcode starting with the prefix invoke-kind.
Heuristics of Types E1 and E2
Detecting the standard Java encryption API or common third party cryptographic lib-
raries is fairly easy. Here, the detection consists of parsing smali, extracting the called
methods and matching the gathered method calls against known package names. The
indicator for common encryption is the use of standard encryption libraries. For now,
our heuristic for Type E1 detects the use of six packages, namely from the standard Java
packages for the security framework java/security [50] and cryptographic operations
javax/crypto [51], Java simplified encryption org/jasypt [94], the free GNU crypto
project gnu/crypto [78], the Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs org/bouncycastle [130],
and the Chilkat Java encryption package com/chilkatsoft [157].
Detecting custom encryption is more challenging. To avoid performance losses in
mobile malware, custom encryption is achieved by utilizing byte (or bits) operations
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on byte arrays that are very efficient in terms of speed. We experienced that custom
encryption usually follows an identical sequence of operations. At the beginning of each
encryption method, an array of data is passed to the method. Three possibilities exist
for converting data into a byte array. Data is converted into a byte array directly; a new
empty byte array is created and afterward filled with data, or an array is returned as
a parameter from the method. After the creation of the array, the bytes are read, and
some sort of transformation (encryption) is applied manipulating the data within the
array. The transformation includes bitwise operations, shifts, and functions handling
modular arithmetic. After the array is completely encrypted, it is converted back and
returned either as a string or an array. The heuristic responsible for detecting custom
encryption detects all three steps. It detects whether in a single method an object reference
is converted to an array, transformed by a trivial math operation, and assigned to a string
or an array. The heuristic for Type E2 checks if these three steps occur in the correct
order. In addition, the heuristic checks whether a simple bit or byte math operation,
shifts and element assignment are repeating in blocks. Each time the heuristic detects
a step in the correct order, it increases an internal custom encryption indicator by one.
If the custom encryption indicator is five or higher, then the method is assumed to
provide custom encryption. In other words, the method must provide at least three
different math operations on strings or arrays. The heuristic also covers the case in which
encryption is scattered over several methods. Then the custom encryption indicator for
the whole class must be ten or higher. The number ten was empirically derived from
manual static analysis of hundreds of Android malware samples that we performed over
the last years. In our manual static analysis we observed that symmetric encryption
prevails over asymmetric encryption and that none of the custom encryptions used in
the analyzed samples is cryptographically secure. MoMOs seem to mostly copy classical
monoalphabetic substitution ciphers. We first tried to derive various forms of custom
encryption, but it turned out to be infeasible because without having the original source
code, it is infeasible to differentiate between custom encryption and (custom) encoding.
Therefore, we consider encoding as a sort of weak encryption.
3.3.2 Performance
We sorted the 32.217 downloaded samples from the A.1 dataset based on SHA256 hash
values. The first 500 samples were selected for performance evaluation. 21 samples
had no identical methods, and 23 samples could not be decompiled. These samples
were removed from the set. In the remaining 456 samples, we first computed the core
methods and analyzed them for the presence of identifier renaming, reflection, and
encryption. The box plot in Figure 3.2 shows that the proposed heuristics are indeed
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Figure 3.2: Running time of heuristics.
very fast. Our heuristics are able to check whether the discussed obfuscation types are
present in Android apps in less than one millisecond on average. Custom encryption is
the slowest heuristic. This is due to the fact that the E2 heuristic is the only heuristic that
checks several subsequent steps.
3.3.3 Ground Truth
Building and evaluating ground truth datasets for all heuristics presented in this paper
considering each method occurring in the dataset is beyond the scope of this paper.
Therefore, we limit ourselves to heuristics on identifier renaming and consider only the
core methods in the above 456 samples used to measure performance.
In the 456 samples, we manually checked over 2,000 classes and observed that 194
samples were not obfuscated, 254 samples were obfuscated with Type I, just one sample
with Type II, four samples with Type III and three with Type IV. Only seven samples
employed more than just one type of identifier renaming in core classes. After applying
the rule that in case more identification renaming types are employed, always the lowest
type is returned, we could summarize our results in the confusion matrix shown in
Table 3.3. A true positive value means that the heuristic returned the same type of
identifier renaming as we recognized in manual static analysis. A true negative value
represents a not obfuscated sample correctly returned as not obfuscated. The confusion
matrix shows that our heuristics on identifier renaming have very low false positive
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Heuristic
Positive Negative Accuracy
Tr
ut
h True 251 166 91.45%
False 28 11
Precision 89.97% 93.76%
Table 3.3: Confusion matrix of 456 samples that we manually analyzed and heuristics
targeting identifier renaming.
rates and we achieve a very promising true positive rate. The accuracy of heuristics for
detecting identifier renaming on the ground truth dataset, computed as correct decisions
of heuristics divided by the 456 samples, is 91.45%. Assuming that the rate of accuracy
holds for all samples, then 27,045 out of 29,574 samples would be correctly identified.
3.3.4 Chronological Quantitative Analysis
We apply heuristics from Subsection 3.3.1 to the A.1 dataset and ascertain whether
Android malware submitted to VirusTotal between the years 2009 and 2014 employ string
encryption, reflection, or encryption. The so generated chronological quantitative analysis
of the A.1 dataset provides valuable insights into recent trends of Android malware.
From the 32.217 downloaded samples in the A.1 dataset we could analyze only 29.574
samples. The distribution of the analyzed samples is visualized in a chronological manner
grouped by the first submission to the VirusTotal database in Figure 3.3. The time interval
is set to be a quarter of a year. The last bar is relatively small since it involves only samples
which were submitted to VirusTotal in the first four days of July in 2014. Assuming
that Android malware doubles every year [166], we can claim that Android users are
confronted with at least 850 new samples each week. Years 2009 and 2010 might not be
very representative with respect to the number of samples, but we list them because these
years elucidate the first occurrence of the respective obfuscation type in Android malware
in the following Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the percentage of Android samples identified as using identifier
renaming. It fluctuates between 40,48% in the last quarter of 2011 and 75,10% in the second
quarter of 2014. Figure 3.4 confirms our expectations that more and more samples are
utilizing obfuscation of Type I. It strongly indicates the convenient use of ProGuard [107]
integrated into the Android build system opposed to identifier renaming of Types II, III,
and IV which have to be invoked manually by the app developer. This is probably the
main reason why obfuscation of Types II, III and IV altogether are present in no more than
10% of all analyzed samples. Recall that in our ground truth dataset, only seven samples
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Figure 3.3: Number of samples grouped by the first submission year and quarter.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of samples using identifier renaming.
out of 456 employed more than just one type of identifier renaming. This corresponds to
less than 2% of all samples.
The heuristic on reflection was first matched at the end of 2010. The percentage of
reflection in samples remained quite steady for two and a half years with a sudden peak
in Q2 of 2012. In this quarter, three Android malware families (DroidKungFu, Fokonge,
and RuFraud) were extremely active employing reflection in more than 70% of their
samples. From 715 samples downloaded in Q2 of 2012, only 269 samples did not belong
to any of these three families. Not counting these three families, the percentage of samples
using reflection would fall back to 23%. This was a unique phenomenon, which does not
apply to any other quarter. Therefore, if we say that we noticed a slight increase from
Q3 of 2012 to Q1 of 2013, then it can be observed in many families. From Q1 2013 on,
Figure 3.5 shows a falling tendency for reflection. We assume that reflection was loosing
its popularity due to its fatal limitation. Recall that reflection determines its characteristics
at runtime, allowing dynamic analysis to completely resolve all reflected classes and
methods at runtime.
Figure 3.6 gives the percentage of samples using encryption. Although encryption
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of samples using reflection.
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of samples using encryption.
was the most common obfuscation technique in 2012 with an average value of 64,6%
compared to 55,9% for identifier renaming, the last year shows a falling tendency. Still,
the majority of Android malware utilizes some sort of encryption.
The different numbers in our chronological quantitative analysis compared to [21] are
due to the fact that we normalized the size of each family to one thousand samples at
most to provide a more accurate distribution of encryption across various families. The
largest families w.r.t. a number of samples include trivial malware, and trivial malware
does not utilize encryption.
An exhaustive list of analyzed Android malware families for the presence of iden-
tifier renaming, reflection, and encryption divided based on heuristics can be found in
Appendix A.
3.4 Dynamic Analysis
An in-depth analysis of traffic initiated by a malware sample during static analysis is
too time-consuming. Through dynamic analysis one observes the behavior of an app
during its execution and captures all runtime information and connection attempts within
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1. Initialization
Modify Android sources
Build emulator
Modify system image
Install benign apps
Import user data
Generate benign traffic
Create restore point
2. Dynamic analysis
Read main activity
Boot emulator
Set battery state
Install APK
 Start main activity
Emulate clicks
Copy & start emulator
Receive short messages
Send short messages
Receive call
Initiate call
Browse Internet
Reboot
3. Parsing
Read radio log and pcap file
Remove by us generated traffic 
Create lists
Figure 3.7: Stages in the dynamic analysis.
a short period of time. From this gathered information, it is usually straightforward to
guess a sample’s malicious activity. To limit the damage of the malicious activity, we
executed dynamic analysis in a sandboxed environment. Our primary target was to learn
more about SMS and IP traffic initiated by Android malware. Our dynamic analysis
has three stages. Since some samples actively check for the presence of an emulated
environment [173], the first initialization stage creates a customized emulator and system
image. The second stage runs the malicious samples in the customized emulator and
records all initiated short messages and IP traffic. The last stage parses the radio log and
pcap file generated during the execution. All three stages are illustrated in Figure 3.7. The
first and the last stage need to be run only once.
It is noteworthy to state that before we set up our dynamic analysis, we analyzed
hundreds of Android malware samples manually in static analysis. Based on our expe-
riences, we created an environment in which samples could inform the MoMO about
information related to the simulated user or device either via short messages or by
Internet communication, but not actively infecting other devices, nor spreading itself
beyond the sandboxed environment under any circumstances. Outgoing radio services
like SMS or calls were intercepted directly in the emulator. IP traffic was allowed without
restrictions. At the time of running the dynamic analysis no Android malware variants
were known that were actively infecting other Android devices. Two years later, there is
still no evidence that any of the analyzed samples tried to infect other devices or spread
themselves beyond the emulator.
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3.4.1 Customizations and Stages of the Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis of Android malware samples is typically done in the Android emulator,
see Section 2.7. We downloaded Android source trees for versions 2.2 (Froyo) and 4.2.2
(Jelly Bean) from the AOSP and modified source code in files responsible for sim card and
modem emulation even before we created the new binary image. Both files responsible
for sim card and modem emulation are licensed under the Apache Software License,
version 2.0. Patched values were the sim card number, phone number, voice mail number,
operator network name, IMEI, IMSI, Mobile Country Code (MCC), and Mobile Network
Code (MNC). Compared to directly overwriting these values in an existing binary image
of the emulator, our approach supports values of arbitrary lengths without modifying
any additional bytecode of the binary image.
Properties of the system image are listed in the build.prop file. We extracted the
image and modified values indicating the device, board, and model name, brand, build
ID, manufacturer, product, CPU, and its fingerprint. All values for Android 2.2 are set in
the same way as they are set on an HTC Google Nexus One smartphone and for Android
4.2.2 in the same way as they are set on an HTC One X+ smartphone. The only string
that we could not modify in both Android versions was the name of the hardware. The
default value in the Android emulator is the string goldfish. By modifying it in the
build.prop file, the Android emulator did not start at all. We tried to modify this string
in a running instance, but it led to crash within a few seconds.
In the running system, we modify values that may identify the running emulated
instance. We set the network environment, create a fake identity, and generate benign
traffic. The fake identity is an adult male called Peter Miller from Germany. He is
a big fan of Beyoncé and actively uses Twitter, Facebook, and other benign apps. The
phonebook contains over 50 entries. The majority are Germans, but contacts from other
countries like US, Russia, China, Japan, Spain, Korea, France, and Netherlands are present
as well. Phone numbers are stored with national and international prefixes. Call, SMS,
and browser histories are filled with benign entries. Not all short messages are already
read, some are left as unread and read later during the second stage. The initialization
stage returns the modified Android emulator and modified system image that serves as
the restore point. The clean state is always restored at the beginning of the second stage.
The second stage executes the app. While the Android emulator boots the copy of
the clean system image, the main activity is extracted from the Manifest file. After the
successful booting, the host machine connects to the emulator over the ADB. We set the
battery state to charging with 90% remaining battery and force the installation of the
app. If the installation is successful (i.e. no errors were returned), then we start the main
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activity of the app and click the keys Enter and Down over the ADB. In the background,
we initiate and receive calls, short messages and browse the Internet in order to trigger
the malicious activity of the app. The structure of short messages mimic chat messages
and two-factor authentication of financial institutions. As the last simulated action, the
ADB instructs the default browser to open the webpage of our institute. By opening the
webpage we knew that the last intermediate step in the second stage is triggered, and we
reboot the emulator. Each app is run twice. In the first run, we start the app right after
the installation. Then we reboot the emulator and repeat all steps except for installation.
All the time, the logging system of the emulator records ingoing and outgoing traffic.
In fact, the logging system records three types of traffic. Traffic initiated by the app,
by the system and the communication between the emulator and host machine. Radio
communication is read directly from the radio log and IP traffic is saved as pcap files and
parsed in the third stage. This final stage filters out all traffic not initiated by the app. The
remaining traffic is analyzed for the presence of short messages and IP traffic. The result
of the third stage is a list containing short messages with phone numbers of recipients
and IP addresses of servers the analyzed app is trying to communicate with.
The dynamic analysis supports Android versions 2.2 (Froyo) and 4.2.2 (Jelly Bean). A
single run with GUI takes on average no more than ninety seconds. If a single run takes
longer than ten minutes, then we abort the analysis and discard the app. This happens
because we force the installation of apps including apps that usually do not run on Froyo
or Jelly Bean. In such cases, the app might not respond to our intents triggered by the
dynamic analysis.
The dynamic analysis can be easily parallelized. We could run up to three instances
on a single host machine with four CPUs in parallel.
3.4.2 Results from the Dynamic Analysis
Figure 3.8 shows the number of analyzed samples from the A.2 dataset and collected
number of SIMM messages, unique SIMM messages, and m-unique SIMM messages
per year. In the following we highlight some findings about gathered phone numbers,
keywords and IP connections gathered from the dynamic analysis applied on samples
of the A.2 dataset. We show that many samples share identical phone numbers and
keywords. At the end of this subsection, we list strings found in SIMM messages that
refer to some type of a sensitive information.
Our findings elucidate the nature and type of traffic initiated by mobile malware on
concrete examples and demonstrate how the proposed detection mechanisms proposed
in this thesis work so well. For instance, the continually repeating phone numbers and
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Samples
SIMM messages
M-unique SIMM messages
Unique SIMM messages
Figure 3.8: Android malware samples and SIMM messages in the A.2 dataset.
keywords in SIMM messages show that there exist relationships between many mobile
malware samples even before we introduce the social network analysis.
Phone Numbers
From all gathered phone numbers only 796 captured phone numbers were unique; from
which 782 phone number had more than three digits. Phone numbers had both national
and international formats. Their distribution is given in Table 3.4. The row No. of digits
denotes the number of digits in the phone number and the row No. of phone numbers shows
how many phone numbers with the given digits were captured in the dynamic analysis.
The length of valid phone numbers varied by 4 digits. The longest captured valid phone
number had sixteen digits. Phone numbers with less digits were overrepresented in the
A.2 dataset but underrepresented in the phone number distribution based on digits. For
instance, 243 (31%) of all valid unique phone numbers had no more than nine digits but
these 243 phone numbers could be found in 4.990 SIMM messages (out of 8.845 SIMM
messages).
The five most repeating phone numbers were short numbers 8700, 8738, 5373, 6006
and 7250. Table 3.5 summarizes some of the gathered phone numbers. The column
Phone number specifies the phone number for which we give the statistics. Its absolute
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No. of digits 4 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
No. of phone numbers 188 1 36 11 7 17 478 29 7 6 1 1
Table 3.4: Distribution of phone numbers collected in the dynamic analysis based on
digits.
Phone number Frequency No. of samples Keywords Other phone numbers
8700 758 758 IMA, GP, HACHAT, PN, PU, HALG, GN 8738, 8775, 8969, 9013
8738 693 689 GAME1, DK, TG, KPAH, MGO, VMD, TGM 8700, 8969, 8775
5373 225 223 604+bigs, L673, 32321, j4990, X487 7250, 7099, 7030, 5370, 1005
6006 217 167 bigpp, playnet, zorfa, bigfun, rusgi, netbit 6005, 6008, 6952, 6152, 6952, 3009
7250 194 105 604+bigs, L673, 4841352, 48494427, 48414236, 428093 5373, 7250, 7099, 7030, 5370, 2332, 7019
1062999923 181 18 b91 106277778
6952 175 168 bigpp, playnet, mawni, bigfun, galve, rusgi, netbit 6005, 6008, 6006, 6152, 3009,
6008 166 166 bigpp, playnet, briez, bigfun, galve, upgame, netbit 6005, 6006, 6952, 6152, 3009,
7099 133 129 X487, 604+bigs, j4990, 221001, 428093, L673, 04001 5370, 2332, 7019, 5373, 7250, 7030, 1005
6152 108 102 bigpp, playnet, bigfun, brolk, ysker 6008, 6952, 6006, 6005,
10658423 75 68 mvwlan, MVSUP3 10658080
576 88 44 04131, 0428038, 04131, 0428093
Table 3.5: Examples of the most often occurring phone numbers collected in the dynamic
analysis.
occurrence within the 8.845 SIMM messages is given in the column Frequency. The next
column No. of samples gives the number of samples that initiated a SIMM message with
this phone number. If frequency equals to the number of samples, then each sample sends
exactly one SIMM message to this phone number. The last two columns Keywords and
Other phone number list keywords of SIMM messages sent to this phone number and other
phone numbers used as recipient in SIMM messages that were also sent by one or more
of the samples that initiated the SIMM message with the phone number shown in the
first column.
Keywords in SIMM Messages
We observed that samples sending premium short messages to the number 6006 send
at least three identical SIMM messages, often five. For instance SIMM messages sent to
the short number 6006 contained keywords playnet, netbit, bigfun, and bigpp. If the
premium number was 7250 and the keyword was L673, than the samples always sent
three SIMM messages. If the keyword was 604+bigs, than five SIMM messages were
sent and two of them to the premium number 7250. SIMM messages sent to premium
numbers 6005, 6006, 6008, 6152 and 6952 were often seen together, i.e., sent by the same
sample. If an Android malware sample initiated a short message to the number 6008,
then the very next messages were sent to 6952 and 6006 respectively. The first most
often occurring non-short number was the number 1062999923 occurring in 181 messages.
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Keyword Frequency No. of samples Unique Phone numbers Other keywords
IMA 664 664 655 8700 GAME1
GAME1 662 662 653 8738 IMA, VMD
604+bigs 435 87 87 5373, 7250, 7099, 7030
playnet 194 47 57 6005, 6008, 6952, 6006, 6152, 2727 692046
\u624b\u673a. . . 190 190 1 18046301549, 15943358327, 13235810280 \u62e6\u622a. . . (in Chinese)
\u62e6\u622a. . . 140 140 75 13207357435, 15862838544, 15055337975, 18114516204 \u624b\u673a. . . (in Chinese)
692046 171 55 55 7530, 7520, 7510, 1151, 1161, 3381, 7750, 7730, 7720 playnet, gf
galve 124 73 73 6008,6952 upgame, rusgi, 678BSMS, brolk
upgame 64 64 64 6005,6008 galve, rusgi, 678BSMS
brolk 52 45 45 6152,6006 upgame, galve, rusgi
Table 3.6: Examples of the most often occurring keywords collected in the dynamic
analysis.
Samples sending short messages to this number sent many identical SIMM messages
with the content b91. Phone numbers used only once were quite underrepresented. The
maximum number of sent SIMM messages per single analysis run was 30 messages.
Table 3.6 shows that identical keywords seem to be registered by many premium
rate services. The description of columns Keyword, Frequency, No. of samples, Phone
numbers, and Other keywords is tantamount to Table 3.5. The column Unique gives the
number of unique SIMM messages starting with the keyword. Altogether we found 1.058
unique keywords. The keyword IMA is the most frequent keyword. Moreover, if the
first keyword is IMA, then the probability that the second messages sent by the same
samples starts with the keyword GAME1 is very high. Samples sending the keyword
604+bigs often send five messages in total, one to phone numbers 5373, 7099, 7030 and
two identical messages to the phone number 7250. Keyword 692046 is sent to at least
three different recipients per sample. Keywords upgame, galve, and brolk have the same
message postfix. In addition, the keyword brolk is always accompanied by messages
with one of the three keywords rusgi, galve, or upgame. In general, the analysis of phone
numbers and keywords shows that many mobile malware samples are connected to each
other. This finding will be crucial for social network analysis in Section 3.5. Moreover, the
identical keywords in many samples make classification easier.
Non-Latin characters were found in 173 unique keywords and 1.025 SIMM messages.
These could not be properly decoded because of the different encoding scheme. Therefore,
we represent each non-Latin character by a four digit hexadecimal number. In Table 3.6,
such four digit hexadecimal numbers have the prefix \u.
IP Connections
During the dynamic analysis, we captured Internet traffic between the Android emulator
and our host machine, traffic initiated by us or the emulator itself, and traffic initiated by
Android malware. The first and second types of traffic simply signaled that the image
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Type Strings Content of the SIMM message
User-specific
IMSI deviceid:123456789012347,imsi:310260667969997
Mobile TAN 43413;1402053280000;mTAN 213199
IBAN 92140->SEPA Transfer to IBAN DE95123131345845, TAN:468485
Call details come in, no anwser,number:004917181293543 time:nullanswer time:nullhung up time:2014-06-07 00:41:33
Device-specific
IMEI IMSI=310260667969997,IMEI=123456789012347,ver=10001,CT=dpt,channel=200001,
Device ID deviceid:123456789012347,imsi:310260667969997
OS, OS version MODEL:Nexus, SYSVER:4.2 AndroidFirstSend ver3
Model, country imei: 123456789012347, country: us, cell: Android, android: 4.2, model: Google Nexus
Malware-specific
Status install apk done!
Package name rock.iconosys.com
App name GAME1 DAICHIENTRENKHONG_APP
App version ANDROID_FIRST_READ ver1, OS:4.2
Time of installation 790383411 833 Android2-2013-10-16-17:02:18
Time of execution din 1940 2013-01-28 10:27:01 JN (31)
Commands 99#310260667969997#android#doudou_1
Table 3.7: List of strings indicating mobile malware communication.
was running properly. These were removed from the log as soon as the dynamic analysis
was finished. We used only the third type of Internet traffic for evaluation. From over
100.000 connections, only 1.100 destination IPv4 addresses were unique. We observed no
IPv6 addresses at all.
We marked each of the 1.100 destination IP addresses as potentially referring to mobile
malware. It should be noted, however, that many external servers are hidden behind
a NAT hosting illicit and legitimate traffic simultaneously. Therefore, without further
knowledge about the source, it is not possible to differentiate between IP addresses
that are directly contacted by mobile malware and those that are part of the benign
functionality of the app. These 1.100 IPv4 addresses represent the A.2.IP subset of the
A.2 dataset.
Sensitive Information found in SIMM messages
During our dynamic analysis of samples in the A.2 dataset, we observed that mobile
malware indeed uses short messages to send sensitive information. This sensitive in-
formation can be divided into three categories based on the nature of the information.
The first category is user-specific information. Mobile malware samples in the A.2
datasets were interested in the IMSI, mobile TAN, IBAN numbers and call details. Device-
specific information was sent too. Device-specific information included the IMEI number,
device ID, device model OS, OS version, and the country in which the mobile device is
currently located. The last category forms SIMM messages responsible for controlling
and administration of the mobile malware. Here, we recorded SIMM messages sending
the status of the installation, information about the package and app name of the mobile
malware, app version, time of installation, time of execution and diverse commands in
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the content of the SIMM message.
The full list of strings pointing to some sensitive information together with its oc-
currence in SIMM message is given in Table 3.7. The first part of Table 3.7 summarizes
user-specific strings, the second part device-specific strings and the last part mobile
malware-specific strings. Listed strings in Table 3.7 serve as the input for pattern matching
in Subsection 4.4.2.
3.5 Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis illustrates relationships between data. We reuse social network
analysis to analyze relationships between Android malware samples initiating SMS traffic.
At first glance, social network analysis provides no additional information compared
to static and dynamic analyses. However, it can reveal more complex relationships
more efficiently than traditional databases. This is especially propitious when complex
information is not directly related, but can be derived from multiple samples.
Detecting this pattern would have been significantly more time-consuming using
typical methods of data representation. Simply graphically representing the data is also
insufficient to detect complex relationships. An initial graphical representation of a social
network is characterized by randomly located nodes on a graph. Edges interconnecting
nodes have many intersections and the whole figure looks cluttered. By utilizing social
network analysis tools and layout algorithms, however, the layout of the graph changes
considerably and the relationships between nodes become more evident. Therefore, if
nodes and edges are placed properly, then the resulting social graph ensures that the
security researcher does not miss any important detail by making the information more
visually accessible.
3.5.1 Social Graph Generation
We generate the social graph using the Gephi tool, see Section 2.7. Input data were
relationships between keywords of SIMM messages, phone numbers, and samples repre-
sented by hash values from the A.2.R subset of the A.2 dataset. Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10
illustrate final graphical representations after the application of layout algorithms. Each
SIMM message is split into two nodes. The first node represents the keyword and the
second node the phone number of a SIMM message.
Phone numbers, keywords, and malware samples are represented as triangles, squares,
and circles, respectively. The shape and the color of each node are of great importance.
The color of the circle represents the character set found in the decompiled source code
of the respective Android malware sample. If the circle node is blue, then the whole
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Latin alphabet only
Cyrillic alphabet
Chinese characters
Keywords
Numbers
Figure 3.9: Less complex clusters of Android malware.
decompiled source code is written solely in the Latin alphabet. Red nodes correspond to
samples that use Cyrillic letters in the source code although the main part of the code is
written in the Latin alphabet. Examples include hardcoded strings such as "отп" (which
is the radical of the word send or sender in Russian) or "текст" (which is Russian for the
English word text). Finally, samples using Chinese characters are depicted as yellow
nodes. Note that we did not encounter any sample using a mix of Cyrillic and Chinese
characters in any decompiled source code.
Edges represent relations between phone numbers, keywords, and samples. Obvi-
ously, each malware sample has at least two edges. The first edge connects the sample
with the phone number of the recipient and the second edge connects it with the keyword
of the short message sent by the sample. If, e.g., many malware samples send short
messages to the same phone number but with different keywords, then the resulting
cluster forms two rings with the phone number node in the middle, see Figure 3.9. The
first colored ring represents samples and the second ring of squares keywords. Sometimes,
the structure of related phone numbers, keywords, and samples is more complex and
harder to illustrate. In that case, nodes in the middle exhibit more edges than outer nodes.
3.5.2 Authorship Estimation of Android Malware
Figure 3.9 depicts about one-sixth of all analyzed Android malware samples. We removed
Android malware samples coping patterns depicted in Figure 3.9 as listing all samples
would lead to a pointlessly complex figure. The figure shows two different patterns. We
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Figure 3.10: The four most complex clusters of Android malware.
call the first pattern single instances and the second pattern simple rings. A single instance
is an Android malware sample that is characterized by not sharing any phone numbers
or keywords with other malware samples. The most trivial single instances in Figure 3.9
have just three nodes and two edges, one to the phone number and one to the keyword. A
simple ring is characterized by many samples referring to only one number or keyword.
We observed simple rings with just one number and many keywords more often than
simple rings with just one keyword and many phone numbers. We attribute this to the
fact that in many countries a user owning a premium number can freely choose a couple
of additional keywords without any extra costs. In the static analysis of simple rings, we
revealed that there exist two more rationales for the ring form. The ring pattern is formed
when samples are generated by wrappers or identical samples signed with different
certificates. Since those malware samples are typically trivial, we suppose that single
instances as well as simple rings were written by rather unskilled malware authors who
try to earn quick money by sending premium messages.
More skilled malware authors seem to be responsible for the majority of Android
malware. Their complex communication relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.10.
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This figure exposes the four most complex malware clusters. In fact, the largest cluster
interconnects more than 21% of all analyzed samples, and all four clusters together
interconnect more than half of all analyzed samples. Recall that the color of nodes denotes
the character set found in decompiled source code.
The layout of the social graph that appears in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 already
allows us to preselect candidates for further analysis. More than one-half of the analyzed
malware samples share phone numbers or keywords with other samples. For some
samples, it is characteristic that they always send short messages to fixed phone numbers,
but their content differs in keywords. Other samples prefer one keyword and many
phone numbers. In both cases, the communication behavior of the very next neighbors
sharing the same phone number or keywords with the samples can serve as an indicator
that two samples were written by the same author.
In our dataset, we found only 101 single instances. Hence, the probability that a
suspicious app is indeed malicious and does not share a keyword or a phone number
with already listed Android malware can be estimated to 3.13%. Here, the social network
analysis enables security researchers to perceive idiosyncrasies of Android malware
within a cluster as well as in the context of the whole Android malware ecosystem
in a very understandable form. Especially the property of viewing idiosyncrasies in
the ecosystem outperforms traditional databases, which are unsuitable for presenting
complex relations of all samples simultaneously.
Figure 3.10 suggests that Android malware initiating short messages is language
specific, and authors of different malware clusters reuse neither numbers nor keywords
of other malware writing groups. Otherwise, we would see edges between numbers,
keywords, and both red and yellow nodes. If we further assume that each of the four
complex clusters was written by either an English, Russian or Chinese-speaking group,
then each cluster should be clearly separable. However, the third largest cluster located
top right in Figure 3.10 exposes one sample with Chinese characters in it. We have
manually analyzed this sample and determined that the main malicious activity, besides
sending short messages, is ad fraud. The source code of the app contains many third-
party ad libraries, and two of them are provided by Chinese ad providers. Since all of
the Chinese characters found in the sample were part of the embedded third-party ad
library, we can treat this sample as a Latin alphabet only. Then, all four clusters are clearly
separable. It strongly suggests the fact that there exist at least four groups of skilled
Android malware authors. We can go even further. Note that all single instances, simple
rings and complex groups shown in Figure 3.9 or Figure 3.10 mix either Latin letters
with Cyrillic letters or Latin letters with Chinese characters. Therefore, we can claim that
there is no mutual exchange between malware authors writing in Cyrillic and Chinese
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Figure 3.11: Malware samples sending SIMM messages to the phone number 7250.
characters.
With the help of social network analysis, we try to determine the approximate number
of authors in each complex cluster. A closer look at Figure 3.10 reveals that each complex
cluster consists of more subtle interconnected substructures. These are either single
instances or, more frequently, single rings. If we assume that each transition between
larger single rings is written by a different author, then we count approximately eleven
distinct authors in the Cyrillic group and seven in the Chinese group. For comparison,
authors of [156] observed that 60% of Russian Android malware can be traced back to
one of ten toll fraud mobile malware developing organizations operating in Russia.
3.5.3 Empirical Verification on an Example
To verify our statement that samples in clusters were written by the same author, we
randomly selected samples, keywords, or phone numbers forming a cluster and analyzed
them manually. An example analysis is illustrated in Figure 3.11. In the analysis, we exa-
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mined source code, app structure, and the certificate file of all 105 samples highlighted in
Figure 3.11. Highlighted samples are either part of the big group, red group or interconnect
outer smaller clusters.
The big group contains the majority of 105 samples. All samples are nearly identical.
They share the name of the package (com.agewap.soft), main activity (ProgressBarActivi-
ty), and certificate file (ALIAS_NA.RSA) and differ in the .dex file and icon. Source code
responsible for the functionality is identical, but the hardcoded SIMM messages in the
source code vary within the big group. The functionality is very trivial. After the sample
is started, a progress bar is shown to the user and in the background, the sample tries
to send up to five SIMM messages. Submission dates of samples to VirusTotal were all
very close to each other. We verified their creation by comparing timestamps contained in
meta information of the compressed APK.
Samples in the red group are repackaged apps of an Opera updater. Again, all samples
in the red group share the name of the package, main activity, and certificate file. In
addition, they share the icon and source code. The only difference is in assets holding an
xml file with SIMM messages. The source code is more structured compared to samples
in the big group but employ the same idea with the progress bar.
Samples interconnecting two clusters use the same certificate (ALIAS_NA.RSA) as
samples from the big group. Therefore, we can argue that there exists a clear parallel
between all samples sending SIMM messages to the phone number 7250. This leads to
the conclusion that all samples highlighted in Figure 3.11 were written by one author.
Similar parallels were experienced in all other manual analyses as well.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the static and dynamic analysis of Android malware. For static
analysis, we described seven heuristics detecting obfuscation types hindering the static
analysis. The presence of identifier renaming, reflection and encryption were evaluated
in a chronological quantitative analysis of 29.574 samples. The chronological quantitative
analysis revealed that only identifier renaming is on the rise. Reflection and encryption hit
their peaks in the first half of the year 2012, and now their presence in Android malware
is declining.
For dynamic analysis, we first customized the Android emulator and system image,
and created a fake identity that tricked malicious samples into thinking they were being
executed on an actual device. Then we ran the dynamic analysis on 4.468 samples
and recorded 8.845 SIMM messages. We realized that many messages shared the same
keyword and were sent to only 782 different phone numbers. This led to the social
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network analysis. We visualized the Android malware initiating SIMM messages with
the help of social graphs and revealed that this malware type is highly interconnected. We
were able to set apart trivial malware clusters from more complex interconnected groups
of clusters. Single instances were very rare. In fact, if the apps did not share any keywords
or phone numbers with already analyzed malware sample, then the probability that the
app was malicious is less than 3.2%. Besides many single instances and simple rings,
the majority of Android malware sending SIMM messages is part of one of four highly
interconnected complex groups, and these groups of clusters are language-dependent.
Then we estimated the number of authors behind the four most complex clusters and
verified our assumption that samples in a cluster are written by the same author on an
example of 105 samples sending SIMM messages to the number 7250.
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The 3GPPMOP Sensor
Mobile malware targeting Android devices (mis)uses the 3GPP network during several
stages of its lifetime. Before installation, the malicious APK propagates through the
network. Detection of a malicious APKs in 3GPP networks is very challenging as the
traffic typically looks like regular encrypted traffic. Nevertheless, header and meta
information like the IP address or the DNS name are still visible to the MNO. In the time
after installation and before initiating any communication, the mobile malware remains
undetectable for the MNO. The first communication of mobile malware is either its
activation or direct execution of the malicious activity. Observable traffic in the activation
stage includes the sending of the installation status informing the MoMO that the malware
is fully operational. This status is often too short to be detected in the IP traffic. However,
if the status is sent over SMS, then it is usually unique to the respective mobile malware
and easy to detect in a 3GPP network. Strings exchanged in the execution stage usually
provide the most evidence.
The aim of this chapter is to describe a lightweight protection sensor called the
3GPPMOP, which we developed to detect mobile malware targeting the network edge.
The sensor can run in currently operated 3GPP networks world-wide, such as the GSM,
UMTS, or LTE network. It can detect traffic initiated by or attributed to mobile malware
that uses the network as a medium of transmission. By supporting circuit-switched
services in addition to packet-switched services, we believe that this sensor enhances
current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and will provide extensive detection and
prevention capabilities for 3GPP networks. The circuit-switched services seems to be out
of the interests of current IDSs running withing the 3GPP network.
The 3GPPMOP architecture consists of two lines of detection. The first line of detection
employs very fast detection approaches and should detect known traffic in the first place.
The second line of detection complements the first line of detection by more complex
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approaches that can detect even not yet analyzed traffic patterns.
In this chapter, we describe blacklisting and pattern matching as two suitable candi-
dates for the first line of detection. A simple blacklist matching entries on the list line by
line is not sufficient as in the 3GPP networks such a list can have up to several million
entries. Therefore, we propose a highly space efficient blacklist that merges entries in
the list and evaluates its space efficiency in several scenarios. In pattern matching, we
discuss types of strings indicating communication between the infected device and the
MoMO. Here, we highlight that there exist different types of traffic and that not every
string generated by mobile malware must strictly indicate a communication initiated by
mobile malware.
Since all detection approaches are not infallible, we propose and implement a stand-
alone DAIMON app listing all events detected by the 3GPPMOP sensor. Besides listing
the events, the DAIMON app give users the possibility to whitelist them by solving
an SMS-based CAPTCHA. The whole DAIMON app communicates exclusively over
circuit-switched services and does not foreseen any Internet connection. Therefore, it can
be operated in the 2G environment as well. For demonstration purposes of the DAIMON
app, we deployed a simplified 3GPPMOP sensor within an Android device and rerouted
relevant radio traffic through the simplified 3GPPMOP sensor.
In the following, we first provide an overview of significant research in the area
of blacklisting and IDSs in Section 4.1. Then we continue with the description of the
3GPPMOP architecture, design goals, and components in Section 4.2 and sensor place-
ment in Section 4.3. Blacklisting and pattern matching being part of the first line of
detection are described in Section 4.4. The DAIMON app is introduced in Section 4.5.
The same section propose the SMS-based CAPTCHA and shows how we redirected the
radio traffic through the 3GPPMOP sensor. The second line of detection is presented in
Chapter 5.
This chapter summarizes several of our publications. The 3GPPMOP architecture
together with its deployment is described in two publications [102] and [87]. In [102], we
introduced the first line of detection and evaluated a possible candidate for the second
line of detection. Highly space efficient blacklisting is analyzed in depth in [101]. Here,
we showed algorithms that optimize the number of entries in terms of space. Its extended
version [103] applies the highly space efficient blacklisting on traffic initiated by Android
malware. Frequently requested strings by MoMOs are mentioned in [87]. Moreover, this
publication outlines first thoughts on user interaction without the use of any Internet
connection.
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4.1 Related Work
Although 3GPP networks are well protected, their infrastructure is often misused by
MoMOs for communication with infected devices. The various IDSs and netflow analysis
approaches known from fixed networks cannot completely filter mobile malware-related
traffic, as these systems are typically designed for data-switched networks that substan-
tially differ from circuit-switched services used in mobile networks. In the following,
we start with the different uses of blacklisting in IDSs. Then we move to more evolved
techniques and Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs).
Blacklisting
The use of blacklisting to protect networks from unwanted traffic dates back to the earliest
days of networking. Since then, it has been successfully adapted to many different
application scenarios as well as to the needs of ever growing networks. Nowadays,
network address blacklists are used, e.g., in the context of SPAM filtering to block email ad-
dresses of spammers [126], in the context of DNS blacklisting to detect or block malicious
activities [172], in the context of firewalls as well as in the context of IP address lookup
algorithms forwarding packets in a network [145, 167]. Often, blacklisting is mentioned
as an effective mitigation measure against mobile malware alongside more sophisticated
detection mechanisms [36, 179]. The actual blacklisting, i.e. checking if a network address
of an incoming or outgoing connection is on the list, is realized either by sequentially
matching the address with entries on the list line by line, by bit vector maps [167] or by
binary tries [145]. All of these realizations as well as current blacklisting-like solutions
have good performance, but suffer from large memory consumption [167]. The concrete
implementation of the blacklist or the blacklisting procedure itself is described in none of
the aforementioned approaches. Therefore, we propose a novel space-efficient blacklisting
solution in Subsection 4.4.1 that is based on representing a blacklist as a Boolean function.
By minimizing the Boolean function we optimize the number of entries required to form
the blacklist.
Evolved NIDS-like Solutions
Besides blacklisting, more evolved NIDSs use content-based filtering. There exist several
techniques identifying malicious traffic patterns including spatial-temporal correlation
[83], structured graph analysis [123], filtering based on header information of short
messages [19], and DNS traffic [110]. In the spatial-temporal correlation [83], clients are
grouped according to their destination IP and port. If a fraction of clients connects to
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the same server roughly at the same time exposing similar structure, then the traffic is
assumed to be botnet-related. BotGrep [123] isolates P2P communication of botnets by the
information of which pairs of nodes communicate with one another. This approach uses
complex clustering methods to extract a smaller set of candidate P2P nodes. FIMESS [19]
checks the short message header to detect SMS spam. It utilizes common blacklisting
and checks on time zones and reply paths. Lever et al. [110] investigate the DNS data
generated by mobile devices subscribed to a major US cellular carrier by linking the
hosts observed in DNS resolution within the cellular network with historic evidence of
malicious behavior. The evidence dataset is composed of public blacklist data, phishing
and drive-by download evidence and hosts accessed by known mobile malware.
Triton [25] is the most similar approach to the 3GPPMOP sensor with respect to the
architecture. Triton places its sensor in the 3G network and monitors downloading, traffic
and behavior of malicious apps. Part of the Triton architecture is located in the 3G core
network and identifies malicious network traffic. Their architecture is designed with
extensibility in mind. It supports any number of well known techniques to identify
malicious traffic patterns. The difference is that Triton requires an additional trusted
component installed on each Android mobile device. This trusted component needs to
be run in a privileged virtual machine or within the kernel space to isolate the trusted
component from other apps running on the device. Then, once a malicious app is detected,
the trusted component has the capability to stop it from execution. The limitation is that
the trusted component is unable to mitigate attacks compromising the kernel space. Our
approach is operational without any trusted component on the client side. The optional
DAIMON app is designed to reduce the number of false positives but all components of
the 3GPPMOP sensor are located exclusively in the core network.
4.2 Architecture Overview
The 3GPPMOP sensor enables detection of traffic initiated by mobile malware directly
in the backbone of 3GPP networks. The sensor is able to detect traffic in both directions
and can be deployed as an inline or passive network sensor. If deployed as an (active)
inline network sensor, it additionally provides filtering capabilities. Note that in many
countries it is prohibited to alter malicious content without informing the user. In this
case a deployment of a passive network sensor is sufficient and reasonable. A passive
network sensor monitors a copy of the actual network traffic. Although it does not posses
the capability to mitigate or block traffic from reaching its final destination, its presence
does not influence the performance of the network. Creating a copy of traffic in a network
is possible through various methods. Most popular are spanning ports or network taps.
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Figure 4.1: The 3GPPMOP architecture and its interaction with other components.
To dynamically split the traffic among multiple sensors of an IDS, NIST recommends load
balancers [149]. The exact location of the 3GPPMOP sensor in various 3GPP networks
will be described later in this chapter in Section 4.3. We first list design goals of the
3GPPMOP sensor and describe the components of the 3GPPMOP architecture.
4.2.1 Design Goals
The 3GPPMOP sensor is designed to be modular, scalable, adaptable for future threats, and
easy to deploy and maintain.
Modularity
The 3GPPMOP sensor has a modular, expandable design. It is extensible in the sense that
it allows an integration of new detection modules on top of the modules we propose in this
chapter. The 3GPPMOP sensor comprises three components: Filter, Checker, and Bridge,
as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The 3GPPMOP sensor represents the first line of detection
and interacts with the second line of detection. Detection mechanisms implemented in
the first line of detection are very lightweight and supposed to detect already known
traffic patterns. Unknown and more complex communication patterns are detected by the
second line of detection. Modules in the second line of defense perform more resource
intensive operations in terms of processing time and memory consumption. Since these
components are not part of the core 3GPPMOP sensor, they can be deployed on any free
resources in the mobile network or even outside the network. Suitable candidates are
anomaly detection systems [28], spatial-temporal correlation [83], or supervised machine
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learning algorithms as detailed in Chapter 5. In fact, any tools and techniques that identify
malicious traffic patterns are possible.
Scalability
Core components of the 3GPPMOP sensor are very lightweight. The system is constructed
so that it can handle a very large volume of Internet and SMS traffic in nearly real-time∗.
The response times of the methods utilized in the first line of detection are negligible.
The second line of detection differentiates between Internet and SMS traffic. Email
communication with companies developing NIDSs for mobile networks state that 10 ms
per analysis of a short message are acceptable for detecting SIMM messages in nearly
real-time. We show in Chapter 5 that the suspicious SMS traffic can be still detected
in nearly real-time but detecting mobile malware initiated Internet traffic is realizable
in offline mode only. Protocols in the IP-based stack are too complex to be parsed and
processed in nearly real-time.
Adaptability
As mobile malware is increasing in sophistication and number, it is essential that each
component of the 3GPPMOP architecture can be updated at any time. The updating
process for HSEB is described in Subsection 4.4.1. Pattern matching and SMS-based
CAPTCHA (SCAPTCHA) challenges can be updated by pushing new lists from an
internal cache or a database. Training of classifiers and tuning of their parameters is
detailed in Section 5.3.
Deployability
The 3GPPMOP sensor is designed to reside in the backbone of a 3GPP network and
monitors incoming and outgoing traffic. We show in Section 4.3 that the 3GPPMOP
sensor is deployable in 3GPP networks up to the current 4G version. The core of the
3GPPMOP can be seen as a single independent sensor. Only one physical piece of
hardware needs to be installed in the core mobile network. The second line of detection
must not strictly be part of the mobile network. However, it is recommended that the
paths between the components of the second line of detection and the 3GPPMOP sensor
are minimal in order to reduce transmission times in both directions.
∗ Users can not differentiate between filtered and unfiltered traffic
84
4.2 Architecture Overview
Maintainability
Maintenance includes updating, retaining, and restoring components to their operable
condition. Because of the modularity property, each component of the 3GPPMOP sensor
and in the 3GPPMOP architecture can be maintained separately without restricting the
functionality of other components. If possible, NIST [149] recommends a separate network
only for maintenance of monitoring components.
4.2.2 Components
The 3GPPMOP sensor consists of three vital components. The incoming traffic is first
filtered by the Filter, and then replicated and sent to the Checker and the Bridge. The
Checker is in fact the first line of detection. It promptly checks for traffic patterns known
to be involved in malicious activities. The Bridge interconnects the first line of detection
with the second line of detection. Strictly speaking, the second line of detection is not part
of the 3GPPMOP sensor but it considerably improves and complements the detection.
Recall that in Section 2.4 we mentioned that new variants of mobile malware can be
easily generated by applying different obfuscation techniques on the same source code
leading to different signatures. This applies to the initiated traffic as well in the sense that
modifications in communication patterns will be no more detected by simple blacklisting
or pattern matching. To detect these, a fully operational second line of detection is
indispensable. In this context, we list components forming the second line of detection as
an inevitable part of the 3GPPMOP architecture.
Filter
The Filter filters the Internet traffic as recommended in [149]. Filtering of short messages
is feasible as SMS is not an immediate service. In particular, it takes some time to deliver
or receive new short messages [69]. Therefore, if the detection and filtering processes
require only a few milliseconds per short message, it is unnoticeable to the user. Each
time a new SMS flow is intercepted by the Filter, the flow is replicated and sent to the
Checker and Bridge, respectively. The replication enables the 3GPPMOP sensor to run
several detection modules in parallel, including the second line of detection.
Checker
The Checker is the most complex component in the 3GPPMOP sensor. It acts as the
first line of detection and integrates highly efficient detection methods like blacklisting
and pattern matching. In addition, if user interaction is enabled, then the Checker
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evaluates feedback from users. The Checker verifies challenges in SCAPTCHAs sent by
users and stores their input in an internal cache or in a database if available. Besides
classical blacklisting, the Checker operates its improved version of highly space efficient
blacklisting described in more detail in Section 4.4. Pattern matching is used to either
match fixed strings using a sliding window technique or process regular expressions,
which is more flexible. With the help of regular expressions, the Checker is able to detect
frequently changing patterns with a fixed structure that are frequently occurring in traffic
initiated by mobile malware. Due to the modular design, methods in the first line of
detection can be easily complemented by new methods.
In the 3GPPMOP architecture, the Checker is always responsible for the final decisions.
If the first line of detection cannot identify the traffic by blacklisting or pattern matching
as being benign or malicious, the Checker waits for the response from the Bridge. The
timeout restriction is bound to the maximum window of time that is still acceptable for
a nearly real-time detection. After the predefined amount of time, the Checker sums
responses pointing to a traffic initiated by mobile malware, multiplies them by a loss
function and compares the result to the sum of responses indicating benign behavior. The
loss function assures that there are less false negatives but more false positives. This is
intended as users are usually willing to accept a few false positives but no false negatives.
The Checker then decides what happens next to the analyzed data. At this stage, various
prevention measures like blocking, partial content deletion, or modification are possible
if required.
Bridge
The Bridge serves as an interface between the 3GPPMOP sensor representing the first line
of detection and other components located within or outside the mobile network. These
components are not essential for the execution of the 3GPPMOP sensor but considerably
improve the final detection rate. The Bridge communicates with all components in the
3GPPMOP architecture over a secure channel. In the one direction, the Bridge specifies
model specific parameters and parses data for components in the second line of detection.
In the opposite direction, the Bridge forwards the obtained results immediately to the
Checker. Since the Bridge does not know the time window in which the Checker accepts
responses from components in the second line of detection, each response is sent not
only to the Checker but also to the database together with the input data and parameters
leading to that result. The same applies to ambiguous results too. Ambiguous results
are results in which the probability that the input data is of malicious nature equals the
probability that the input data is benign. Ambiguous results are often returned from
methods having more than two classes or methods where the union of two classes does
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not cover all possible results.
Classifiers
Components illustrated in Figure 4.1 but excluding the main 3GPPMOP sensor can
significantly improve the detection rate. Strictly speaking, only Classifiers form the second
line of detection, while the Trainer and the Database are requested to update classifiers and
are, therefore, also part of the 3GPPMOP architecture.
Classifiers run more extensive computations and possess processing power exceeding
that of the Checker. Their detection engines are not bound to any particular services or
algorithms. Each Classifier can handle as many requests as required by the 3GPPMOP
sensor. If necessary, a single classifier component runs several identical classifiers in
parallel. All classifiers are adjustable in the sense that parameters provided by the Bridge
specify the trained model and other relevant parameters for classification. Trained models
should periodically be fetched from the Database and stored in the local cache.
In smaller mobile networks, Classifier can be a part of the Checker. However, if the
MNO has enough free resources, then it is recommended that classifiers are separated
from the 3GPPMOP sensor to support better performance and scalability. Since the
3GPPMOP sensor is very lightweight and possesses only limited processing power,
migration to other free resources could improve the performance. Better scalability is
achieved if two 3GPPMOP sensors deployed in two different mobile networks communi-
cate with the same Classifier. Each MNO deploys only a few classifiers but shares them
with other MNOs. Results from different classifiers are combined together to achieve more
accurate classification results. Each MNO benefits from the mutual exchange. The more
information that is acquired for the final decision, the better. Note that the final decision
is always made by the Checker. That way, the MNO can influence the weight of results
obtained from its own Classifier as well as those from another Classifiers provided by
other MNOs. The MNO sharing the Classifier learns the input data and the result. Note
that the input data is already parsed by the Bridge sending the request and, therefore,
already pseudo-anonymised. Nevertheless, by storing input data and result pairs in
its own database, the MNO can train the Classifier on data never observed in its own
network.
Trainer
In order to achieve good detection rates, each Classifier should be frequently updated with
the most recent data. Most machine learning approaches rely on models that determine
the function used for classification. The role of the Trainer is to compute the new model on
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newly collected and analyzed data reflecting the current state. Training a model typically
consists of two steps, see Section 2.6. The data for training is provided by the Database. If
the detection rate of the computed model is sufficient, then the Trainer pushes the model
to the Database. We separated the Trainer from the Classifier because the training period
for generating new models varies greatly based on the input data and the type of classifier.
The classification itself usually needs a constant amount of time.
The Trainer is also responsible for generating new lists for the first line of detection.
Such updates can be triggered as the result of the MNO’s own analysis or by external
sources (e.g. by antivirus companies or user feedback). Though, lists do not have to be
updated with each new entry as different mobile malware samples often reuse the same
syntax and URIs.
Database
The last component in the 3GPPMOP architecture is the Database. A single mobile
network needs a single database, but in large networks a set of databases is more prevalent.
The Database communicates with the Checker, Bridge, Classifier and Trainer. Besides
storing information, as described above, all components should periodically inform the
Database about events that have occurred. To optimize the time needed for classification,
additional information such as the load of the respective classifiers may be stored in the
Database. This information can then be used to generate less complex models performing
faster classification.
In case the MNO wants to support the Detection Approach in Mobile Networks
(DAIMON) app in order to reduce false negatives, all suspicious strings together with
the users’ ID can be stored in the Database.
4.3 Sensor Placement in 3GPP Networks
The 3GPPMOP sensor is designed to support all currently deployed 3GPP networks,
see Section 2.2 for a brief introduction to 3GPP network architectures. Chronologically
speaking, the first digital 3GPP network is the 2G GSM network. The GSM network is
circuit switched and does not support IP traffic. Only calls and MO short messages are
supported. Thus, the SMSC seems to be a good place to filter SMS traffic. However, the
SMSC is not standardized in 3GPP specifications. It cannot be ensured that all types
of short messages are forwarded to the SMSC in the same way in every 3GPP network
deployment.
Mobile devices are connected to 3GPP networks via BTSs, NBs, or eNBs that are part
of the 2G, 3G and 4G raio access network, respectively. The distances between them
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Figure 4.2: Placement of the passive 3GPPMOP sensor in the LTE network architecture.
and other components in the network core are rather long. Recall that the 3GPPMOP
sensor has to make the decision nearly immediately and its architecture is designed
to communicate with components in the network core. Longer paths could negatively
influence the response time. In addition, Since BTSs, NBs, and eNBs are deployed in areas
not controlled by the MNO, an attacker could steal and reverse-engineer the rules used
for traffic filtering within the 3GPPMOP sensor. The same applies for BSCs and RNCs.
Charging systems responsible for network configuration, maintenance, subscriptions
and charging information process mostly signaling traffic. Therefore, they are not suitable
for the deployment of the 3GPPMOP sensor, either.
We recommend the following sensor placements for 3GPP networks. In the GSM
network, the best location is alongside each MSC. The MSC controls all connections
within the circuit switched domain. We identified the MSC to be the perfect location
for filtering traffic originating or terminating at mobile devices connected to the GSM
network. The MSC residing in the GSM core network minimizes the critical path lengths
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between the 3GPPMOP sensor and other components of the 3GPPMOP architecture. For
the UMTS network, the standard proposes the SGSN and the GGSN. We identified that
the SGSN is more suitable for the 3GPPMOP sensor placement. Compared to the GGSN,
the SGSN has a direct interface to the SMSC and is the first routing component in the core
UMTS network. The LTE network possesses only one main SAE-GW interconnecting all
components in the network. Therefore, it is evident that the 3GPPMOP sensor should
be connected to the SAE-GW, see Figure 4.2. The SAE-GW consists of the Serv-GW and
PDN-GW. Both provide lawful interception [6]. If the 3GPPMOP sensor is deployed
as an inline network sensor, then the sensor should be connected to the PDN-GW as
the Serv-GW allows only passive filtering. On the other hand, traffic from mobile de-
vices located within the network is first routed through the Serv-GW. Therefore, if the
3GPPMOP sensor is deployed as a passive network sensor, then the placement alongside
the Serv-GW could detect incidents earlier.
4.4 The First Line of Detection
The first line of detection is designed to utilize only the fastest available detection me-
chanisms with respect to the response time. As the detection mechanism, we propose
a blacklist. Although blacklists are very efficient, they have their limitations. These
limitations become particularly apparent in the context of mobile networks where millions
of packets are processed per second. By simply sequentially matching each URI in a packet
against hundreds of thousands of entries in a blacklist, the whole approach becomes
inefficient. To cope with this limitation, we introduce a very space efficient blacklist by
compressing the entries in the list significantly.
4.4.1 Highly Space Efficient Blacklist
In Section 2.5, we introduced the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, its generation and reduc-
tion steps leading to the minimal cover of a Boolean function. Although the algorithm is
very well suited to be implemented in software and hardware [33], recent tools solving
the two-level minimization problem (e.g. [169], [55], [86]) are still far from being efficient
in terms of memory usage. In addition, adding a single variable to the Boolean function
will roughly double the required memory as the covering matrix increases exponentially
with the number of prime implicants. For functions of n variables, there exist at most
(3n/
√
n) prime implicants [42]. For very large blacklists, the creation of the covering
matrix required for the second step may become infeasible. To overcome the drawback
with the exponentially increasing covering matrices, we propose algorithms that compute
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all (relative) essential prime implicants without the need of the covering matrix and call it
a Space Efficient Quine-McCluskey (SEQM) algorithm.
The SEQM algorithm extends the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The first generation
step in the SEQM algorithm is identical to the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Its reduction
step is similar to the dominated columns method. The SEQM algorithm heuristically
picks a relative essential prime implicant of the highest degree and computes a suboptimal
minimal cover similarly to the dominated columns method, but operates on lists of prime
implicants and completely omits the covering matrix. Although the final cover is not truly
minimal, the SEQM algorithm provides a very good approximation of the truly minimal
cover. What is more important, the generation and reduction of (relatively essential)
prime implicants is highly space efficient.
We represent the HSEB by Boolean logic. Each entry in the HSEB is seen as a Boolean
term and the list of entries is seen as a Boolean function in a disjunctive form representa-
tion. The HSEB assumes entries of fixed length that can be represented by bits like entries
in the IP, port or phone number blacklists.
The Generation Step
The first generation step of the SEQM algorithm is complemented by reduced masks [93].
All terms are described as pairs consisting of a reduced mask and the remaining term
value. For pseudo0(f
′), all reduced masks are initialized to zero and their term values are
the entries in the blacklist in the binary notation. Then, in the matching process, if two
minterms can be matched together (i.e. they differ in a single bit) a new shared reduced
mask is computed as XOR of the previous identical reduced mask and the flipped bit,
see Algorithm 4.1. The flipped bit of the newly generated term value is set to zero. For
example, the m14,15 1-minterm can be expressed as the 0001 1110 binary value with 0001
being the reduction mask and 1110 the term value. The next matching with m10,11 sets
the reduced mask to 0001 XOR 1110 XOR 1010 = 0101 (line 10 of Algorithm 4.1) and the
shared term value to 1110 AND 1010 = 1010 (line 11 of Algorithm 4.1). Note that in order
to find a match of two i-minterms, we require only two trivial instructions since we do
not have to compare literals one by one, but rather we simply check if two reduced masks
are equal and if the hamming distance of their corresponding term values equals one. The
rest of the first phase follows the Quine-McCluskey algorithm recalled in Section 2.5 up
to the point when the list of all unique primen(f
′) with n representing the highest found
degree is generated. The preliminary result of the SEQM’s first step are all possible prime
implicants stored in n + 1 lists in the form of pairs of reduced masks and term values
indicating literals that could not be further reduced.
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Algorithm 4.1: The first phase of the SEQM algorithm.
Input :f
Output :prime(f ′)
1 Convert all products of f to pseudo0(f
′) and prime0(f
′)
2 Set reduced mask to 0
3 for each i = 0 to n do
4 Remove duplicate implicants in pseudoi(f
′)
5 for each pj ∈ pseudoi(f ′) do
6 for each pk ∈ pseudoi(f ′)\ pj do
7 A = mask(pj) XOR mask(pk))
8 B = value(pj) XOR value(pk))
9 if (A = 0) AND (hamm(B) == 1) then
10 mask(p) = mask(pj) XOR B
11 value(p) = value(pj) ADD (NOT mask(p))
12 Add p to primei+1(f
′)
13 Remove pj and pk from primei(f
′)
14 end
15 end
16 pseudoi+1(f
′) = primei+1(f
′)
17 end
18 end
19
The Reduction Step
The reduction process in the Quine-McCluskey method continues with the covering
matrix in which essential prime implicants are determined based on the rows. Here,
the covering matrix is very space consuming since for k prime implicants and l entries
it requires up to kl space. To decrease the memory consumption, our proposed SEQM
algorithm operates only upon the given n + 1 lists.
The second reduction phase of the SEQM algorithm heuristically selects an arbitrary
prime implicant with the highest degree n from primen(f
′) and decomposes it back to all
2n 0-minterms, see Algorithm 4.2. All decomposed 0-minterms are then checked if they
are already covered by any other prime implicant of the same degree n or by essenm(f
′)
with m > n. If a single decomposed 0-minterm cannot be covered, then the selected prime
implicant is strictly a relative essential prime implicant. Otherwise it is discarded. The
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Algorithm 4.2: The second phase of the SEQM algorithm.
Input :prime(f ′)
Output :essen(f ′)
1 for i = n down to 0 do
2 for each pj ∈ primei(f ′) do
3 Decompose pj to k 0-miterms mk for each mk do
4 if mk /∈ primei(f ′)\ pj ∪ essen(f ′) then
5 Add pj to essen(f
′)
6 end
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 Check for essen(f ′)\essen0(f ′) covering a single entry
11 Remove reduced masks from essen0(f
′)
same process repeats for each prime implicant in primen(f
′) so that only relative essential
prime implicants remain in the set. Once we have generated all relative essenn(f
′), the
SEQM algorithm continues with primen−1(f
′) in an iterative manner until essen(f ′) is
completely generated. Although SEQM is not able to determine the set of truly essential
prime implicants because of the missing covering matrix, our empirical evaluation shows
that the final relative essen(f ′) provides a good approximation to the minimal cover and
the whole approach is highly space efficient. Its second phase requires no more than
k + l + 2n memory space.
Pairs in essen(f ′) represent the compressed blacklist. To verify if an entry is on the
list, the compressed blacklist binary adds the tested value to the complement of a reduced
mask in order to zero the masked bits in the tested entry and the result compares to the
term value corresponding to the reduced mask. Note that the negation of reduced masks
can be performed globally right after essen(f ′) is computed and so reduce the number of
comparisons required to two.
To compress the list even more, after the whole essen(f ′) set is generated, all relative
essential prime implicants are checked for the number of uniquely covered entries. If
any relative essential prime implicant uniquely covers only a single entry, it is deleted
and only a single entry is added to essen0(f
′). Our improvement is based on the fact that
relative essential prime implicants of higher degrees uniquely cover only a subset of all 2n
possible entries. Therefore, in the above mentioned case we can reduce the degree of the
relative essential prime implicant to 0. Now, recall that all reduced masks in essen0(f
′)
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are initialized to zeros by default. Since their binary negation of such reduced mask is
1 for each bit, we can omit it and store essen0(f
′) separately without the reduced mask.
This improvement also guarantees that the compressed blacklist is never larger than the
original one. Either at least two entries could be reduced and they are stored as pairs or
they are stored as essen0(f
′). If essen(f ′) = essen0(f
′), then we need one more block for
separation essen0(f
′) from other relative prime implicants. However, in this case we can
return to a simple list.
Maintenance of Entries
New entries are added to the compressed blacklist either directly as new 0-minterms to
essen0(f
′) or indirectly via re-optimization of essen(f ′). Although adding new entries to
essen0(f
′) is trivial and in many cases sufficient, it does not consider the fact that a new
entry could significantly reduce the whole compressed blacklist. Assume the new entry
can be matched several times. Then the final relative essential prime implicant of a degree
m can remove up to m − 1 terms in essen(f ′), one for each matching except the first
one. In addition, since the compressed blacklist administers the whole essen(f ′), it is not
required to start with a single entry because an m-minterm representing a multi range of
entries can be added in just one step (recall the merging of multiple ranges in Section 2.5).
We recommend employing the indirect one whenever possible and so operate a highly
space efficient blacklist. The trade-offs are higher performance costs and time needed for
re-optimization of essen(f ′).
Deleting redundant entries is equivalent to the second phase of the SEQM algorithm.
All relative essential prime implicants pd covering the entry to be removed are decom-
posed to 0-minterms one by one and those already covered by essen(f ′)\pd are discarded.
The rest is either added to essen0(f
′) or follows the second indirect method of the above
add-new-entry procedure.
Note that SEQM has been carefully crafted for solving the minimization problem of
entries in a blacklist. Our empirical observation revealed that the markedly smaller subset
of all possible entries in the blacklist influences the maximum degrees of prime implicants.
The smaller the subset and the more bits are used to describe entries in the blacklist, the
exponentially lower is the ratio of higher degree prime implicants to the overall number
of prime implicants. Concrete examples with exact numbers will be provided in the
next subsection, for now it suffices to notice that the distribution of prime implicants is
exponentially decreasing and n in n + 1 lists are rather small. Apart from the property
that higher degree prime implicants might cover other lower degree prime implicants,
the exponentially smaller cyclic core for prime implicants of higher degrees is also the
reason why we utilize the top-down approach.
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Dataset Bits No. of entries prime(f ′) E(f ′)[E0(f
′)] Saved
A.2.PN 54 782 741 741 [704] 0.38%
A.2.IP 32 1,100 839 793 [646] 14.46%
A.3 32 1,448,523 1,354,794 1,174,117 [964,169] 4.45%
B.2 17 7,079 8,552 2,515 [1,027] 43.44%
B.3 16 6,053 3,555 1,013 [479] 74.29%
Table 4.1: Space saved by applying the SEQM algorithm.
Evaluation of the SEQM Algorithm
We implemented the SEQM algorithm and tested its suitability in five different scenarios
applicable in current 3GPP networks. We evaluated the B.2 (RWTH land-line numbers),
B.3 (IANA ports), A.3 (DNS blacklist) and two subsets of the A.2 dataset - A.2.PN
(unique phone numbers in SIMM messages), A.2.IP (IPv4 addresses captured in the
dynamic analysis), see Section 3.2 for more information on datasets. In the following,
the datasets A.2.PN, A.2.IP and A.3 pose as three blacklists and datasets B.2 and B.3
pose as two whitelists. All IPv4 addresses are represented as 32-bit integers and IANA
ports as 16-bit integers. The RWTH phone numbers have up to six digits whereas the
longest phone number in A.2.PN has sixteen digits. These numbers correspond to 17-bit
and 54-bit integers, respectively.
The results are presented in Table 4.1. The column Bits represents the number of
literals in each entry whereas the column No. of entries shows the total number of entries
in a simple blacklist. The last column Saved indicates how much space is saved by
employing HSEB instead of a simple blacklist. The E(f ′)[E0(f
′)] column shows the
number of relative essential prime implicants and the number of relative essential prime
implicants of the round zero. Recall that relative essential prime implicants are returned
either if there are no other implicants that could merge with them or if a relative essential
prime implicant of a higher round was decomposed and only one decomposed implicant
could not be covered by the remaining entries of HSEB. The number of relative essential
prime implicants of the round zero is essential for computing the space saved by the
SEQM algorithm. For instance, in the case of blacklisting the A.2.IP dataset, HSEB could
save up to 1 − 646+(793−646)∗2+11,100 = 14, 46% space. The +1 block is assumed to separate
relative essential prime implicants of the round zero listed without reduced masks from
other relative essential prime implicants listed with reduced masks. Applying the SEQM
algorithm on phone numbers initiated by mobile malware (A.2.PN) yields only a subtle
difference. We investigated this phenomenon and realized that premium-rate short
numbers are not presented in blocks. In fact, the highest degree of relative essential prime
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Figure 4.3: Prime and relative essential prime implicants of the B.2 dataset.
implicants in the A.2.IP dataset was only two. For comparison, in the B.2 dataset, the
highest degree of relative essential prime implicants of phone numbers was five. A degree
of five leads to a single essential prime implicant covering another 32 prime implicants.
We examined the influence of relative essential prime implicants on HSEB in Fi-
gure 4.3. The figure illustrates the number of generated prime and relative essential
prime implicants during the execution of the SEQM algorithm on the example of the
B.2 dataset. This dataset shows good compression rates. Note that the number of
essen0(f
′) exceeds prime0(f
′) because the last phase of the SEQM algorithm decomposes
all prime(f ′) covering only single entries back to essen0(f
′). This operation saves space
as only the value and not the mask needs to be stored in HSEB.
If entries on the list were distributed uniformly, the number of prime implicants
per round would be strictly decreasing and could be estimated beforehand. However,
real-world HSEBs are in general not distributed uniformly. In the B.2 dataset, we
experience more prime2(f
′) than prime1(f
′) indicating that land-line numbers at the
RWTH university are mostly assigned in ranges of four phone numbers.
The saved space can be roughly determined even before the second phase of the
SEQM algorithm takes place. In general, the more (relative essential) prime implicants
with higher degrees are occurring, the less space will be required for the final HSEB, and
the more space will be saved. Prime implicants with higher degrees cover exponentially
many lower level degrees. For instance, the prime implicants of the B.2 dataset illustrated
in Figure 4.3 have the maximum degree of five. In the B.3 dataset there exist prime
implicants of the degree of eight and in the A.2.PN dataset, we found only a few prime
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Dataset Segments E(f ′) E0(f
′) E1(f
′) E2(f
′) E3(f
′) E4(f
′)
A.2.PN
779 740 702 36 2 - -
779 741 704 35 2 - -
779 742 706 34 2 - -
779 743 708 33 2 - -
A.3
941 795 650 98 26 12 9
941 793 646 100 25 13 9
941 794 648 99 26 12 9
942 793 645 100 26 13 9
944 800 657 96 26 12 9
Table 4.2: Possible combinations of essen(f ′).
implicants of the degree of two. Therefore, we can expect more space gain in the B.3
dataset than in the A.2.PN dataset even before the second phase of the SEQM algorithm
is initiated. Table 4.1 confirms our expectation.
Table 4.2 lists possible combinations of relative essential prime implicants in the
A.2.PN and A.3 datasets. The Segments column gives the number of space units required
to store the HSEB. x in Ex(f
′) denotes the round of relative essential prime implicants.
Note that the total number of relative essential prime implicants for the A.2.PN dataset
fluctuates between 740 and 743, but the number of space units necessary to store them
remains constant. This strongly indicates that all four approximations to the minimal
cover are equivalent and provide the truly minimal cover. We verified it, and all four
combinations indeed provide the truly minimal cover. Therefore, we claim that the SEQM
algorithm can compute the truly minimal cover. For the A.3 dataset, Table 4.2 lists the
best and worst approximations to the minimal cover w.r.t. the number of space units. In
the worst case, HSEB has to store three additional values compared to the best possible
solution.
HSEB performs especially well if entries in the list can be described by a Boolean
function with dozens of literals. The more literals are presented, the lower the probability
that two terms can be merged together and the less space can be saved. For entries
consisting of several hundreds of bits, HSEB loses its effectiveness. In this case, it is more
suitable to use standard pattern matching methods.
4.4.2 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching matches a sequence of input data with already known mobile malware
patterns. If a sequence can be matched, then it indicates the presence of traffic initiated
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by mobile malware. Unlike blacklisting, entries in pattern matching do not have a fixed
length or structure. Pattern-based filtering uses a sliding window technique to match the
current window content with regular expressions generated from patterns and strings
used in already known mobile malware. Strictly matching strings against fixed patterns or
regular expression is not very resource intensive, which makes pattern matching suitable
for the first line of detection. Note that due to the modular architecture design of the
3GPPMOP sensor, any pattern matching technique can easily complement the existing
pattern matching operating with fixed patterns and regular expression.
Limitations of pattern matching are similar to blacklisting. Both approaches require
frequent updating of entries in order to provide exceptional accuracy. The main dis-
advantage of pattern matching (and blacklisting) is the inability to detect unknown
traffic. Unknown traffic is traffic initiated by mobile malware that has not been seen
before. Another drawback of detection mechanisms operating on traffic including pattern
matching is it cannot filter the content of encrypted traffic. In this case, only the header
information in packets is visible to the detection mechanisms. On the other hand, SIMM
messages seem to be rarely encrypted. We checked all SIMM messages in the A.2.SIMM
dataset and found only a few encrypted SIMM messages. The content of unencrypted
SIMM messages permits us to list strings often sent by mobile malware. These strings are
divided into three categories based on the nature of the information, see Subsection 3.4.2.
The first category focuses on user specific information. The second category lists often
uploaded sensitive information about the infected device and the last category uses SIMM
messages to inform the MoMO about the status and activities of mobile malware.
User-specific Information
Mobile malware interested in user-specific information either tries to identify the user or
impersonate the user for financial fraud. In 3GPP networks, the user is identifiable by
the IMSI [9]. The digit length of the IMSI depends on the implementation. The European
standard uses 14 digits whereas the North American standard uses 15 digits. In both
standards, the first three digits represent the MCC followed by the MNC [9]. Based on the
standard, the MNC is either two or three digits long. These two codes identify the MNO.
The fixed nine digits long suffix of the IMSI is called the Mobile Subscription Identification
Number (MSIN). The MSIN identifies the user in the home mobile network.
Bank institutions frequently use the SMS for single use one-time passwords authori-
zing financial transactions. In many countries worldwide including the European Union,
Middle East and the Caribbean, the International Bank Account Number (IBAN) [92] has
a fixed structure with up to 34 characters starting with two letters indicating the country
code and ends with two check digits. An infected device intercepting and relaying
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short messages carrying one-time passwords can be detected by the bank account and
transaction details given in the short message as the IBAN number is usually accompanied
by a text mentioning the word IBAN somewhere in the content. Since these short messages
are always MT, every MO short message containing this information is highly suspicious.
The same applies to verification codes sent by mail service providers and other third-party
operators of services.
Device-specific Information
3GPP-compliant mobile devices can be identified by the IMEI [14]. The IMEI consists of
15 digits. The first 14 digits represent the type allocation code, final assembly code and
the serial number, respectively. The last digit is a Luhn check digit. IMEI numbers are
stored on mobile devices and also in the EIR in the core network. Hence, the MNO can
easily check whether the IMEI is part of a short message.
Besides the IMEI, mobile malware gathers additional information about the device.
In Subsection 3.4.2, we experienced mobile malware sending strings like device ID and
model, OS version, or country. This information is often sent by benign apps as well and,
therefore, we do not recommend to search for these strings as they might generate many
false positives.
Mobile Malware-specific Information
There exist several stages when mobile malware communicates with the MoMO. In
the activation stage, see Section 2.4, mobile malware informs the MoMO about its suc-
cessful installation and status. Here, the mobile malware updates itself to the latest
version and awaits for incoming commands. Status SIMM messages often have a fixed
strcture. Commands include various activities ranging from executing DDoS attacks
to suspending processes running on the mobile device. Commands exhibit similar
structures within a mobile malware family but differ greatly between families. For
instance, all variants of NickySpy send commands over short messages of the form #<com-
mand>#<password>#<option> [82].
Whereas strings in the first and second category are sometimes sent by benign apps,
the third category consists of strings requested and posted only by mobile malware.
Therefore, only the last category of strings provides the strongest indications that an
infected device is connected to the mobile network. Moreover, each string can be assigned
to a specific sample or family since it condemns the requested malicious activity and intent
of the MoMO. In the following, we propose regular expressions for pattern matching for
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each category based on the results from the dynamic analysis, see Subsection 3.4.2 for
more information.
4.5 The DAIMON App
Blacklisting and content filtering are deterministic processes not free from false pos-
tives and false negatives although their occurence is rare. To address this situation, the
3GPPMOP architecture envisages that the user can beneficially complement the detection
by giving the user the possibility to submit feedback on suspicious traffic tagged by
the MNO. The Detection Approach in Mobile Networks (DAIMON) app provides an
interface between the MNO and the user. It can be installed as a standalone app or be
part of some other app provided by the MNO. As a proof-of-concept we implemented
the DAIMON app as a standalone app supporting whitelisting of blocked calls and short
messages by the MNO, see Figure 4.4. Each time a suspicious activity is detected, the user
receives a short message from the MNO informing the user about the suspicious call or
short message. Since the DAIMON app is implemented as a standalone app, it is listed in
the app list with all other regular apps. In the DAIMON app, the user can whitelist MO
and MT calls, and short messages. In addition, the user can set up a sensitivity level which
determines the threshold on how suspicious the call or short message should be in order
to be blocked. The sensitivity level is particularly important for detection approaches
running in the second line of detection as not all approaches must strictly return binary
values. The third picture in Figure 4.4 lists blocked short messages. The DAIMON app
lists the direction from the mobile phone’s point of view, the phone number and the
content of the short message. By clicking on the short message, additional information
like the timestamp, reason and the CAPTCHA challenge are shown, see Figure 4.4. The
button "Send" whitelists the blocked short message if the CAPTCHA challenge is correctly
solved. The CAPTCHA challenge serves as a confirmation for the MNO that the user
really wants to whitelist the short message. An incorrect response triggers another
CAPTCHA challenge. After three incorrect attempts, the short message is permanently
blocked and the MNO is informed. To whitelist such permanently blocked short messages,
the user has to directly contact the MNO. The main drawback of the DAIMON app is the
need of additional resources to store data on a per user basis.
4.5.1 SCAPTCHA
For CAPTCHA in the DAIMON app, we proposed an SMS-based CAPTCHA we call
SCAPTCHA. SCAPTCHA is a typical challenge-response CAPTCHA built upon SMS. It
does not require any Internet connection and is, therefore, suitable for mobile phones
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DAIMON
DAIMON
Figure 4.4: The DAIMON app.
connected to 2G networks as well. The challenge is of semantical or, for illiterate users,
of visual nature. In both cases, the user has to select a word that does not fit with the
rest of words. The semantic SCAPTCHAs has all words written in English and only
English speaking users are competent to solve the challenge. The challenge is to find a
word that semantically does not match other words. The visual SCAPTCHA is language-
independent. Here, the user has to reveal the pattern of words in the short message
and identify the one word that does not follow the pattern of the other words. This
type of question is often seen in psychological tests. Examples of semantical and visual
SCAPTCHAs are given in Table 4.3.
Type Challenge
Semantic
blue, ball, pink, green, black, red
cow, pen, ape, ant, bug, cat
jet, train, car, ship, cup, bus
socks, belt, pants, panda, shoes, jeans
Visual
LILIL, LILILI, LILILIL, LILILILI, LIIILILIL, LILILILILI
oOoOo, OoOoO, oOoOo, oOoOo, oOoOo, oOoOo
-|-|-|, -|||- -, ||- -||, |||- - -, -||- -|, - -|-||
:-(, :(, :), -(, :-), .-)
Table 4.3: Semantic examples of SCAPTCHA challenges.
Note that a very sophisticated mobile malware sample that rooted the mobile device
has the capability to parse words in the SCAPTCHA. By simply guessing the correct
word, the mobile malware sample could evade the challenge. Therefore, we recommend
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Figure 4.5: Emulation of radio traffic on a mobile device running Android.
using reasonably complex challenges. The probability of solving the semantical or visual
SCAPTCHA with a randomly selected word is 1/n where n is the number of words in
the challenge. The complexity can be increased by adding more than one word to the
challenge that does not belong to the category of the majority of words, or by sending
more disjoint challenges at once. For instance, having three challenges of eight words
each with two words required for the correctly solved challenge leads to a probabilty of
less than 1/10.000 for the correctness of a uniformly random guess.
4.5.2 Rerouting of Radio Traffic
Since the 3GPPMOP sensor could not be tested on real traffic in 3GPP networks, we
deployed the 3GPPMOP sensor in an emulated environment. The emulated environment
consisted of an actual mobile device running the Android version 2.2 (Froyo). In order
to get traffic similar to the traffic entering and leaving mobile devices in 3GPP networks,
we redirected the entire radio communication from and to the radio modem through the
3GPPMOP sensor.
The idea of rerouting radio traffic is not completely new. The approach was first
introduced by Mulliner et al. in [121] where pipes between the RILd and the radio
modem are redirected. Our implementation follows their idea, see Figure 4.5. However,
it is noteworthy to say that although AT commands are very well documented, control
characters vary with radio modems. We conducted many empirical experiments with
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Figure 4.6: Simulated SMS protocol with the deployed 3GPPMOP sensor.
different mobile devices and experienced that our implementation supports only radio
modems that are part of the Qualcomm Snapdragon chipset, model numbers QSD8250 or
MSM7227. The emulation was first implemented as part of a master thesis [115] and later
improved by us to support communication with the 3GPPMOP sensor and to support
more ATs.
Recall from Section 2.1 that the RILd resides between the radio modem and the
application framework layer. So does our implemented and deployed inline 3GPPMOP
sensor. The deployed 3GPPMOP sensor intercepted only radio traffic and its capabilities
were limited to monitoring calls and short messages. The Checker tests phone numbers
and the content of short messages. In parallel, each short message is classified by the
classifier. The user is informed each time a potential threat is detected. Malicious activities
found by the Checker and suspicious short messages returned by the Classifier are
intercepted and stored in the Database. These malicious activities can be viewed in the
DAIMON app. Here, the user can whitelist the intercepted call or short message by
solving the SCAPTCHA challenge.
Suspicious incoming calls are simply blocked. The 3GPPMOP sensor interrupts the AT
command of the outgoing call and responds with a busy signal indicating that the callee is
occupied. At the same time, the user is informed on why the callee seems to be occupied.
The 3GPPMOP sensor is able to intercept suspicious short messages too because of the
structure of the SMS protocol, see Section 2.3. The SMS protocol provides no mutual
authentication or integrity protection between the RILd and radio modem. Therefore,
the 3GPPMOP sensor can intercept, process and modify all AT commands, see Figure 4.6.
The telephony manager is not shown in Figure 4.6 as its traffic is identical to that of the
RILd. Figure 4.6 illustrates the case of an outgoing short message. The RILd simply
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forwards the AT+CMGS=L command to the pipe normally used for communication with
the radio modem. Now, this pipe is redirected to the 3GPPMOP sensor. The 3GPPMOP
sensor replies to be ready for the PDU in the name of the radio modem. The RILd replies
with the PDU and again, the 3GPPMOP sensor responds that the short message was
successfully sent. The 3GPPMOP sensor responds without any information on who is
the real initiator or what is the content of the short message. Also, the RILd alone has no
possibility to check whether the messages is indeed sent or not. Then, the PDU is checked
by the Checker and the SVM classifier, respectively. If the Checker decides that the short
message was really sent by the user, the 3GPPMOP sensor starts a new communication
with the radio modem by using a second pipe. Otherwise, the short message is stored in
the Database and the user is informed about the new event.
The DAIMON app is written in Java and available as an APK. It requires only
the SEND_SMS permission to send SCAPTCHA challenges. The 3GPPMOP sensor is
written in C, resides in the user space layer and can easily be cross-compiled to any
mobile architecture. We implemented the Filter, Checker, Bridge, Database and one SVM
classifier. The Trainer was not implemented, as models for the linear SVM-LIN were
generated on a desktop computer and manually pushed to the classifier. The SVM-LIN
classifier is built upon the SVMlight library [95]. The Database was implemented as an
SQLite database located in the user space of the DAIMON app.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described the modular 3GPPMOP architecture and proposed sensor
placement in 2G, 3G and 4G networks. Several deployments were discussed, but, to the
best of our knowledge, the MSC, SGSN and PDN-GW provide the best locations for the
3GPPMOP sensor.
The modular 3GPPMOP architecture contains two lines of detection. The heart of
the 3GPPMOP sensor is the first line of detection. We described and evaluated the
novel HSEB that provides the same level of detection as a simple blacklist, but requires
considerably less space for storing entries. Strings with fixed structures often occurring in
traffic initiated by mobile malware were discussed in Subsection 4.4.2. We described three
different groups of strings often initiated by mobile malware and detectable by pattern
matching.
The first line of detection was complemented by user interaction in the form of the
DAIMON app. Although the 3GPPMOP sensor is best suited to be deployed directly
in the core architectures of 3GPP networks, it can be emulated on mobile devices as an
inline sensor. We implemented the 3GPPMOP sensor on an Android phone and emulated
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radio traffic. To emulate real SMS traffic exchanged between the mobile device and the
3GPP network, we redirected the traffic flow between the RILd and the radio modem.
We showed that calls and short messages could be successfully interrupted without
users noticing the presence of the 3GPPMOP sensor. A user could whitelist each blocked
event in the DAIMON app. Since mobile malware may have the capability to gain root
privileges and then respond in the name of the user, we proposed the SCAPTCHA to
distinguish between users and mobile malware.
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CHAPTER 5
Detection of MO SIMM Messages by
Supervised Machine Learning
New mobile malware samples are submitted to VirusTotal daily and the trend is increasing
[175]. Detection approaches of the first line of detection presented in Chapter 4 are very
efficient in terms of time needed for matching patterns to an existing list, but suffer from
the drawback than only entries already on the list can be detected. Traffic patterns of
new samples are not detected by the first line of detection. Our 3GPPMOP architecture
described in Chapter 4 copes with this situation by introducing a second line of detection.
We show in this chapter that this line successfully mitigates the drawback of the first
line of detection. In comparison to the first line of detection, the second line of detection
requires more resources and is, therefore, not suitable for real-time filtering. However,
it is capable of detecting not yet previously analyzed traffic patterns that currently pass
unnoticed through mobile networks.
Existing solutions already demonstrate that this is possible. However, they are either
designed for packet-switched networks (e.g. [147], [125]) or for end devices handling
more information than that present in the initiated traffic (e.g. [77], [63]).
We focus on circuit-switched services, especially the SMS, and are primarily interested
in traffic visible to the MNO. The detection itself is possible without any side information
that can be captured only on mobile devices, since we are interested in traffic visible to
the MNO.
In this chapter, we demonstrate that supervised machine learning algorithms based
on old SIMM messages can reliably detect new SIMM messages. It is not even required
to train the classifier on a daily basis if only the content of MO SIMM messages is used
for training. The reason for using only MO SIMM messages in training is twofold. First,
the A.2.SIMM dataset consists of only MO SIMM messages, see Section 3.4. Second, the
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Header Payload
0001000c81107577820088000007 d3e654f7341a01
SMS:OFF
Number of characters:  
Number of special characters: 
Number of numerics:               
Number of whitespaces: 
                      . . .
[0.2492, 0, 0, ... ]
7
1
0
0
Figure 5.1: A high-level overview of stages required for classification of short messages.
B.1 dataset of benign short messages does not list any header information due to privacy
reasons, see Section 3.2. A high-level overview of subsequent stages prior to classification
of short messages in supervised machine learning is given in Figure 5.1. A short message
is a composite of a header and payload. The header holds meta information for the MNO
and the destination mobile device. The payload carries the content of the short message.
Assuming the default 7-bit encoding, feature extraction decodes the payload of the short
message and maps it to a finite set of discrete features characterizing the content of the
short message. In Section 5.2 we describe altogether twenty-five features. Feature selection
in Section 5.3 trains classifiers introduced in Section 2.6 on the A.2 and B.1 datasets.
From the A.2.SIMM dataset, we take the m-unique SIMM messages. Feature selection
tests several thousands of feature combinations in the simple cross-validation and k-fold
method. The choice of classifiers’ parameters and the best average ACC per classifier are
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 evaluates three real-world scenarios
better fitting to the intended use of supervised machine learning in traffic monitoring
approaches. In common classification tasks, time or partial dependencies within a subset
of training data do not play a crucial role. In mobile malware, only a subset of all SIMM
messages is known at any point in time. In addition, SIMM messages sent by samples
belonging to mobile malware families are often related. The first scenario compares
similarities between mobile malware families. We have already stated in Section 3.3 that
samples from different families share code. In Section 5.4 we show that a smaller subset
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of families is sufficient to train a classifier for extraordinary results. The scenario assumes
that yet unknown SIMM messages of new malware families can be detected based on
SIMM messages initiated by already known samples of other families. The model is
trained over SIMM messages sent by samples of a subset of mobile malware families and
evaluated against SIMM messages sent by samples of mobile malware families that were
not used in training. In the next two scenarios, we infer backward how well classifiers
trained in the past can detect SIMM messages in the future. First we compare models
trained upon all short messages and show that there is a huge bias if the trained model
is used for a longer period of time. Then we select the RF classifier as the classifier with
the best overall properties w.r.t. the highest mean ACC. The RF classifier is trained
on training sets of all benign short messages and SIMM messages known to security
researchers at some point in the past. That way we estimate the probability of detecting
unknown samples by considering the fact that we know only some of the SIMM messages.
Section 5.6 reveals limitations of machine learning in general as well as limitations of our
SIMM classification approach. The final discussion in Section 5.7 summarizes the main
arguments for the suitability of supervised machine learning for the detection of SIMM
messages.
This chapter extends our publication on SIMM classification [104]. In [104], we have
already published sections on related work (Section 5.1), feature extraction (Section 5.2),
feature selection (Section 5.3), evaluation of the five classifiers (Section 5.4) and the
performance of the classifiers (Section 5.5). Note that Section 5.6 discussing the limitations
of supervised machine learning is, in fact, the only yet unpublished section of this chapter.
5.1 Related Work
Mobile malware samples sending short messages have been mentioned in numerous
prominent publications, e.g. [188], [189], [73]. Classification of spam short messages using
supervised machine learning is presented in [79], [180] and [49] and detecting SIMM
messages is addressed in [18] and [102].
For example, [188] and [189] confirm that many malicious apps in official and third
party app stores indeed send SIMM messages and the authors of [73] identified that more
than a half of the analyzed mobile malware samples send short messages.
A comparison of classifiers classifying short messages in ham and spam messages
is presented in the seminal paper on content-based spam SMS filtering [79]. They com-
pare classifiers SVM-LIN, DT, and NB with up to 400 features. The SVM-LIN classifier
outperformed the other algorithms most of the time. [49] evaluates the identical set of
ham short messages as in [79] but includes even more spam short messages. In [49], SVM
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Paper Focus Classifiers ACC Features Dataset
[79] Spam short messages SVM, DTs, NB 95, 5% < 400 1.119/82
[49] Spam short messages SVM 95% (AUC) - 1.119/372
[180] Spam short messages SVM, NB 86% 20 4.318
[102] SIMM messages SVM-LIN 99, 25% 11 4.539/155
Table 5.1: Related work on classification of spam and SIMM messages.
slightly outperforms other evaluated classifiers. In addition, the authors state that short
messages contain an insufficient number of words to properly support the technique
called bag of words. The SMSAssassin paper [180] examines the number of features in
the same classification task. Authors condemn that too many features make the whole
classification computationally too intensive and applicable only to server-side solutions.
Their very light-weighted classification with just 20 features achieves an 86% accuracy on
correctly classifying spam messages.
A real-time signature-based detection approach to detect SMS botnets was proposed
by Alzahrani et al. [18]. They evaluate 747 SIMM messages and claim a detection rate of
100% with no false negative. This perfect detection rate is achieved due to the way how
return values from the signature-based detection approach are interpreted. Instead of just
having two distinct classes representing benign and malicious messages, Alzahrani et al.
introduce a new group of suspicious short messages. Applying the real-time signature-
based detection approach from [18] on their yet unpublished dataset returns 0% malicious,
6.9% suspicious and 93.1% benign messages.
In a previous publication [102], we propose to shift the decision whether or not the
message originates from malware or from the mobile device (or the user) to the operator
of the mobile network. We show that the operator has the capability to detect SMS
fraud. The example SVM classifier achieves an accuracy of 99.25% in the standard k-fold
validation setting. Datasets used for evaluation in [102] were different than those in
this chapter. The dataset with SIMM messages consisted of only 155 SIMM messages
compared to 2.441 in this thesis. The dataset with benign short messages was identical.
The unbalanced datasets in [102] generated models biased towards the benign dataset.
Results presented in this chapter use datasets A.2.SIMM and B.1. Since these datasets
contain roughly the same amount of benign and SIMM messages and, trained models are
not biased towards any dataset.
Table 5.1 summarizes related research on classification of mobile malware samples,
spam, or SIMM messages. The column Focus indicates the target of classification. The
column Classifiers lists classifiers that are also evaluated in this chapter. The column ACC
shows the best yielded mean ACC of classifiers presented in the column Classifiers. In [49],
only the AUC is given. The number of features is given in the column Features. A minus
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sign indicates that the corresponding value is not mentioned in the paper and could not
be computed from given results. Each dataset is divided into a benign and a malicious
part. The first value represents the benign part while the second represents the malicious
part. [180] provides only the total number of spam short messages used for classification.
5.2 Feature Extraction
The initial step in feature extraction of short messages is to decode the payload into
plain text. The content is by default 7-bit encoded and there exist several mappings
of 7-bit characters to 8-bit ASCII characters. This chapter evaluates the A.2.SIMM and
B.1 datasets. From the A.2.SIMM dataset, we took only the m-unique SIMM messages
without the corresponding phone numbers because the B.1 dataset does not list them
due to privacy reasons. The content of short messages in both datasets is already decoded
into plain 8-bit ASCII characters. Non-Latin characters are treated as Unicode characters
(\uxxxx where xxxx is a 4-digit hexadecimal number).
Our intention is to create features that are lightweight and easy to extract without
any complex parsers. Since feature extraction is inevitable for each evaluated MO short
message, it directly affects the time needed for classification. In order to detect SIMM
messages in nearly real-time, the whole process of classification has to be extraordinarily
fast; the whole process should not exceed 100 ms.
We propose three groups of discrete features. The first group characterizes messages
in general. Each feature in this groups counts types of characters in a message. This group
of features captures the fact that in natural languages some characters typically occur
more often than others. The second group examines words. It detects specific words and
strings like phone numbers or links that do not follow general syntactic rules in word
formatting. The last group of features focuses on very short short messages containing
only one or very few words. In the following we describe the features in detail
Each feature is represented by a leading F followed by a number. The first feature
F0 counts all characters in the content of the message. The second feature F1 counts the
number of special characters except for whitespaces, dots, commas, apostrophes, question
and exclamation marks. Feature F2 counts whitespaces and feature F3 adds numerical
characters to feature F1. Numerics alone are counted in feature F4. Letters are counted
in two separate features: feature F5 counts the number of capital letters and feature
F6 the number of lowercase letters. For each feature F1-F6, we additionally derive a
relative feature that sets the feature in relation to the overall number of characters in the
content (F0). We mark these relative features by a leading R, e.g., feature RF4 refers to
the number of whitespaces divided by all characters in the message (F4/F0).
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Inspired by SMS spam classification [180], we added four features exposing words
that do not contain only letters, but are still valid in benign short messages. Although we
cannot determine if a string is valid, we can still learn characteristics of words indicating
valid strings in benign short messages. These words are usually accompanied by other
words. Our feature F7 simply counts the number of words separated by whitespaces.
On a first glance, this feature seems to be redundant to feature F3. However, a closer
look at benign short messages reveals that many users put two or more whitespaces
between words or put extra whitespaces before commas. More precisely, the number of
words in a message is determined by the number of sequences of characters separated by
whitespaces where each sequence contains, at least, one or more non-special characters
or numbers. The second feature in the second group of features, F8, examines words
that mix numbers with special characters without any other real text. This feature detects
listings in benign short messages and commands sent by mobile botnets. The next feature
F9 counts the number of words containing only numerics. With feature F9, we are able
to identify subtle differences between benign short messages sending phone numbers
within a larger text and unique identifiers sent by mobile malware. Our last feature in
this group, F10, counts words containing special characters, numbers, and letters within
a single word. Its role is to detect the presence of links in the text. Usually, a benign
short message sends no more than one link, and if there is a link, then there is some
comment describing the link. Features F8 to F10 have been evaluated in an absolute and
relative form. In the relative form, the three features are set in relation to feature F7, i.e.
RF8 = F8F7 .
By experimenting with F1-F10, we observed that benign short messages containing
only one word are prone to be falsely classified as SIMM messages. We empirically
experienced that SIMM messages generally contain fewer words than benign short mes-
sages. In order to mitigate FNs, we added feature F11 returning the length of the first
word. The relative feature RF11 tells us whether the whole message is a single string
or a composition of more words. If there is only a very long single string, then the
probability that some special character acts as a separator is quite high. Such long strings
are quite common in SIMM messages. We reflect this fact in feature F12, where we count
special characters, numerics, and capital letters in the first word. One capital letter in the
first word is occurring in benign short messages as well. To limit it to just benign short
messages, feature F13 counts the number of capital letters in the first word. In total, six
new features are introduced in the third group.
Logic behind features in the first group was first introduced in [102]. In fact, all
features except for features F3 and RF3 are taken from [102]. We added the two features
to the first group because they can be derived from features F0, F1, and F4. In addition,
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Feature Description
Benign SIMM
RFx Fx RFx Fx
F0 Number of characters 62,848 36,224
F1 Number of special characters 0,009379 0,528 0,043715 2,814
F2 Number of whitespaces 0,183258 11,863 0,067402 1,895
F3
Number of numerics and special
0,013657 0,799 0,451874 17,705
characters
F4 Number of numerics 0,004278 0,271 0,408157 14,890
F5 Number of capital letters 0,058563 3,748 0,211908 5,385
F6 Number of lowercase letters 0,693763 43,583 0,258679 10,441
F7 Number of words 11,566 1,806
F8
Number of words containing special
0,033467 0,389 0,327930 0,668
characters, numerics, no letters
F9
Number of words containing special
0,010043 0,128 0,262017 0,530
characters and numerics only
F10
Number of words containing special
0,268465 2,490 0,592493 1,317
characters, numerics and letters
F11 Length of the first word 0,091537 3,810 0,493904 17,805
F12
Number of special characters, numerics
0,376502 1,027 0,485192 1,583
and capital letters in the first word
F13
Number of capital letters in the first
0,390519 1,090 0,670225 12,198
word
Table 5.2: Feature statistics of all benign and SIMM messages in A.2.SIMM and B.1
datasets averaged over all short messages in the set.
in [102], the best accuracies were achieved from feature vectors containing features F1
and F4. Features in the second and third group were first introduced in [104]. Table 5.2
summarizes all features divided into the three groups as described above. It gives feature
statistics for each proposed feature of the benign and SIMM messages in our dataset,
respectively, and thus provides a rough estimation on how well each feature fits for
classification. Higher differences between the benign and SIMM part of our dataset hint
at better results, as the probability that some classifier will be able to differentiate the
benign and SIMM part due to this feature is intuitively higher. In the next section, we
describe which combinations of features should ultimately be selected.
5.3 Feature Selection
The most challenging part of the training phase is to identify the most suitable feature
vectors for the classifiers SVM, KNN, DTs, RFs and NB ultimately separating both classes.
For SVM, we differentiate between the SVM-LIN and SVM-RBF models. We first run
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feature selection based on the simple cross-validation method on the classifiers using
the default parameters. Two feature selection runs are performed in parallel. The first
one starts with F0-F10 and the second run with F0 and RF1-RF10. Then we search for
proper parameters in all classifiers and rerun the feature selection from the beginning.
In the simple cross-validation method, we randomly selected 75% of the messages of
the benign and malicious part each for training. The remaining 25% of messages were
used for testing, calculating mean ACC, and AUC values of the evaluated classifiers. We
used the implementation of classifiers, the simple cross-validation method and k-fold
method provided by open source machine learning library scikit-learn [133], see also
Section 2.7. For SVM-LIN, we took the liblinear implementation [70] as this library scales
better with larger numbers of samples. For NB, we decided to evaluate MNB because of
the captured word frequency information and its very promising results in spam filtering
compared to other NB classifiers [119]. For KNN, we selected the uniform KNN, and for
DTs we selected the non-binary DTs. All other classifiers were taken as they are present
in the scikit-learn library.
An exhaustive search on all combinations of the 26 features introduced in the previous
section would be too time-consuming. Therefore, our feature selection adopts the SFSA.
We chose this algorithm due to its iterative nature. The adapted starting set of features
of SFSA starts with feature vectors containing features from the first group of features
and then adds not yet selected features in an iterative manner. The adapted SFSA starts
with absolute and relative features separately. Feature selection starting with absolute
features starts with all combinations of features F0-F10 and continues step-wise with
features F11, F12, F13, RF13, RF12, . . . , RF1, respectively, see Figure 5.2. After each
feature selection on a subset of features, the one hundred best feature vectors w.r.t.
mean ACC were reselected and combined with the newly added feature so that in each
run 100 new feature vectors were evaluated. Feature selection starting with relative
features started with features F0, RF1-RF10 and continued with features in the opposite
direction as feature selection with absolute features. That way we started in fact two
feature selections assuming that they will end up with nearly identical feature vectors. It
did not happen. It was even more surprising that despite of the different feature vectors,
the best mean accuracies per classifier were virtually identical. We found the reason to
be twofold. Benign and SIMM messages seem to be quite easily separable by machine
learning techniques. There exist few outliers in the training set that were misclassified
regardless of the classifier. The second reason is that our relative features are compositions
of absolute features, and there exist apparent dependencies. In our case, this is responsible
for many equally good feature vectors. We experienced that mixing absolute and relative
features is beneficial as mixed feature vectors clearly outperformed feature selection on
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F0 F13F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12
RF13RF1 RF2 RF3 RF4 RF5 RF6 RF7 RF8 RF9 RF10 RF11 RF12
Step:
Step:
1 2 3 4
517 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
F0 RF13RF1 RF2 RF3 RF4 RF5 RF6 RF7 RF8 RF9 RF10 RF11 RF12
F13F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12
Step:
Step:
1 2 3 4
517 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
Figure 5.2: The adapted SFSA starting with features F0-F10.
just absolute or relative features. Pure absolute features in feature vectors are prone to
return identical feature vectors for different messages and pure relative features in feature
vectors cannot detect outliers.
To improve the stability of feature selection, each feature vector was trained and tested
several times in order to provide more reliable results. A round consisted of ten runs.
Adding more runs to a round did not significantly influence the final results. The mean
ACC of a round was taken as the leading predictor for the feature vector. If a single run
(i.e. testing one feature vector) took more than five hours, then we suspended that run,
discarded that feature vector and continued with the next feature vector. Altogether, only
eight runs had to be suspended. They were all part of the relative group and all included
the feature F0.
Best mean ACCs from the two SFSAs were very close, see Table 5.3. Table 5.3 lists
the final best five feature vectors per classifier obtained from the SFSA initialized with
combinations of F0-F10 after the first round. KNN performs best with the mean ACC
over 99, 16%. This corresponds to 1.730 out of 1.745 messages on average correctly
classified short messages in the testing set. The very close mean ACCs in Table 5.3
suggest that many different feature vectors can classify most of the benign and SIMM
messages equally well. We analyze this phenomenon later in this chapter. The best
classifier w.r.t. the number of features is SVM-RBF. Here, the use of just two features
is sufficient to achieve a mean ACC of over 98%. It was quite surprising that RFs and
SVM-RBF perform slightly worse compared to other classifiers as these two classifiers are
generally assumed to be superior to DTs and SVM-LIN. The worse classification result
of SVM-RBF compared to SVM-LIN strongly suggests that the majority of benign and
SIMM messages is linearly separable, or the setup of the classifiers was suboptimal. Both
assumptions turned out to be true. We examined the first assumption and revealed that
many benign short messages are indeed linearly separable except for a very small group
115
Chapter 5 Detection of MO SIMMMessages by Supervised Machine Learning
Classifier Mean ACC
Features
F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 #
SVM-LIN
0,987346 X X X X X X X 7
0,987317 X X X X X X X 7
0,987312 X X X X X X X 7
0,987300 X X X X X X X X 8
0,987260 X X X X X X X X 8
SVM-RBF
0,980745 X X X 3
0,980401 X X X 3
0,980229 X X 2
0,980057 X X X X 4
0,979885 X X X 3
KNN
0,991633 X X X X X X 6
0,991576 X X X X X 5
0,991404 X X X X X X X 7
0,991347 X X X X X X X X 8
0,991175 X X X X X X X 7
DTs
0,989456 X X X X X X 6
0,988080 X X X X X X X 7
0,988023 X X X X X 5
0,988023 X X X X X X X 7
0,988023 X X X X X X 6
RFs
0,987794 X X X X 4
0,986820 X X X 3
0,986361 X X X 3
0,985387 X X X X X 5
0,985043 X X X X 4
mNB
0,982063 X X X X 4
0,981261 X X X X X X 6
0,981261 X X X X X 5
0,981089 X X X X X 5
0,981032 X X X X X 5
Table 5.3: Five best absolute feature vectors from the first group of features.
of short messages showing characteristics of the opposite class regardless of the feature
vector. These incorrectly classified messages were often very short, mostly containing
only one or two words. Recall that to address this misclassification, we introduced the
third group of features, namely features F11 to F13.
Examples for often misclassified benign and SIMM messages are given in Table 5.4.
The column class reveals the true class of the short message. The reason for misclassifi-
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short message Class
26th OF JULY Benign
GAME1 DAOVANG_APP SIMM
Ok. Benign
baby SIMM
Thank you for downloading My Golf Pics Have fun, share it on facebook,
SIMMemail to a friend. Be sure to check out DriveReply, the number one
driver safety a
Table 5.4: Examples for often misclassified short messages.
cation of the first two short messages is the fact that they are relatively short and mix
numbers with characters in a rather unusual way. The next two messages are very short.
In addition, similar short messages can be found in the opposite classes. There exists no
clear indication whether the short message is benign or SIMM. The last SIMM message is
the hardest to detect as it contains all signs of user initiated short message. Only feature
vectors containing absolute features can classify them correctly as they can train models
on exactly these exceptions.
Parameters in classifiers can considerably influence the model generation process.
Hence, we tested the top two hundred best feature vectors (one hundred from the best
absolute and one hundred from the best relative starting features) under different setups.
For SVM-LIN, we tested the C parameter in the interval from 0, 5 to 1, 5 with a step of
0, 05, but we did not notice any evident difference between runs. Widening the interval to
logarithmic values starting from 10−5 to 105 did not lead to any improvement either. We
only observed that SVM-LIN with C greater than 10 or lesser than 0, 75 was noticeably
getting worse and we decided to keep C = 1. Contrary to SVM-LIN, SVM-RBF disclosed
obvious patterns leading to parameters C = 100 and gamma = 1, 0. This was even more
obvious in DTs where we experienced overfitting for more complex DTs. Feature vectors
with absolute starting features returned trees with the depth of 8 while feature vectors
with relative starting features returned trees with the depth of 7. We chose the new depth
of DTs to be 8 because of the better overall accuracy. More than 10 trees resulted in a
mean ACC reduced by 0, 2% compared to DTs with 7 or 8 trees. RFs returned two peaks,
one for the depth of 10 with 16 trees in a forest and one for the depth of 13 with 13 trees
in a forest. We selected the latter parameters again due to better overall mean accuracy
and for fewer trees. For KNN, the best mean ACC was obtained for five neighbors.
We updated the parameters for all classifiers and reran two feature selections using
the adapted SFSA. The top 100 feature vectors per classifier were reevaluated in 100
rounds to confirm the mean accuracy. The standard deviation was quite small, e.g., the
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R
an
k SVM-LIN SVM-RBF KNN
Mean ACC Feat. vector Mean ACC Feat. vector Mean ACC Feat. vector
1. 0,988722 4755af00 0,991547 5112a580 0,992739 20b70200
2. 0,988521 4f55ef00 0,991467 5110a580 0,992716 55508500
3. 0,988114 6754ef00 0,991243 15522580 0,992710 55508580
4. 0,988103 45d4af00 0,991031 55128580 0,992676 45508580
5. 0,988000 d773ee40 0,990767 55500580 0,992665 30b50240
50. 0,986986 47d4aec0 0,990189 1552a100 0,991828 0a87ee80
100. 0,983489 88afb840 0,988183 1750a180 0,991186 8a8d4e00
R
an
k DTs RFs mNB
Mean ACC Feat. vector Mean ACC Feat. vector Mean ACC Feat. vector
1. 0,991965 2a9cce40 0,993610 babd4fc0 0,986280 1da56780
2. 0,991959 0b9d4e80 0,993598 2ab4e780 0,986280 0da56780
3. 0,991873 3a9cce40 0,993512 22b6a780 0,986263 0de56740
4. 0,991816 0a956e80 0,993495 2ab5a780 0,986206 0da5a780
5. 0,991770 119ef780 0,993489 22b6af80 0,986206 0da5a7c0
50 0,991026 0a87ee80 0,993123 2b5ef80 0,985690 18a42780
100 0,990733 22854e00 0,992911 2b7af00 0,983965 08a535c0
Table 5.5: Mean ACC for the five best, 50-th best and 100-th best feature vector per
classifier after updating parameters in classifiers.
standard deviation of the best feature vector for KNN in 100 rounds was merely 0, 001792.
Only subtle differences were spotted between 10 and 100 rounds. The best five, the 50-th,
and the 100-th feature vectors with corresponding mean ACCs per classifier are listed in
Table 5.5. Feature vectors are represented in hexadecimal notation where each feature
in the feature vector is represented by a bit. The order of features represented by bits
follows Table 5.2, starting with F0 as the leftmost bit and continuing with RF1, F1, RF2,
F2, etc. For instance, the feature vector 5110a580 in bold consists of nine features: RF1,
RF2, RF4, RF6, RF9, RF10, F11, F12 and RF13. Table 5.5 shows that each classifier
performs best with a different subset of features, and there exist no ultimately best feature
vector. The best feature vectors per classifier typically share many features and rotate only
a small subset of features. The best example in Table 5.5 is MNB. All five features vectors
inhere the feature vector da65740 with 13 features. On one hand, many absolute features
are underrepresented. On the other hand, they are essential for the generation of all RFx
features. Therefore, we believe that all absolute and relative features we propose have
their argument in the feature set. Overall, RFs and KNN performed best with mean ACC
over 99.25%. In some classifiers, the first feature vector completely or partially inheres the
second best feature vector. In this case, we decided to take the second best feature vector
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Positive Negative PRE ACC
True 603,18 1130,65 0,988820 0,993599
False 6,82 4,35
0,992853 0,994008
0,005992 0,007145
Table 5.6: Confusion matrix for RFs trained upon the feature vector 2ab4e780.
due to fewer features and faster feature extraction. We compared our feature selection
to scikit-learn’s built-in feature selection and obtained similar but slightly worse results.
The feature vectors highlighted in bold in Table 5.5 were taken for k-fold validation,
family-based, and chronological evaluation.
The confusion matrix for RFs trained upon the feature vector 2ab4e780 is given
in Table 5.6. All values in Table 5.6 are averaged over 100 rounds. As expected, TPR
and TNR are more balanced than in [102]. Both rates are over 99%. This indicates that
less than 1% of all tested elements were misclassified. The PRE is 98, 88% and the mean
ACC is 99, 36%. Lower PRE compared to ACC suggests more FPs than FNs. The table
confirms our expectation. More than 1% of all classified SIMM messages are FPs whereas
only 0, 38% benign short messages are classified as FNs. Having more FPs than FNs is
preferred as users are more willing to accept SIMM messages not being blocked by the
MNO than their own MO short messages being blocked. Overall, values in the confusion
matrix indicate a very well trained classifier. Other classifiers returned very similar
confusion matrices with balanced TPRs and TNRs.
The ROC curves and AUC values for each evaluated classifier are given in Figure 5.3.
Due to the outstanding separable properties of the datasets, all the ROC curves are close
to the optimal point at [0, 1]. To see the subtle differences between ROC curves and to
better recognize the proximity of the ROC curves to the optimal point, we list the AUC
value under each ROC curve. An ROC curve intersecting the optimal point has the AUC
value equal to one. The best classifier is RFs followed by SVM-RBF and KNN.
The k-fold method is used to validate classifiers for different sizes of training and
testing sets. Besides, it assures that all elements from the input data are selected for the
testing set exactly once. We use this method to confirm feature selection on variable sizes
of sets. We set the value k to be two, three, five, seven and nine, respectively. Each k-fold
validation was repeated ten times. As depicted in Table 5.7, results mostly comply to
the mean ACCs known from the simple cross-validation method. Note that for k = 4,
a single run (out of k runs) in the 4-fold validation method is identical to the simple
cross-validation method from feature selection w.r.t. to the number of training and testing
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(a) SVM-LIN (b) SVM-RBF
(c) KNN (d) DTs
(e) RFs (f) mNB
Figure 5.3: ROC curves and AUC values of the evaluated classifiers on the A.2.SIMM and
B.1 datasets.
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elements. For other k values, the more folds are used for training, the better the final
mean ACC. The results in Table 5.7 confirm the high ACCs for all classifiers regardless
of the training and testing size. Except for SVM-LIN and MNB, all classifiers exhibit a
steady mean ACC of over 99% percent.
Classifier
k
2 3 4 5 7 9
SVM-LIN 0,987822 0,988467 0,988739 0,988854 0,988897 0,988969
SVM-RBF 0,990057 0,991332 0,991189 0,991332 0,991591 0,991905
KNN 0,991017 0,991862 0,992436 0,992607 0,992894 0,992636
DTs 0,989628 0,991662 0,992135 0,992249 0,992421 0,992335
RFs 0,992479 0,992923 0,993295 0,993453 0,993625 0,993381
mNB 0,985931 0,986017 0,986032 0,986046 0,986031 0,986060
Table 5.7: K-fold validation.
5.4 Evaluation
The simple cross-validation method as well as k-fold validation selects training and
testing elements regardless of any hidden relations between elements. In both methods,
the probability that similar SIMM messages from the same mobile malware family occur
in the training and testing set at the same time is quite high. This enables classifiers to be
more capable of detecting SIMM messages, since the training data may include similar
if not identical SIMM messages in the testing set. To demonstrate the capability that
supervised machine learning can indeed detect completely yet unknown SIMM messages,
we added two classification tasks reflecting the possible use of machine learning in real-
world scenarios. The two scenarios handle elements in the testing and training sets
independently from the elements in the classification set under the two restrictions we
made. The first restriction is that the model is trained exclusively on MO SIMM messages
from a subset of mobile malware families. The second restriction is on the time. We set
a point in the past and trained classifiers only on SIMM messages from samples known
prior to this point.
5.4.1 Family-based Evaluation
Family-based evaluation analyzes relationships between families. We argue that there will
always be new mobile malware families waiting to be discovered by security researchers
and that many mobile malware samples reuse code snippets responsible for malicious
activities not only family-wise but between families as well. It is quite common that
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Figure 5.4: Mean accuracy of classifiers trained upon a percentage of mobile malware
families.
samples within the same mobile malware family share patterns or fixed strings in the
code or traffic. In fact, some family names like Torec or SmsSend are derived from
observed traffic. Moreover, mobile malware families that evolved from other families
inherit these patterns, e.g., the SIMM messages in the mobile malware families NickySpy
and TigerBot differ mainly in the delimiters between parameters. The NickySpy family
uses as a delimiter # while the TigerBot family uses ?.
The family-based evaluation confirms that outgoing short messages sent by different
mobile malware families share features characteristic to only SIMM messages. We show
that a classifier trained on SIMM messages of one mobile malware family can effectively
detect SIMM messages sent by other families because of the similar distinct structure. We
trained each classifier on all benign short messages from the B.1 dataset and on the m-
unique SIMM messages in the A.2.SIMM dataset from a subset of the 52 families occurring
in our dataset. The simple cross-validation method with the feature vectors highlighted
in Table 5.5 was employed. Families not used for training and testing were used for
classification. For each classifier, Figure 5.4 depicts the mean ACCs on the y-axis. The
x-axis indicates the percentage of families employed in training and testing. For less than
five families, only MNB provides satisfactory results. The situation dramatically changes
when about 50% of families are known for training and testing the classifier. From here
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Figure 5.5: Mean accuracy of classifiers trained on all SIMM messages.
on, all classifiers classify unknown SIMM messages with a steady mean ACC above 90%.
With nearly all families used, RFs performs best with mean ACC over 97% while MNB is
the only classifier with mean ACC below 95%. SVM-LIN, SVM-RBF, KNN, DTs and RFs
classified unknown SIMM messages equally well all the time and there is no superior
classifier between them. At first, MNB provided the best results, but with increasing
number of families used for training and testing, its mean ACC is outperformed by all
five classifiers. Nevertheless, the stable mean ACC makes MNB an attractive candidate
for SIMM detection.
5.4.2 Chronological Evaluation with Best Feature Vectors
In the chronological evaluation, we measured the ability of our models to detect SIMM
messages in the near future. Figure 5.5 shows on the right y-axis the number of SIMM
messages sent by samples submitted to the VirusTotal database [175] per month between
January 2012 and April 2014. On the left y-axis, the number of misclassified SIMM
messages is shown. All classifiers were trained with feature vectors and parameters
returned from the simple cross-validation method described in Section 5.3. The training
included all benign short messages and all SIMM messages known at some point in the
past. Figure 5.5 depicts misclassified SIMM messages per classifier at some point in the
past. It reveals that more SIMM messages involved in the training do not strictly yield
better results. In April 2013, 57 new SIMM messages were captured. Most of them were
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Figure 5.6: Chronological evaluation of RFs trained on SIMM messages known at some
point in the past.
short English words that confused the training of many classifiers. Only KNN has a
strictly increasing mean ACC at all time.
The second observation we made is related to family-based evaluation. We noticed
that although the simple cross-validation method utilizes all SIMM messages, comparable
mean ACCs were achieved with fewer messages months before. From February 2014
on, improvements on ACCs in Figure 5.5 are minimal. We traced this phenomenon back
to the family-based evaluation as SIMM messages captured after December 2013 were
mostly variants of already known messages. Although these SIMM messages were sent
by until this month unseen samples, their close relationship to other mobile malware
families enabled classifiers to detect them. Therefore, we argue that classifiers trained on
current SIMM messages have the capability to detect SIMM messages of future mobile
malware samples and families.
5.4.3 Chronological Classification of Random Forests
In Figure 5.6 we examine RFs with updated parameters as described in Section 5.3. We
selected RFs because RFs had the best mean ACC in Table 5.5. This time, we do not
reuse the best feature vectors, but rather perform the whole SFSA feature selection on all
benign short messages and SIMM messages known in April 2012, October 2012, April
2013, and October 2013, respectively. The computed feature vector is then reused for
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Figure 5.7: Times required for (a) training and (b) classification per classifier.
classification of SIMM messages revealed after this point in the past. The y-axis shows the
number of newly identified SIMM messages per month and the number of misclassified
SIMM messages from classification. Due to the nature of SIMM messages, RFs perform
quite well in the chronological evaluation. For instance, RFs trained on data available
in October 2012 can still detect the majority of new SIMM messages months after the
training. Even eighteen months later, in April 2014, the model is capable of detecting 50
out of 58 new SIMM message indicating an ACC over 86%. On the other hand, training
on more recent data leads to more accurate models. To always obtain reliable ACC, we
recommend to train a classifier on more recent data at least once every few months.
5.5 Performance
To show that all proposed classifiers are very light-weighted and can be part of the second
line of detection, we measure their performance in terms of speed. We measure the CPU
time of scikit’s functions responsible for training the model and for classification of a single
value as proposed by the python’s documentation for benchmarking algorithms [75]. All
measurements were repeated 100 times. Feature vectors and setups of classifiers were
taken from Section 5.3. The obtained results are illustrated in Figure 5.7. The y-axes depict
times needed to perform the operation. The x-axis lists the classifiers. For training, we
did not include KNN, because it does not have any training phase. It just orders given
training elements in some metric space. The times needed for training 75% of benign
and SIMM messages in the simple-cross validation are illustrated in Figure 5.7 (a) and
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span from milliseconds to several seconds. For each classifier, the training time is quite
constant.
Most classifiers evaluate unknown short messages within 0, 1 ms. Only KNN and RFs
needed more time. The decision comes after 0, 25 ms and 0, 5 ms, respectively. On the
other hand, these two yielded the best ACCs. Nevertheless, the most important fact is
that all proposed classifiers evaluate unknown short messages in less than one ms and
can, therefore, be used to detect SIMM messages in nearly real-time.
5.6 Limitations
As all tools, machine learning has its limitations too. First we discuss limitations generally
applicable to supervised machine learning and then narrow our focus in particular on
SIMM detection.
5.6.1 Limitations of Supervised Machine Learning
The very critical limitation of supervised machine learning is the dataset used for training.
Having too sparse or unbalanced training sets usually leads to a model performing well
only on a subpart of the whole classification task. Creating representative training sets is
another concern. Supervised machine learning algorithms require all training elements to
be labeled. In larger datasets, this simple restriction turns out to be laborious in practice.
Especially, if several thousands of elements have to be labeled manually.
Another critical issue is the existence of FNs and FPs. Both FNs and FPs give a false
feeling of security. Although these values, as well as FNR and FPRs, can be computed on
existing training elements while training the model, classification of unknown elements
not checking the truth values of the classified elements may lead to diametrically different
FNR and FPRs in practice (compared to FNR and FPRs computed in training). Moreover,
since classification usually has no possibility to check the truth values of classified el-
ements, it has no information on how FNR and FPRs differ from the ones empirically
experienced in training.
The most well known attacks on supervised machine learning are the mimicry [144]
and poisoning [29] attack. The idea of the mimicry attack is to mimic a chosen benign
sample in a malicious one, making the resulting mimicry sample to be a FP. Authors
of [144] claim that the mimicry attack is quite simple to implement, can be applied to
any classification algorithm, and does not necessarily depend on a particularly learned
classifier model. The poisoning attack assumes that the attacker can influence training
elements. The attacker injects specially crafted training elements leading to models
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classifying some elements as FPs or FNs. The assumption is that the attacker can inject
training elements and learns how these injected elements influence model generation.
5.6.2 Limitations of SIMM Detection
In addition to limitations of supervised machine learning, we identified five more limi-
tations occurring in our SIMM detection that do not apply to other supervised machine
learning classification tasks.
One of these limitations is the dilemma of feature selection. In our feature selection,
a single misclassified message decreases the mean ACC by 0, 000573, resulting in many
equally good feature vectors. Since the training and testing sets comprise randomly
picked elements with no consideration of hidden relations, one can only determine the
theoretically better feature vector through trial and error; running several rounds with
different training and testing sets. Alternatively, one can uncover the hidden relations.
Assuming it would be more time-efficient, we attempted isolation of hidden family
relationships. We discovered, however, that some SIMM messages have multiple family
relationships, significantly hindering our effort to isolate them. Ultimately, we determined
that the whole system of hidden relations is too complex to be run efficiently and does
not scale well with new mobile malware families. Therefore, we decided to fall back on
running several rounds with different training and testing elements. Nevertheless, the
family-based evaluation demonstrated that machine learning can partially resolve hidden
relations.
The number of features in a feature vector impacts results directly and indirectly.
Having too many features in a feature vector may lead to overfitting. Having too few
features may result in many FPs and FNs as different training data are mapped to identical
feature vectors. For instance, considering the feature vector combination of features RF2
(relative number of whitespaces), F4 (number of numerics) and F7 (number of words),
the benign short message "Ok." and the SIMM message "Baby" share the same identical
feature vector. As a consequence, regardless of the classifier, only one of the above two
short messages will be classified correctly.
In the original SFSA, the so-called nested property of SFSA prevents once selected
features from being removed afterwards. Our version of SFSA softens this property as
we select feature vectors instead of features. Still, features in once selected feature vectors
cannot be directly removed. There is only a high probability that such feature vectors will
be removed from the top list over time, and feature vectors mixing different features will
preserve until the end.
The B.1 dataset is a collection of benign MO short messages with no phone numbers
of recipients provided. Therefore, it is infeasible to guess the destination, which short
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messages were sent to premium rate services and which to users. By simply analyzing
the content, the majority of short messages seem to be sent to users. We did not find a
single indication of a premium rate service. If so, then our classifiers are trained over
MO benign messages sent to users and SIMM messages sent to regular and premium
rate phone numbers. Classification itself would be affected in the sense that many short
messages sent to benign premium services will be classified as SIMM messages. Due to
the lack of such benign short messages, we could not verify the hypothesis in more depth.
Nevertheless, we empirically tested three benign short messages sent to premium rate
services located in Germany and Netherlands. All of them contained a keyword followed
by a single word and all three were classified correctly.
The last limitation we are aware of is that all classifiers assume short messages to
be written in Latin. Non-Latin characters are represented as Unicode characters. Since
the B.1 dataset does not contain any non-Latin characters, short messages with Non-
Latin characters are more prone to be classified as SIMM messages because of the 4-digit
hexadecimal number being part of the Unicode character.
5.7 Conclusion
We discussed all steps required for successful classification of short messages into benign
and SIMM messages with the help of commonly used supervised machine learning
algorithms in detail. Specifically, we proposed twenty-five features mapping the content
of short messages to a space of potential feature vectors. The obtained feature vectors
were very close to each other, and their differences in mean ACC were minimal. As
exposed later, the main reason for so many equally good feature vectors is the similar
structure of SIMM messages in many mobile malware families. The similar structure of
SIMM messages is responsible for the outstanding separation properties of many different
feature vectors. All classifiers perform very well with mean ACCs significantly over 98%.
The best mean ACC of over 99, 36% was achieved by RFs followed by SVM-RBF. Even
training a model on SIMM messages originating from a 50% smaller subset of mobile
malware families led to a mean ACC of over 90% for all classifiers. When less mobile
malware families were involved in the training, MNB yielded significantly better results
than the other four classifiers. Chronological classification confirms that feature vectors
should be regularly updated on most recent data in order to provide the best accuracies,
but still perform acceptably if trained, e.g., only once every few months.
We estimated the performance of the various classifiers by measuring times required
for training the model and for classification of short messages. All classifiers are suitable
to be deployed alongside the 3GPPMOP sensor in 3GPP networks. The most efficient
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classifiers in terms of speed were DTs and MNB. They provide the decision within 0, 05
ms on average. SVM-LIN and SVM-RBF models followed with 0, 7 ms on average.
Finally, we discussed limitations of supervised machine learning and of our SIMM
detection. The ACC of a classifier depends on the training dataset. However, creating a
representative training dataset can be a very complex and laborious process. We learned
that an unbalanced or too sparse training dataset can easily provide a false feeling of
security. Two types of attacks that exploit this fact were discussed. Both are classifier
independent. In our SIMM detection, we face the dilemma of feature selection. We have
many equally good feature vectors. On one hand, it indicates that both sets are quite
easily separable. On the other hand, it makes it challenging to select the ultimately best
feature vector per classifier.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we showed that traffic initiated by mobile malware can be indeed de-
tected directly in mobile networks. We focused primarily on short messages initiated by
Android malware because Android malware is the most prevalent mobile malware and
because research on detection of short messages initiated by Android malware is still
underrepresented compared to detection of IP-based traffic.
Prior to introducing the architecture of the 3GPPMOP sensor we first analyzed existing
Android malware in Chapter 3. The chronological quantitative analysis of 29.574 Android
malware samples identified trends of using identifier renaming, reflection, and encryption
in a static manner. The dynamic analysis of 3.228 Android malware samples in the
highly customized Android emulator targeted samples known to send short messages.
Obtained results were visualized using social graphs and used for evaluation of detection
approaches proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The visualization revealed that only
roughly one-sixth of all samples forms single instances, i.e. mobile malware sending
a single unique short message to a single unique recipient or simple rings where mo-
bile malware sends many short messages but neither the recipient nor the keyword of
the short messages are shared with other mobile malware samples. The majority of
samples is interconnected. By examining characters found in the decompiled samples,
we experienced that all of the interconnected samples are either written using Latin
characters, Latin and Chinese characters, or Latin and Cyrillic characters. As a result, we
postulated the statement that Android malware initiating short messages can be separated
based on language geography and authors of one region do not cooperate with Android
malware authors of other regions. In addition, we estimated the number of authors for
the four most complex clusters. The number of authors behind the most complex cluster
interconnecting more than one-fifth of all analyzed samples was estimated to eleven
authors.
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We continued with the description of the 3GPPMOP architecture and its components
in Chapter 4. The 3GPPMOP sensor is a modular, lightweight, and easily maintainable
sensor deployable in the most common 3GPP networks such as GSM, UMTS, and LTE.
The 3GPPMOP sensor supports approaches detecting already known traffic in nearly
real-time. We detailed two approaches. The HSEB blacklist operates on a compressed
list of entries. The compressed list saves up to 74, 29% space compared to a classical
blacklist. Adding new entries and deleting obsolete entries in the HSEB can be done
without additional efforts. In pattern matching, we discussed patterns collected during
the dynamic analysis that may indicate traffic initiated by mobile malware. We divided
patterns into three sets based on the type of the information the malware sample is
interested in. Whereas the user-specific and device-specific patterns pointed to sensitive
information that, in general, must not strictly indicate the presence of an infected device
in the network, the malware-specific patterns provide strong evidence of an infected
device.
The core 3GPPMOP sensor interacts with components in the 3GPPMOP architecture.
These components possess resources exceeding those of the 3GPPMOP sensor, and their
detection capabilities can detect yet unknown traffic initiated by mobile malware. In
Chapter 5, we evaluated five classifiers SVM, KNN, DTs, RFs and MNB with the result
that regardless of the classifier, the SIMM messages are separable from benign short
messages. In addition, the contribution of Chapter 5 is that these classifiers are capable
of detecting yet unknown SIMM messages with a mean ACC above 90% if only 50% of
analyzed mobile malware families are known for training. The overall best classifier was
RFs. Experiments conducted with RFs revealed that a model trained on short messages
available in October 2012 correctly classifies 50 out of 58 SIMM messages gathered in the
following one year and a half. Despite these positive results, we recommend training
each classifier on more recent data as often as possible.
In the general design consideration, the user always has the possibility to check all
detected events by the 3GPPMOP sensor in the DAIMON app and whitelist them by
solving the SMS-based CAPTCHA.
6.1 Future Work and Directions
In the following, we briefly elaborate on open issues that require additional research
outside of the scope of this thesis.
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Ground Truth for Core Methods
Chapter 3 analyzed Android malware for the presence of identifier renaming, reflection,
and encryption. In the ground truth in Subsection 3.3.3, we manually checked core
methods of 456 samples and computed the accuracy for heuristics of Type I-IV detecting
the presence of identifier renaming. However, the ground truth of the core methods
returned from the preprocessing step was not evaluated. In order to verify the correctness
of the preprocessing step, it should further be investigated how well the top ten core
methods apply to Android samples of different mobile malware families. On one hand,
this would be tedious manual work as it would require not only to understand the
functionality of each family but also to identify all methods responsible for the malicious
activity in each sample upon which the ground truth is built. On the other hand, research
on core methods per malware family could help mobile malware analysts to disclose
methods involved in malicious activities more easily if some similarities with other
Android samples can be determined beforehand.
Extensions to the Chronological Quantitative Analysis
The chronological quantitative analysis in Subsection 3.3.4 shows the percentage of
Android malware gathered between October 2009 and July 2014 obfuscated by either
identifier renaming, reflection, and encryption. It could be interesting to see current
trends of Android malware samples and whether these samples employ more than one
type of identifier renaming in a single sample.
Up-to-date Dynamic Analysis
The dynamic analyses in Section 3.4 runs on two Android versions, Version 2.2 Froyo
and Version 4.2.2 Jelly Bean released in years 2010 and 2012, respectively. Since then,
several Android versions were released. In order to be able to install, run and trigger
Android malware targeting Android devices optimized for newer Android versions, the
dynamic analysis should be continuously updated. Note that the malware may behave
differently in Android versions. Therefore, we recommended to run several copies of
dynamic analyses of different Android versions in parallel as we did in the dynamic
analyzes.
Performance of the HSEB
The HSEB described in Subsection 4.4.1 is evaluated w.r.t. to the space saved compared
to a simple blacklist. By evaluating the HSEB we experienced that HSEBs with highly
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compressed lists are very efficient not only in terms of space saved but also in terms of
time required to check the compressed list. For verification that a tested entry is on the
list, the HSEB requires one additional binary add operation per entry on the list compared
to a blacklist simply comparing the tested entry with the list of entries line by line. If
we assume that CPUs usually require equally many CPU cycles for both the binary add
and comparison operations, then the HSEBs with more than 50% saved space should
outperform a simple blacklist in terms of saved space and speed. We believe that even
less saved space suffices for better performance if the tested entry is on the list; because
implicants of higher degrees representing the entries are stored on the top of the list. The
probability that the tested entry is in the first half of the compressed list is higher for
tested entries that are on the list. A formal verification of our assumption would provide
another argument for the HSEB.
Detection of IP-based Traffic Using Supervised Machine Learning
Lastly, in Chapter 5 we demonstrated that supervised machine learning classifiers can
detect yet unknown SIMM messages. However, mobile malware misuses both SMS also
IP-based traffic for communication. The SIMM detection could be complemented by
classifiers classifying IP-based traffic. Patterns commonly occurring in IP-traffic initiated
by Android malware are already listed in Subsection 4.4.2. The joint detection of IP-based
and SIMM traffic would definitely improve the detection capabilities of the 3GPPMOP
architecture.
6.2 Back to the Future
We can expect that the number of mobile devices will raise in the next few years. So
will mobile malware. The current detection approaches will increase their level of so-
phistication. As a consequence, mobile malware writers will be forced to create more
complex mobile malware. Reaction to the improved mobile malware will be even better
detection approaches and the cycle will repeat. Security researchers are already familiar
with this type of a mouse-and-cat game. However, this time, security researchers have a
decisive advantage. We are prepared; existing research groups in this domain can easily
outnumber the authors of mobile malware. Be it in expertise or in numbers.
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List of Android Malware Families
An exhausted list of all 145 mobile malware families for which we downloaded and
analyzed samples is shown below. Following abbreviations have been used: Down. and
Anal. denotes the number of downloaded and analyzed samples, respectively. I, II, III, IV,
R, E1 and E2 refer to heuristics as described in this paper. Missing values represent 0. All
data is taken from [105].
Family Name Down. Anal.
Identifier renaming
R
Encryption
I II III IV E1 E2
AccuTrack 12 12
Ackposts 436 433 395 217 6 141
Acnetdoor 1 0
Adrd 303 285 114 2 3 66 6 198
Adsms 38 37 29 6 6 25
Airpush 1.000 978 594 283 184 90
Antares 6 2 2
Arspam 2 0
AVPass 4 0
Badnews 25 24 12 2 3 2
Basebridge 834 783 723 4 3 123 61 265
BeanBot 18 18 11 2 7
Beita 3 3 2 3
BgServ 37 31 28 3 29
Biige 10 8 8
Booster 384 369 247 11 90 14 12
Boxer 1.000 971 170 18 31 205 421 4 424
Cawitt 4 2 2
Cellspy 13 7 1
Coogos 1.000 991 976 1 102 528 369
CopyCat 24 23 23 2 15 1
Cosha 153 145 138 1 32 71 38
Counterclank 1.000 999 84 855 16 68
Crosate 53 50 22 29 13
Crusewind 21 16
Dogowar 4 2 1
Dougalek 20 3 3
DroidDeluxe 22 18 14 10 9
DroidDream 457 448 381 29 171 56 206
DroidDreamLight 126 126 121 89 1 106
DroidKungFu 1.000 971 863 1 8 360 137 756
DroidSheep 17 13 2 1
Droisnake 2 2
FaceNiff 16 13 8 1 1 5
FakeAngry 763 735 567 4 22 482 99 548
FakeAV 810 800 477 259 5 514
FakeBank 346 281 98 5 54 46 75
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FakeDaum 2 2 2 1
FakeDefender 83 81 57 38 1 36
FakeDoc 976 975 893 602 654
FakeFlash 338 311 28 29 4 8
FakeInst 1.000 874 380 4 14 68 174 22 538
FakeJobOffer 3 2 2
FakeMarket 1 0
FakeMart 4 3 3
FakeNefix 23 20 12
FakeNotify 409 408 2 4 369
FakePlayer 40 14
FakePlay 106 77
FakeRegSMS 1 0 18
FakeTaoBao 71 67 4 8 12
FakeTimer 16 8
FakeUpdate 4 2 1 1
Fidall 3 2 1
Finspy 2 2 2 1 1
Fjcon 999 996 960 1 23 7 966
Flexispy 6 5 2 3 5
Fokonge 761 754 681 1 405 162 562
Foncy 8 1
Gamex 162 152 116 2 24 28 74
Geinimi 377 361 272 1 95 32 135
GGTracker 52 47 10 2 7 6
GingerBreak 428 416 302 3 258 18 270
GingerMaster 1.000 886 721 2 3 489 234 330
Godwon 10 10 4
GoldenEagle 12 11 8 4 4 2
GPspy 14 10
HippoSMS 228 221 169 49 6 87
Iconosys 162 77 38 6 28
Imlog 56 51 3 12 2
Jifake 1.000 854 427 308 375 58
JollyServ 5 5 5 2
Jsmshider 649 627 147 1 211 39 369
Kidlogger 625 15 2 2 1 1 10
KMIN 19 616 287 30 5 205
Ksapp 1.000 979 616 2 11 3 509 326 296
LeNa 12 9 3 3 8
Lien 156 152 42 93 68 79
Loicdos 1 0
Loozfon 11 5 2
Lovetrap 175 168 160 1 42 3 91
Luckycat 7 5 5
Maistealer 21 19 3 5 3 1
Mania 82 57 45 2 44 5 1
MmarketPay 506 500 222 4 267 194 236
MobileSpy 338 294 130 9 59 4 206
MobileTx 56 55 22 33
Mobinauten 35 26 2
Moghava 6 3
Monad 17 0
Nandrobox 1.000 946 925 92 83 602
Netisend 38 26 12 6 14
Nickispy 47 37 2 10 4 31
Obad 5 4 1 2
Oldboot 12 7 7 5 2
OpFake 1.000 943 457 18 9 154 374 20 781
PDAspy 3 3 2 3
Penetho 44 40 3 36 5 5
Pjapps 190 175 100 1 30 20 71
Placms 33 33 2 10 24 8
Plankton 1.000 239 60 164 9 31
Qicsomos 3 2 2
Raden 44 40 34 11 6
Repane 12 7
Roidsec 1 0
RootSmart 31 29 27 2 28
RuFraud 950 934 25 12 415 26 212 30 645
Saiva 12 12 1 10 1
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Scavir 13 13
Scipiex 1 0
SeaWeth 13 12 4 10
Skullkey 14 9 5 5 2
SMSpacem 10 7 6 6 6
SMSreg 1.000 905 620 1 2 366 63 505
SMSsniffer 6 4 4
SMSspy 1.000 881 715 24 73 28 609
Sndapps 46 43 15 2
SpamBot 265 203 148 7 21 11 16
Spitmo 33 20 6 1 2
SpyBubble 30 24 10 2 1 2 19
SpyOO 30 28 1 5 7
Ssucl 4 2 2
Steek 62 62 1 1 2 32 58
Tascudap 2 12 9 2 3 9
Tetus 16 23 6 2
TGloader 25 2
TigerBot 13 12 10 1 11
Tonclank 20 19 19 17 3
Tracer 70 27 7 4 18
TypStu 46 43 15 2
UpdtBot 337 301 146 1 1 1 90 50 86
UpdtKiller 87 87 2 45 44
Uracto 88 13 3 5 2
USBcleaver 14 2 2
Uten 312 299 233 3 160 132 79
Uxipp 35 35 1 6 28
Vdloader 1.000 994 982 353 335 404
Walkinwat 11 7 7 2
Waps 1.000 988 955 1 290 128 194
YZHC 64 61 9 1 8 49
Zeahache 1 0
ZergRush 9 4 4 3
ZertSecurity 2 2 2 2
Zitmo 78 62 31 10 6
Zsone 62 57 45 8 16
Summary 32.217 29.574 18.537 63 605 545 9.949 3.797 13.975
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APPENDIX B
Data for Confusion Matrices
The trained classifier is the RF classifier with the updated model parameters as described
in Section 5.3 and feature vector 2ab4e780.
Round TP TN FP FN TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC PRE
1 601 1133 9 2 0,9966832504 0,9921190893 0,0078809107 0,0033167496 0,9936962751 0,9852459016
2 603 1130 7 5 0,9917763158 0,9938434477 0,0061565523 0,0082236842 0,9931232092 0,9885245902
3 605 1131 5 4 0,9934318555 0,9955985915 0,0044014085 0,0065681445 0,9948424069 0,9918032787
4 604 1129 6 6 0,9901639344 0,9947136564 0,0052863436 0,0098360656 0,9931232092 0,9901639344
5 602 1129 8 6 0,9901315789 0,9929639402 0,0070360598 0,0098684211 0,9919770774 0,9868852459
6 602 1129 8 6 0,9901315789 0,9929639402 0,0070360598 0,0098684211 0,9919770774 0,9868852459
7 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
8 603 1126 7 9 0,9852941176 0,9938217123 0,0061782877 0,0147058824 0,9908309456 0,9885245902
9 599 1133 11 2 0,996672213 0,9903846154 0,0096153846 0,003327787 0,9925501433 0,9819672131
10 600 1132 10 3 0,9950248756 0,9912434326 0,0087565674 0,0049751244 0,9925501433 0,9836065574
11 604 1128 6 7 0,9885433715 0,9947089947 0,0052910053 0,0114566285 0,9925501433 0,9901639344
12 604 1128 6 7 0,9885433715 0,9947089947 0,0052910053 0,0114566285 0,9925501433 0,9901639344
13 602 1130 8 5 0,9917627677 0,992970123 0,007029877 0,0082372323 0,9925501433 0,9868852459
14 604 1132 6 3 0,9950576606 0,9947275923 0,0052724077 0,0049423394 0,9948424069 0,9901639344
15 604 1133 6 2 0,99669967 0,9947322212 0,0052677788 0,00330033 0,9954154728 0,9901639344
16 604 1132 6 3 0,9950576606 0,9947275923 0,0052724077 0,0049423394 0,9948424069 0,9901639344
17 602 1133 8 2 0,9966887417 0,9929886065 0,0070113935 0,0033112583 0,994269341 0,9868852459
18 605 1132 5 3 0,9950657895 0,9956024626 0,0043975374 0,0049342105 0,9954154728 0,9918032787
19 605 1129 5 6 0,9901800327 0,9955908289 0,0044091711 0,0098199673 0,9936962751 0,9918032787
20 604 1132 6 3 0,9950576606 0,9947275923 0,0052724077 0,0049423394 0,9948424069 0,9901639344
21 603 1129 7 6 0,9901477833 0,9938380282 0,0061619718 0,0098522167 0,9925501433 0,9885245902
22 604 1129 6 6 0,9901639344 0,9947136564 0,0052863436 0,0098360656 0,9931232092 0,9901639344
23 600 1130 10 5 0,9917355372 0,9912280702 0,0087719298 0,0082644628 0,9914040115 0,9836065574
24 605 1131 5 4 0,9934318555 0,9955985915 0,0044014085 0,0065681445 0,9948424069 0,9918032787
25 608 1131 2 4 0,9934640523 0,9982347749 0,0017652251 0,0065359477 0,9965616046 0,9967213115
26 603 1127 7 8 0,9869067103 0,9938271605 0,0061728395 0,0130932897 0,9914040115 0,9885245902
27 604 1133 6 2 0,99669967 0,9947322212 0,0052677788 0,00330033 0,9954154728 0,9901639344
28 599 1132 11 3 0,9950166113 0,990376203 0,009623797 0,0049833887 0,9919770774 0,9819672131
29 600 1130 10 5 0,9917355372 0,9912280702 0,0087719298 0,0082644628 0,9914040115 0,9836065574
30 605 1131 5 4 0,9934318555 0,9955985915 0,0044014085 0,0065681445 0,9948424069 0,9918032787
31 602 1131 8 4 0,9933993399 0,992976295 0,007023705 0,0066006601 0,9931232092 0,9868852459
32 602 1128 8 7 0,9885057471 0,9929577465 0,0070422535 0,0114942529 0,9914040115 0,9868852459
33 600 1127 10 8 0,9868421053 0,9912049252 0,0087950748 0,0131578947 0,9896848138 0,9836065574
34 600 1133 10 2 0,9966777409 0,9912510936 0,0087489064 0,0033222591 0,9931232092 0,9836065574
35 605 1131 5 4 0,9934318555 0,9955985915 0,0044014085 0,0065681445 0,9948424069 0,9918032787
36 604 1131 6 4 0,9934210526 0,9947229551 0,0052770449 0,0065789474 0,994269341 0,9901639344
37 599 1130 11 5 0,9917218543 0,9903593339 0,0096406661 0,0082781457 0,9908309456 0,9819672131
38 604 1127 6 8 0,9869281046 0,9947043248 0,0052956752 0,0130718954 0,9919770774 0,9901639344
39 604 1129 6 6 0,9901639344 0,9947136564 0,0052863436 0,0098360656 0,9931232092 0,9901639344
40 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
41 603 1129 7 6 0,9901477833 0,9938380282 0,0061619718 0,0098522167 0,9925501433 0,9885245902
42 600 1134 10 1 0,9983361065 0,9912587413 0,0087412587 0,0016638935 0,9936962751 0,9836065574
43 605 1132 5 3 0,9950657895 0,9956024626 0,0043975374 0,0049342105 0,9954154728 0,9918032787
44 603 1133 7 2 0,9966942149 0,9938596491 0,0061403509 0,0033057851 0,9948424069 0,9885245902
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45 603 1133 7 2 0,9966942149 0,9938596491 0,0061403509 0,0033057851 0,9948424069 0,9885245902
46 598 1134 12 1 0,9983305509 0,9895287958 0,0104712042 0,0016694491 0,9925501433 0,9803278689
47 606 1131 4 4 0,993442623 0,9964757709 0,0035242291 0,006557377 0,9954154728 0,993442623
48 603 1129 7 6 0,9901477833 0,9938380282 0,0061619718 0,0098522167 0,9925501433 0,9885245902
49 605 1131 5 4 0,9934318555 0,9955985915 0,0044014085 0,0065681445 0,9948424069 0,9918032787
50 602 1129 8 6 0,9901315789 0,9929639402 0,0070360598 0,0098684211 0,9919770774 0,9868852459
51 608 1131 2 4 0,9934640523 0,9982347749 0,0017652251 0,0065359477 0,9965616046 0,9967213115
52 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
53 605 1128 5 7 0,9885620915 0,9955869373 0,0044130627 0,0114379085 0,9931232092 0,9918032787
54 604 1133 6 2 0,99669967 0,9947322212 0,0052677788 0,00330033 0,9954154728 0,9901639344
55 604 1132 6 3 0,9950576606 0,9947275923 0,0052724077 0,0049423394 0,9948424069 0,9901639344
56 603 1131 7 4 0,9934102142 0,9938488576 0,0061511424 0,0065897858 0,9936962751 0,9885245902
57 604 1129 6 6 0,9901639344 0,9947136564 0,0052863436 0,0098360656 0,9931232092 0,9901639344
58 603 1133 7 2 0,9966942149 0,9938596491 0,0061403509 0,0033057851 0,9948424069 0,9885245902
59 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
60 605 1128 5 7 0,9885620915 0,9955869373 0,0044130627 0,0114379085 0,9931232092 0,9918032787
61 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
62 604 1129 6 6 0,9901639344 0,9947136564 0,0052863436 0,0098360656 0,9931232092 0,9901639344
63 607 1131 3 4 0,9934533552 0,9973544974 0,0026455026 0,0065466448 0,9959885387 0,9950819672
64 603 1130 7 5 0,9917763158 0,9938434477 0,0061565523 0,0082236842 0,9931232092 0,9885245902
65 603 1133 7 2 0,9966942149 0,9938596491 0,0061403509 0,0033057851 0,9948424069 0,9885245902
66 606 1128 4 7 0,9885807504 0,9964664311 0,0035335689 0,0114192496 0,9936962751 0,993442623
67 605 1130 5 5 0,9918032787 0,9955947137 0,0044052863 0,0081967213 0,994269341 0,9918032787
68 603 1134 7 1 0,9983443709 0,9938650307 0,0061349693 0,0016556291 0,9954154728 0,9885245902
69 601 1132 9 3 0,9950331126 0,9921121823 0,0078878177 0,0049668874 0,9931232092 0,9852459016
70 604 1133 6 2 0,99669967 0,9947322212 0,0052677788 0,00330033 0,9954154728 0,9901639344
71 605 1132 5 3 0,9950657895 0,9956024626 0,0043975374 0,0049342105 0,9954154728 0,9918032787
72 602 1133 8 2 0,9966887417 0,9929886065 0,0070113935 0,0033112583 0,994269341 0,9868852459
73 603 1129 7 6 0,9901477833 0,9938380282 0,0061619718 0,0098522167 0,9925501433 0,9885245902
74 603 1129 7 6 0,9901477833 0,9938380282 0,0061619718 0,0098522167 0,9925501433 0,9885245902
75 600 1126 10 9 0,9852216749 0,9911971831 0,0088028169 0,0147783251 0,9891117479 0,9836065574
76 603 1132 7 3 0,995049505 0,9938542581 0,0061457419 0,004950495 0,994269341 0,9885245902
77 602 1132 8 3 0,9950413223 0,9929824561 0,0070175439 0,0049586777 0,9936962751 0,9868852459
78 604 1132 6 3 0,9950576606 0,9947275923 0,0052724077 0,0049423394 0,9948424069 0,9901639344
79 604 1133 6 2 0,99669967 0,9947322212 0,0052677788 0,00330033 0,9954154728 0,9901639344
80 602 1131 8 4 0,9933993399 0,992976295 0,007023705 0,0066006601 0,9931232092 0,9868852459
81 606 1125 4 10 0,9837662338 0,9964570416 0,0035429584 0,0162337662 0,9919770774 0,993442623
82 599 1133 11 2 0,996672213 0,9903846154 0,0096153846 0,003327787 0,9925501433 0,9819672131
83 603 1132 7 3 0,995049505 0,9938542581 0,0061457419 0,004950495 0,994269341 0,9885245902
84 602 1133 8 2 0,9966887417 0,9929886065 0,0070113935 0,0033112583 0,994269341 0,9868852459
85 603 1132 7 3 0,995049505 0,9938542581 0,0061457419 0,004950495 0,994269341 0,9885245902
86 603 1132 7 3 0,995049505 0,9938542581 0,0061457419 0,004950495 0,994269341 0,9885245902
87 603 1134 7 1 0,9983443709 0,9938650307 0,0061349693 0,0016556291 0,9954154728 0,9885245902
88 602 1131 8 4 0,9933993399 0,992976295 0,007023705 0,0066006601 0,9931232092 0,9868852459
89 604 1130 6 5 0,9917898194 0,9947183099 0,0052816901 0,0082101806 0,9936962751 0,9901639344
90 604 1131 6 4 0,9934210526 0,9947229551 0,0052770449 0,0065789474 0,994269341 0,9901639344
91 605 1130 5 5 0,9918032787 0,9955947137 0,0044052863 0,0081967213 0,994269341 0,9918032787
92 609 1127 1 8 0,9870340357 0,9991134752 0,0008865248 0,0129659643 0,9948424069 0,9983606557
93 601 1133 9 2 0,9966832504 0,9921190893 0,0078809107 0,0033167496 0,9936962751 0,9852459016
94 602 1128 8 7 0,9885057471 0,9929577465 0,0070422535 0,0114942529 0,9914040115 0,9868852459
95 603 1131 7 4 0,9934102142 0,9938488576 0,0061511424 0,0065897858 0,9936962751 0,9885245902
96 602 1133 8 2 0,9966887417 0,9929886065 0,0070113935 0,0033112583 0,994269341 0,9868852459
97 602 1129 8 6 0,9901315789 0,9929639402 0,0070360598 0,0098684211 0,9919770774 0,9868852459
98 606 1131 4 4 0,993442623 0,9964757709 0,0035242291 0,006557377 0,9954154728 0,993442623
99 602 1127 8 8 0,9868852459 0,9929515419 0,0070484581 0,0131147541 0,9908309456 0,9868852459
100 601 1133 9 2 0,9966832504 0,9921190893 0,0078809107 0,0033167496 0,9936962751 0,9852459016
603,18 1130,65 6,82 4,35 0,9928534378 0,9940079498 0,0059920502 0,0071465622 0,9935988539 0,9888196721
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List of Acronyms
1G First Generation
2G Second Generation
3G Third Generation
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
3GPPMOP 3GPP Mobile Malware Protection
4G Fourth Generation
5G Fifth Generation
AAPT Android Asset Packaging Tool
ACC Accuracy
ADB Android Debug Bridge
AOSP Android Open Source Project
APK Android Application Package
ARIB Association of Radio Industries and Businesses
ART Android Runtime
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
AT Attention
ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
AUC Area Under the Curve
AuC Authentication Center
AVD Android Virtual Device
BSC Base Station Controller
BSS Base Station Subsystem
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List of Acronyms
BTS Base Transceiver Station
CAPTCHA Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans
Apart
C2 Command and Control
CCSA China Communications Standards Association
CS-MGW Circuit-Switched Media Gateway Function
DAIMON Detection Approach in Mobile Networks
DCS Data Coding Scheme
DEX Dalvik Executable
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DT Decision Tree
EIR Equipment Identity Register
eNB Evolved Node B
EPS Evolved Packet System
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
E-UTRAN Evolved UTRAN
FN False Negative
FNR False Negative Rate
FP False Positive
FPR False Positive Rate
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
GMSC Gateway MSC
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HLR Home Location Register
HSEB Highly Space Efficient Blacklist
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List of Acronyms
HSS Home Subscriber Server
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
IBAN International Bank Account Number
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IMEI International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
KNN K-Nearest Neighbor
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MBNB Multivariate Bernoulli Naive Bayes
MCC Mobile Country Code
MME Mobility Management Entity
MoMO Mobile Malware Operator
MNB Multinomial Naive Bayes
MNC Mobile Network Code
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MO Mobile-Originating
MR Message Reference
MSC Mobile Switching Centre
MSIN Mobile Subscription Identification Number
MT Mobile Terminating
NAT Network Address Translation
NB Naive Bayes
NCD Normalized Compression Distance
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List of Acronyms
NIDS Network-based Intrusion Detection System
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology
NodeB Node B
P2P Peer-to-peer
PDN-GW Packet Data Network Gateway
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PID Protocol Identifier
PRE Precision
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RBF Radial Basis Function
RF Random Forest
RILd RIL Daemon
RNC Radio Network Controller
RNS Radio Network Sytem
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic
SAE-GW System Architecture Evolution Gateway
SCAPTCHA SMS-based CAPTCHA
SDK Software Development Kit
SEQM Space Efficient Quine-McCluskey
Serv-GW Serving Gateway
SFSA Sequential Feature Selection Algorithm
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
SIMM Short Messages Initiated by Mobile Malware
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
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List of Acronyms
SMSC SMS Service Center
SMS Short Message Service
SVM-LIN Linear SMV
SVM-RBF SMV with Radial Basis Function
SVM Support Vector Machine
TAN Transaction Authentication Number
TNR True Negative Rate
TN True Negative
TPR True Positive Rate
TP True Positive
TSDSI Telecommunications Standards Development Society India
TTA Telecommunications Technology Association
TTC Telecommunication Technology Committee
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
VLR Visitor Location Register
VP Validity Period
145

Bibliography
[1] 3GPP. Releases. http://www.3gpp.org/specifications/67-releases. 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). [Online; accessed 23-August-2016].
[2] 3GPP. Interface Protocols for the Connection of Short Message Service Centers
(SMSCs) to Short Message Entities (SMEs). TR 23.039, 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP), 2002.
[3] 3GPP. General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access. TS 23.401, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 2014.
[4] 3GPP. General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2. TS 23.060,
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 2014.
[5] 3GPP. Network architecture. TS 23.002, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP),
2014.
[6] 3GPP. 3G security; Lawful interception architecture and functions. TS 33.107, 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[7] 3GPP. Alphabets and Language-specific Information. TS 23.038, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[8] 3GPP. AT Command Set for User Equipment (UE). TS 27.007, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[9] 3GPP. Numbering, Addressing and Identification. TS 23.003, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[10] 3GPP. Point-to-Point (PP) Short Message Service (SMS) support on Mobile radio
interface. TS 24.011, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[11] 3GPP. Subscriber data management; Stage 2. TS 23.016, 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP), 2015.
[12] 3GPP. Support of Short Message Service (SMS) over generic 3GPP Internet Protocol
(IP) access; Stage 2. TS 23.204, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
[13] 3GPP. Technical Realization of Short Message Service (SMS). TS 23.040, 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 2015.
147
Bibliography
[14] 3GPP. International Mobile Equipment Identities (IMEI). TS 22.016, 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), 2016.
[15] Yousra Aafer, Wenliang Du, and Heng Yin. DroidAPIMiner: Mining API-level
Features for Robust Malware Detection in Android. In Proceedings of the 9th
International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks.
Springer International Publishing, 2013.
[16] Mary Agoyi and Devrim Seral. SMS Security: an Asymmetric Encryption Approach.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Communications.
IEEE, 2010.
[17] T. A. Almeida, José María G. Hidalgo, and Akebo Yamakami. Contributions to the
Study of SMS Spam Filtering: New Collection and Results. In Proceedings of the 11th
ACM Symposium on Document Engineering. ACM, 2011.
[18] Abdullah J. Alzahrani and Ali A. Ghorbani. Real-time Signature-based Detection
Approach for SMS Botnet. In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Annual Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust. IEEE, 2015.
[19] Iosif Androulidakis, Vasileios Vlachos, and Alexandros Papanikolaou. FIMESS:
Filtering Mobile External SMS Spam. In Proceedings of the 6th Balkan Conference in
Informatics. ACM, 2013.
[20] AppBrain. Analyze. Optimize. Get popular. www.Appbrain.com/stats. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[21] Axelle Apvrille and Ruchna Nigam. Obfuscation in Android Malware and How
to Fight Back. https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2014/
07/obfuscation-android-malware-and-how-fight-back, 2014. Virus
Bulletin. [Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[22] Daniel Arp, Michael Spreitzenbarth, Hugo Gascon, and Konrad Rieck. DREBIN:
Effective and Explainable Detection of Android Malware in Your Pocket. In
Proceedings of the 21th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.
The Internet Society, 2014.
[23] Steven Arzt, Siegfried Rasthofer, Christian Fritz, Eric Bodden, Alexandre Bartel,
Jacques Klein, Yves Le Traon, Damien Octeau, and Patrick McDaniel. Flowdroid:
Precise Context, Flow, Field, Object-Sensitive and Lifecycle-aware Taint Analysis for
Android Apps. In Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming
Language Design and Implementation. ACM, 2014.
148
Bibliography
[24] Kathy Wain Yee Au, Yi Fan Zhou, Zhen Huang, and David Lie. PScout: Analyzing
the Android Permission Specification. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2012.
[25] Arati Baliga, Jeffrey Bickford, and Neil Daswani. Triton: a carrier-based Approach
for Detecting and Mitigating Mobile Malware. Journal of Cyber Security, 3(2):1–30,
2012.
[26] Mathieu Bastian, Sebastien Heymann, and Mathieu Jacomy. Gephi: an Open
Source Software for Exploring and Manipulating Networks. In Proceedings of the
3rd International Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. The AAAI Press, 2009.
[27] Michael Becher. Security of Smartphones at the Dawn of their Ubiquitousness. Phd
thesis, University of Mannheim, Germany, 2009.
[28] Monowar H Bhuyan, Dhruba Kumar Bhattacharyya, and Jugal Kumar Kalita.
Network Anomaly Detection: Methods, Systems and Tools. IEEE Communications
Surveys and Tutorials, 16(1):303–336, 2014.
[29] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. Poisoning Attacks against Support
Vector Machines. In Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Machine
Learning. JMLR.org, 2012.
[30] Christopher M. Bishop. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. Springer-Verlag
New York, 2006. ISBN 978-0-387-31073-2.
[31] Blue Coat Systems Inc. Towelroot and Leaked Hacking Team Exploits
Used to Deliver "Dogspectus" Ransomware to Android Devices. https:
//www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2016-04-25/Android-exploit-
delivers-dogspectus-ransomware. [Online; accessed 28-April-2016].
[32] Ciaran Bradley. In Mobile Operators we Trust. http://
www.adaptiveMobile.com/blog/in-Mobile-operators-we-trust.
Adaptive Mobile. [Online; accessed 30-July-2014].
[33] Robert King Brayton, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, Curtis T. McMullen, and
Gary D. Hachtel. Logic Minimization Algorithms for VLSI Synthesis. Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1984. 978-0-898-38164-1.
[34] Leo Breiman. Random Forests. Journal of Machine Learning, 45(1):5–32, 2001.
149
Bibliography
[35] Iker Burguera, Urko Zurutuza, and Simin Nadjm-Tehrani. Crowdroid: Behavior-
based Malware Detection System for Android. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM
Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices. ACM, 2011.
[36] Liang Cai, Sridhar Machiraju, and Hao Chen. Defending against Sensor-sniffing
Attacks on Mobile Phones. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Networking,
Systems, and Applications for Mobile handhelds. ACM, 2009.
[37] Yinzhi Cao, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Manuel Egele, Christopher
Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, and Yan Chen. EdgeMiner: Automatically Detecting
Implicit Control Flow Transitions through the Android Framework. In Proceedings
of the 22nd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. The Internet
Society, 2015.
[38] CCITT. The International Public Telecommunication Numbering Plan. TS E.164,
Comité Consultatif International Téléphonique et Télégraphique (CCITT), 2011.
[39] Pulse Secure Mobile Threat Center. Mobile Threat Report.
https://www.pulsesecure.net/download/pages/2819/
PulseSecure_MobilityReport.pdf, 2016. [Online; accessed 13-July-2016].
[40] Silvio Cesare and Yang Xiang. Classification of Malware Using Structured Control
Flow. In Proceedings of the 8th Australasian Symposium on Parallel and Distributed
Computing. Australian Computer Society, 2010.
[41] Jien-Tsai Chan and Wuu Yang. Advanced Obfuscation Techniques for Java Bytecode.
Journal of Systems and Software, 71(1):1–10, 2004.
[42] Ashok K. Chandra and George Markowsky. On the Number of Prime Implicants.
Discrete Mathematics, 24(1):7–1, 1978.
[43] Girish Chandrashekar and Ferat Sahin. A Survey on Feature Selection Methods.
Journal of Computers & Electrical Engineering, 40(1):16–28, 2014.
[44] Cheetah Mobile. Busted! ’Proxy Spy’ has been Found by Cheetah Mobile After
Hiding for 2 Years. http://www.cmcm.com/blog/en/security/2015-05-
05/609.html. [Online; accessed 27-April-2016].
[45] Mike Chen, Alice X. Zheng, Jim Lloyd, Michael Jordan, Eric Brewer, et al. Failure
Diagnosis Using Decision Trees. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on
Autonomic Computing. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
150
Bibliography
[46] Tao Chen and Min-Yen Kan. Creating a Live, Public Short Message Service Corpus:
the NUS SMS Corpus. Language Resources and Evaluation, 47(2):299–335, 2013.
[47] Monojit Choudhury, Rahul Saraf, Vijit Jain, Animesh Mukherjee, Sudeshna Sarkar,
and Anupam Basu. Investigation and Modeling of the Structure of Texting
Language. International Journal of Document Analysis and Recognition, 10(3-4):157–174,
2007.
[48] Stelvio Cimato, Alfredo De Santis, and U. Ferraro Petrillo. Overcoming the
Obfuscation of Java Programs by Identifier Renaming. Journal of Systems and
Software, 78(1):60–72, 2005.
[49] Gordon V. Cormack, José María Gómez Hidalgo, and Enrique Puertas Sánz. Spam
Filtering for Short Messages. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Conference
on Information and knowledge management. ACM, 2007.
[50] Oracle Corporation. Package java.security. https://docs.oracle.com/
javase/7/docs/api/java/security/package-summary.html. [Online;
accessed 3-July-2016].
[51] Oracle Corporation. Package javax.crypto. https://docs.oracle.com/
javase/7/docs/api/javax/crypto/package-summary.htmland. [Online;
accessed 3-July-2016].
[52] Oracle Corporation. Special Methods. https://docs.oracle.com/javase/
specs/jvms/se7/html/jvms-2.html. [Online; accessed 3-July-2016].
[53] Olivier Coudert. Two-level logic Minimization: an Overview. Integration, the VLSI
journal, 17(2):97–140, 1994.
[54] Jonathan Crussell, Ryan Stevens, and Hao Chen. MAdFraud: Investigating ad fraud
in Android Applications. In Proceedings of the 12th annual International Conference on
Mobile Systems, Applications, and services. ACM, 2014.
[55] Michel R. Dagenais, Vinod K. Agarwal, and Nicholas C. Rumin. McBOOLE: a New
Procedure for Exact Logic Minimization. IEEE Transaction on Computer-Aided Design
of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 5(1):229–238, 1986.
[56] Semantic Designs. Java Source Code Obfuscator. http://www.semdesigns.com/
Products/Obfuscators/JavaObfuscator.html. [Online; accessed 11-May-
2016].
151
Bibliography
[57] Anthony Desnos. Androguard. https://code.google.com/p/androguard.
[Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[58] Android Developers. Android Lollipop. https://developer.Android.com/
about/versions/lollipop.html. [Online; accessed 6-August-2016].
[59] Android Developers. Android Studio. http://developer.Android.com/sdk/
index.html. [Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[60] Android Developers. Content Provider Basics. https://
developer.Android.com/guide/topics/providers/content-
provider-basics.html. [Online; accessed 23-August-2016].
[61] Android Developers. Intents and Intent Filters. http://
developer.Android.com/guide/components/intents-filters.html.
[Online; accessed 18-April-2016].
[62] Kanishka Dilshan. VirusTotal Public API 2.0 Implementation in Java. http://
kdkanishka.github.io/Virustotal-Public-API-V2.0-Client. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[63] Gianluca Dini, Fabio Martinelli, Andrea Saracino, and Daniele Sgandurra. MADAM:
a Multi-level Anomaly Detector for Android Malware. In Proceedings of the 6th
International Conference on Computer Network Security. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2012.
[64] Joshua J. Drake, Zach Lanier, Collin Mulliner, Pau Oliva Fora, Stephen A. Ridley,
and Georg Wicherski. Android Hacker’s Handbook. Wiley Publishing, 2014. ISBN
978-1-118-60864-7.
[65] Ken Dunham. Mobile Malware Attacks and Defenses. Syngress Publishing, 2009. ISBN
978-0-080-94919-2.
[66] Ken Dunham, Shane Hartman, Manu Quintans, Jose Andre Morales, and Tim
Strazzere. Android Malware and Analysis. Auerbach Publications, 2014. ISBN
978-1-482-25219-4.
[67] William Enck, Peter Gilbert, Seungyeop Han, Vasant Tendulkar, Byung-Gon
Chun, Landon P. Cox, Jaeyeon Jung, Patrick McDaniel, and Anmol N. Sheth.
TaintDroid: an Information-flow Tracking System for Realtime Privacy Monitoring
on Smartphones. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 32(2):5, 2014.
152
Bibliography
[68] William Enck, Machigar Ongtang, and Patrick McDaniel. On lightweight Mobile
phone Application certification. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2009.
[69] William Enck, Patrick Traynor, Patrick McDaniel, and Thomas La Porta. Exploiting
Open Functionality in SMS-capable Cellular Networks. In Proceedings of the 12th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2005.
[70] Rong-En Fan, Kai-Wei Chang, Cho-Jui Hsieh, Xiang-Rui Wang, and Chih-Jen Lin.
LIBLINEAR: a Library for Large Linear Classification. Journal of Machine Learning
Research, 9(1):1871–1874, 2008.
[71] Adrienne Porter Felt, Erika Chin, Steve Hanna, Dawn Song, and David Wagner.
Android Permissions Demystified. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2011.
[72] Adrienne Porter Felt, Serge Egelman, and David Wagner. I’ve Got 99 Problems, but
Vibration Ain’t One: a Survey of Smartphone Users’ Concerns. In Proceedings of the
2nd ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices. ACM,
2012.
[73] Adrienne Porter Felt, Matthew Finifter, Erika Chin, Steve Hanna, and David Wagner.
A Survey of Mobile Malware in the Wild. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on
Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices. ACM, 2011.
[74] Ira R. Forman and Nate Forman. Java Reflection in Action. Manning Publications
Co., 2004. ISBN 978-1-932-39418-4.
[75] Python Software Foundation. Time Access and Conversions. https://
docs.python.org/2/library/time.html. [Online; accessed 30-March-2016].
[76] Gartner. Gartner Says Worldwide Smartphone Sales Grew 3.9 Percent in First
Quarter of 2016. http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3323017. [Online;
accessed 13-July-2016].
[77] Hugo Gascon, Fabian Yamaguchi, Daniel Arp, and Konrad Rieck. Structural
Detection of Android Malware Using Embedded Call Graphs. In Proceedings of the
2013 ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. ACM, 2013.
[78] GNU. The GNU Crypto Project. https://www.gnu.org/software/gnu-
crypto. [Online; accessed 03-July-2016].
153
Bibliography
[79] José María Gómez Hidalgo, Guillermo Cajigas Bringas, Enrique Puertas Sánz, and
Francisco Carrero García. Content based SMS Spam Filtering. In Proceedings of the
6th ACM Symposium on Document Engineering. ACM, 2006.
[80] Google. Google Play. https://play.google.com. [Online; accessed 11-May-
2016].
[81] Michael Grace, Yajin Zhou, Qiang Zhang, Shihong Zou, and Xuxian Jiang.
Riskranker: Scalable and Accurate Zero-day Android Malware Detection. In
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and
Services. ACM, 2012.
[82] Josh Grunzweig. NickiSpy.C - Android Malware Analysis & Demo.
https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/NickiSpy-
C---Android-Malware-Analysis--Demo. [Online; accessed 05-May-2016].
[83] Guofei Gu, Junjie Zhang, and Wenke Lee. Botsniffer: Detecting Botnet Command
and Control Channels in Network traffic. In Proceedings of the 15th Annual Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium. The Internet Society, 2008.
[84] GuardSquare. DexGuard. http://www.saikoa.com/dexguard. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[85] Arnaud Henry-Labordère and Vincent Jonack. SMS and MMS Interworking in Mobile
Networks. Artech House, 2004. ISBN 978-1-580-53890-9.
[86] Jan Hlavicˇka and Petr Fišer. BOOM: a Heuristic Boolean Minimizer. In Proceedings of
the 20th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-aided Design. IEEE Computer
Society, 2001.
[87] Michael Hoche, Heiko Kirsch, and Marián Kühnel. Recommender System
for Security Risk Reduction - Situational Awareness for Critical Information
Infrastructures. Technical Report D4.1(II), ASMONIA consortium, 2012.
[88] Thorsten Holz, Christian Gorecki, Konrad Rieck, and Felix C. Freiling. Measuring
and Detecting Fast-Flux Service Networks. In Proceedings of the 15th Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium. The Internet Society, 2008.
[89] Yijue How and Min-Yen Kan. Optimizing Predictive Text Entry for Short Message
Service on Mobile Phones. In Proceedings of 11th International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction, 2005. [Online; accessed 05-May-2016].
154
Bibliography
[90] Nathaniel Husted and Steven Myers. Why Mobile-to-Mobile Wireless Malware
Won’t Cause a Storm. In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale
Exploits and Emergent Threats. USENIX Association, 2011.
[91] Shunichi Ishihara. A Forensic Authorship Classification in SMS Messages: a
Likelihood Ratio based Approach Using N-gram. In Proceedings of Australasian
Language Technology Association Workshop, 2011. [Online; accessed 30-May-2016].
[92] ISO. Financial Services - International Bank Account Number (IBAN) – Part 1:
Structure of the IBAN. ISO ISO 13616-1:2007, International Organization for
Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007.
[93] Tarun Kumar Jain, Dharmender Singh Kushwaha, and Arun Kumar Misra.
Optimization of the Quine-mccluskey Method for the Minimization of the Boolean
Expressions. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Autonomic and
Autonomous Systems. IEEE Computer Society, 2008.
[94] Jasypt. Java Simplified Encryption. http://www.jasypt.org. [Online; accessed
03-July-2016].
[95] Thorsten Joachims. Making large-scale svm learning practical. LS8-Report 24,
Universität Dortmund, LS VIII-Report, 1998.
[96] Heikki Kaaranen, Ari Ahtiainen, Lauri Laitinen, Siamk Naghian, and Valtteri Niemi.
UMTS Networks. John Wiley & Sons, 2001. ISBN 978-0-470-01103-4.
[97] Hyunjae Kang, Jae-wook Jang, Aziz Mohaisen, and Huy Kang Kim. Detecting and
Classifying Android Malware using Static Analysis along with Creator Information.
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2015(6):7–16, 2015.
[98] Slava M. Katz. Distribution of Content Words and Phrases in Text and Language
Modelling. Natural Language Engineering, 2(01):15–59, 1996.
[99] Marian Kühnel. 4G Network Sensor for Mobile Malware. http://
www.asmonia.de/index.php?page=22. [Online; accessed 18-July-2016].
[100] Marián Kühnel, Joerg Abendroth, and Ulrike Meyer. Social Network Analysis of
Mobile Malware Initiating SMS Messages. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop
on Security in Highly Connected IT Systems held in Conjunction with 20th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security. ACM, 2015.
155
Bibliography
[101] Marián Kühnel and Ulrike Meyer. Highly Space Efficient Blacklisting. In
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Computational Intelligence in Security
for Information Systems. Springer International Publishing, 2014.
[102] Marián Kühnel and Ulrike Meyer. 4GMOP: Mopping Malware Initiated SMS
Traffic in Mobile Networks. In Proceedings of the 16th Information Security Conference.
Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[103] Marián Kühnel and Ulrike Meyer. Applying Highly Space Efficient Blacklisting
on Mobile Malware. Logic Journal of the Interest Groug In Pure and Applied Logics,
24(6):971–981, 2016.
[104] Marián Kühnel and Ulrike Meyer. Classification of Short Messages Initiated by
Mobile Malware. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Malware Analysis
held in Conjunction with the 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security. IEEE Computer Society, 2016.
[105] Marián Kühnel, Ulrike Meyer, and Manfred Smieschek. Fast Identification of
Obfuscation and Mobile Advertising in Mobile Malware. In Proceedings of the
14th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and
Communications. IEEE Computer Society, 2015.
[106] McAfee Labs. Threats Report March 2016. http://www.mcafee.com/us/
resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-mar-2016.pdf. [Online; ac-
cessed 27-April-2016].
[107] Eric Lafortune. ProGuard. http://proguard.sourceforge.net, 2015.
[108] Patrick Lantz and Anthony Desnos. DroidBox: Android Application Sandbox.
https://www.honeynet.org/gsoc2011/slot5. [Online; accessed 11-May-
2016].
[109] Dmitry Leskov. Protect Your Java Code - Through Obfuscators and Beyond. http:
//www.excelsior-usa.com/articles/java-obfuscators.html. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[110] Charles Lever, Manos Antonakakis, Brad Reaves, Patrick Traynor, and Wenke
Lee. The Core of the Matter: Analyzing Malicious Traffic in Cellular Carriers. In
Proceedings of The 20th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.
The Internet Society, 2013.
156
Bibliography
[111] Martina Lindorfer, Matthias Neugschwandtner, Lukas Weichselbaum, Yanick
Fratantonio, Victor Van Der Veen, and Christian Platzer. Andrubis-1,000,000 Apps
Later: a View on Current Android Malware Behaviors. In Proceedings of the the 3rd
International Workshop on Building Analysis Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns
for Security, 2014.
[112] Bin Liu, Suman Nath, Ramesh Govindan, and Jie Liu. DECAF: Detecting and
Characterizing Ad Fraud in Mobile Apps. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX
Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation. USENIX Association,
2014.
[113] Benjamin Livshits, John Whaley, and Monica S. Lam. Reflection Analysis for Java.
In Proceedings of the 3rd Asian Conference on Programming Languages and Systems,
APLAS ’05, pages 139–160. Springer-Verlag, 2005. [Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[114] Lookout. BadLepricon: Bitcoin Gets the Mobile Malware Treatment in Google Play.
https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2014/04/24/badlepricon-bitcoin,
2014. [Online; accessed 20-April-2016].
[115] Bastian Manske. Analysis and Detection of Botnets Using SMS for Command and
Control Traffic on the Android Platform. Master’s thesis, RWTH Aachen University,
Germany, 2012.
[116] Philip Marquardt, Arunabh Verma, Henry Carter, and Patrick Traynor. (sp) iPhone:
Decoding Vibrations from Nearby Keyboards Using Mobile Phone Accelerometers.
In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
ACM, 2011.
[117] C. McCarty, H. R. Bernard, P. D. Killworth, G. A. Shelley, and E. C. Johnsen. Eliciting
Representative Samples of Personal Networks. Social Networks, 19(4):303–323, 1997.
[118] Edward J. Mccluskey. Minimization of Boolean Functions. The Bell System Technical
Journal, 35(6):1417–1444, 1956.
[119] Vangelis Metsis, Ion Androutsopoulos, and Georgios Paliouras. Spam Filtering
with Naive Bayes - Which Naive bayes? In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Email
and Anti-Spam. ACM, 2006.
[120] Yan Michalevsky, Dan Boneh, and Gabi Nakibly. Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech
from Gyroscope Signals. In Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Conference on Security.
USENIX Association, 2014.
157
Bibliography
[121] Collin Mulliner and Charlie Miller. Injecting SMS Messages into Smart Phones
for Security Analysis. In Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX Conference on Offensive
technologies. USENIX Association, 2009.
[122] Collin Mulliner and Jean-Pierre Seifert. Rise of the iBots: Owning a Telco Network.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software.
IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[123] Shishir Nagaraja, Prateek Mittal, Chi-Yao Hong, Matthew Caesar, and Nikita
Borisov. BotGrep: Finding P2P Bots with Structured Graph Analysis. In Proceedings
of the 19th USENIX Conference on Security. USENIX Association, 2010.
[124] Mohamed Nassar, Olivier Festor, et al. Monitoring SIP Traffic Using Support Vector
Machines. In Proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
[125] Thuy T. Nguyen and Grenville Armitage. A Survey of Techniques for Internet
Traffic Classification Using Machine Learning. IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, 10(4):56–76, 2008.
[126] Nix Spam Project. DNS-based Blacklist of NiX Spam. www.dnsbl.manitu.net.
[Online; accessed 28-March-2016].
[127] Andreas Noack. Unified Quality Measures for Clusterings, Layouts, and Orderings of
Graphs, and their Application as Software Design Criteria. Phd thesis, Brandenburg
University of Technology, Germany, 2007.
[128] Steven Nowick. The Quine-McCluskey Method. http://www.cs.columbia.edu/
~cs6861/handouts/quine-mccluskey-handout.pdf. [Online; accessed 20-
June-2016].
[129] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Consumers and Mobile
Financial Services 2016. http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/
consumers-and-Mobile-financial-services-report-201603.pdf.
[Online; accessed 12-July-2016].
[130] The Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs. https://
www.bouncycastle.org. [Online; accessed 3-July-2016].
[131] Palo Alto Networks. Novel Malware XcodeGhost Modifies
Xcode, Infects Apple iOS Apps and Hits App Store. http://
researchcenter.paloaltoNetworks.com/2015/09/novel-Malware-
158
Bibliography
xcodeghost-modifies-xcode-infects-Apple-ios-Apps-and-hits-
App-store. [Online; accessed 18-April-2016].
[132] The 5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership. 5G VISION. https://5g-
ppp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/5G-Vision-Brochure-v1.pdf.
[Online; accessed 28-March-2016].
[133] Fabian Pedregosa, Gaël Varoquaux, Alexandre Gramfort, Vincent Michel, Bertrand
Thirion, Olivier Grisel, Mathieu Blondel, Peter Prettenhofer, Ron Weiss, Vincent
Dubourg, Jake VanderPlas, Alexandre Passos, David Cournapeau, Matthieu
Brucher, Matthieu Perrot, and Edouard Duchesnay. Scikit-learn: Machine Learning
in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830, 2011.
[134] Hao Peng, Chris Gates, Bhaskar Sarma, Ninghui Li, Yuan Qi, Rahul Potharaju,
Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Ian Molloy. Using probabilistic generative models for
ranking Risks of Android Apps. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2012.
[135] Silas Santiago Lopes Pereira, José Everardo Bessa Maia, and Jorge Luiz de Castro
e Silva. A Real Time Internet Traffic Classifier Monitor. International Journal of
Computer Science & Information Technology, 6(6):23, 2014.
[136] Sebastian Poeplau, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Christopher Kruegel, and
Giovanni Vigna. Execute This! Analyzing Unsafe and Malicious Dynamic Code
Loading in Android Applications. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium. The Internet Society, 2014.
[137] Phillip A. Porras, Hassen Saidi, and Vinod Yegneswaran. An Analysis of the iKee.B
iPhone Botnet. In Proceedings of the 2nd International ICST Conference on Security and
Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
[138] Android Open Source Project. Android Interfaces and Architecture. https:
//source.Android.com/devices/#HardwareAbstractionLayer. [Online;
accessed 21-August-2016].
[139] Android Open Source Project. Welcome to the Android Open Source Project!
https://source.Android.com. [Online; accessed 18-April-2016].
[140] Willard V. Quine. The Problem of Simplifying Truth Functions. The American
Mathematical Monthly, 59(8):521–531, 1952.
159
Bibliography
[141] Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and William Enck. AppsPlayground: Automatic
Security Analysis of Smartphone Applications. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. ACM, 2013.
[142] Vaibhav Rastogi, Yan Chen, and Xuxian Jiang. Droidchameleon: Evaluating
Android Anti-Malware Against Transformation Attacks. In Proceedings of the 8th
ACM SIGSAC Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security.
ACM, 2013.
[143] Alessandro Reina, Aristide Fattori, and Lorenzo Cavallaro. A System Call-
centric Analysis and Stimulation Technique to Automatically Reconstruct Android
Malware Behaviors. In Proceedings of the 6th European Workshop on Systems Security.
ACM, 2013.
[144] Nedim Rndic and Pavel Laskov. Practical Evasion of a Learning-based Classifier: a
Case Study. In Proceedings of the 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE,
2014.
[145] Miguel Á Ruiz-Sánchez, Ernst W. Biersack, and Walid Dabbous. Survey and
Taxonomy of IP address Lookup Algorithms. IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global
Internetworking, 15(2):8–23, 2001.
[146] Connor Tumbleson Ryszard Wis´niewski. APKtool - A Tool for Reverse Engineering
Android Apk Files. http://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[147] Sherif Saad, Issa Traore, Ali Ghorbani, Bassam Sayed, David Zhao, Wei Lu, John
Felix, and Payman Hakimian. Detecting P2P Botnets through Network behavior
Analysis and machine Learning. In Proccedings of the 9th Annual International
Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust. IEEE Computer Society, 2011.
[148] Maritin Sauter. From GSM to LTE: an Introduction to Mobile Networks and Mobile
Broadband. John Wiley & Sons, 2010. ISBN 978-0-470-66711-8.
[149] Karen A. Scarfone and Peter Mell. SP 800-94. guide to intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPS). Technical report, National Institute of Standards &
Technology (NIST), 2012.
[150] Karl-Michael Schneider. On Word Frequency Information and Negative Evidence
in Naive Bayes Text Classification. In Prceedings of the 4th International Conference on
Advances in Natural Language Processing. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004.
160
Bibliography
[151] Securelist. Mobile Malware Evolution: an Overview Part 1. https:
//securelist.com/Analysis/Malware-evolution-monthly/36109/
Mobile-Malware-evolution-an-overview-part-1/. [Online; accessed
15-April-2016].
[152] Kamaldeep Singh, Sharath Chandra Guntuku, Abhishek Thakur, and Chittaranjan
Hota. Big Data Analytics Framework for Peer-to-peer Botnet Detection Using
Random Forests. Journal of Information Sciences, 278(1):488–497, 2014.
[153] Ranjeet Singh and Andy King. Partial Evaluation for Java Malware Detection. In
Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Logic-Based Program Synthesis and
Transformation. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[154] Smardec. Allatori Java Obfuscator. http://www.allatori.com. [Online;
accessed 11-May-2016].
[155] Manfred Smieschek. Genealogy of Mobile Malware Targeting the Android OS.
Master’s thesis, RWTH Aachen University, Germany, 2014.
[156] Ryan Smith and Tim Strazzere. Dragon Lady: an Investigation into the Industry
Behind the Majority of Russian-Made Malware. In CD of the 21th DEF CON Hacking
Conference, 2013. [Online; accessed 30-May-2016].
[157] Chilkat Software. Chilkat for Android. https://www.chilkatsoft.com/
chilkatAndroid.asp. [Online; accessed 03-July-2016].
[158] PreEmptive Solutions. Java Obfuscation DashO. http://www.preemptive.com/
products/dasho. [Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[159] Michael Spreitzenbarth. Mobile Phone Forensics and Mobile Malware. http:
//forensics.spreitzenbarth.de/Android-Malware. [Online; accessed 11-
May-2016].
[160] Michael Spreitzenbarth, Felix Freiling, Florian Echtler, Thomas Schreck, and
Johannes Hoffmann. Mobile-sandbox: Having a Deeper Look into Android
Applications. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing.
ACM, 2013.
[161] Statista. Distribution of Android Operating Systems Used by Android Phone
Owners in October 2015. http://www.statista.com/statistics/271774/
share-of-Android-platforms-on-Mobile-devices-with-Android-
os. [Online; accessed 30-July-2014].
161
Bibliography
[162] Statista. Number of Available Applications in the Google Play Store from December
2009 to February 2016. http://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/
number-of-available-Applications-in-the-google-play-store.
[Online; accessed 15-July-2016].
[163] Statista. Number of Available Apps in the Apple App Store from July 2008 to
June 2016. http://www.statista.com/statistics/263795/number-of-
available-Apps-in-the-Apple-App-store. [Online; accessed 15-June-
2016].
[164] Statista. Statistics and Facts about Android. http://www.statista.com/
topics/876/Android. [Online; accessed 12-July-2016].
[165] Lukas Stefanko. Android banking trojan masquerades as Flash Player and
bypasses 2FA. http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/09/Android-
trojan-targets-online-banking-users. [Online; accessed 09-May-2016].
[166] Vanja Svajcer. Sophos Mobile Security Threat Report 2014. http:
//www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/other/sophos-Mobile-
security-threat-report.pdf. [Online; accessed 11-May-2016].
[167] Lane Thames, Randal Abler, and David Keeling. Bit Vector Algorithms Enabling
High-speed and Memory-efficient Firewall Blacklisting. In Proceedings of the 47th
Annual Southeast Regional Conference. ACM, 2009.
[168] The Internet Assigned numbers authority (IANA). Service Name and Transport Pro-
tocol Port number Registry. http://www.iana.org/assignments/service-
names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml. [Online; ac-
cessed 30-January-2013].
[169] Michael Theobald, Steven M. Nowick, and Tao Wu. Espresso-hf: a Heuristic
Hazard-free Minimizer for Two-level Logic. In Proceedings of the 33rd annual Design
Automation Conference. ACM, 1996.
[170] Patrick Traynor, Michael Lin, Machigar Ongtang, Vikhyath Rao, Trent Jaeger, Patrick
McDaniel, and Thomas La Porta. On Cellular Botnets: Measuring the Impact of
Malicious Devices on a Cellular Network Core. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2009.
[171] Trend Micro Inc. Mobile Malware Mines Dogecoins and Litecoins for
Bitcoin Payout. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-
162
Bibliography
intelligence/Mobile-Malware-mines-dogecoins-and-litecoins-
for-bitcoin-payout. [Online; accessed 27-April-2016].
[172] Johannes Ullrich. DShield Global Worst Offender List. https://
feeds.dshield.org/block.txt. [Online; accessed 28-March-2016].
[173] Timothy Vidas and Nicolas Christin. Evading Android Runtime Analysis via
Sandbox Detection. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security. ACM, 2014.
[174] Timothy Vidas, Jiaqi Tan, Jay Nahata, Chaur Lih Tan, Nicolas Christin, and
Patrick Tague. A5: Automated Analysis of Adversarial Android Applications.
In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones &
Mobile Devices. ACM, 2014.
[175] VirusTotal. Free Online Virus, Malware and URL Scanner. www.virustotal.com.
[Online; accessed 30-July-2014].
[176] Wei Wang, Mikhail Istomin, and Jeffrey Bickford. Dandelion-Revealing Malicious
Groups of Interest in Large Mobile Networks. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Network and System Security. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[177] Dong-Jie Wu, Ching-Hao Mao, Te-En Wei, Hahn-Ming Lee, and Kuo-Ping Wu.
Droidmat: Android Malware Detection through Manifest and API Calls Tracing. In
Proceedings of the 7th Asia Joint Conference on Information Security. IEEE Computer
Society, 2012.
[178] Cui Xiang, Fang Binxing, Yin Lihua, Liu Xiaoyi, and Zang Tianning. Andbot:
Towards Advanced Mobile Botnets. In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on
Large-scale Exploits and Emergent Threats. USENIX Association, 2011.
[179] Rubin Xu, Hassen Saïdi, and Ross Anderson. Aurasium: Practical Policy
Enforcement for Android Applications. In Proceedings of the 21th USENIX Conference
on Security. USENIX Association, 2012.
[180] Kuldeep Yadav, Ponnurangam Kumaraguru, Atul Goyal, Ashish Gupta, and
Vinayak Naik. SMSAssassin: Crowdsourcing Driven Mobile-based System for
SMS Spam Filtering. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems and Applications. ACM, 2012.
[181] Rishi Yadav. Spark Cookbook. Packt Publishing, 2015. ISBN 978-1-783-98706-1.
163
Bibliography
[182] Zhenlong Yuan, Yongqiang Lu, Zhaoguo Wang, and Yibo Xue. Droid-sec: Deep
Learning in Android Malware Detection. In Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 28th
Conference of the Special Interest Group on Data Communication. ACM, 2014.
[183] Zelix. KlassMaster. http://www.zelix.com/klassmaster. [Online; accessed
11-May-2016].
[184] Yuanyuan Zeng, Kang G. Shin, and Xin Hu. Design of SMS Commanded-and-
controlled and P2P-structured Mobile Botnets. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM
Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. ACM, 2012.
[185] Harry Zhang. The Optimality of Naive Bayes. In Proceedings of the 17th International
Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference. AAAI Press, 2004.
[186] Min-Ling Zhang and Zhi-Hua Zhou. ML-KNN: a Lazy Learning Approach to
Multi-label Learning. Pattern recognition, 40(7):2038–2048, 2007.
[187] Wu Zhou, Yajin Zhou, Xuxian Jiang, and Peng Ning. Detecting Repackaged
Smartphone Applications in Third-party Android Marketplaces. In Proceedings of
the 2nd ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. ACM, 2012.
[188] Yajin Zhou and Xuxian Jiang. Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and
Evolution. In Proceedings of the 33th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE
Computer Society, 2012.
[189] Yajin Zhou, Zhi Wang, Wu Zhou, and Xuxian Jiang. Hey, You, Get Off of My
Market: Detecting Malicious Apps in Official and Alternative Android Markets.
In Proceedings of the 19th Network and Distributed Security Symposium. The Internet
Society, 2012.
[190] Zhichao Zhu, Guohong Cao, Sencun Zhu, Supranamaya Ranjan, and Antonio
Nucci. A Social Network based Patching Scheme for Worm Containment in Cellular
Networks. In Proceedings of the 28th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications, Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies.
IEEE Computer Society, 2009.
164
